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Foreword                   
If only corruption were confined to occasional lapses in personal integrity,
we might be able to come to terms with it. But, alas, it assumes countless
forms with multiple causes and unintended consequences, some of which are
quite severe and irreversible. Theorizing about it much resembles exploring a
complicated maze replete with dead ends and surprising turns enough to
frustrate the hardiest venturer. The quest, like so many other puzzles in the
social sciences, is to better understand ourselves, in this case, to discover why
people and organizations act counter to what they profess in public to be their
cultural ideals. What they do quite openly too belies what they claim they
hold dear in their hearts. This is not necessarily just putting themselves first
above everything else or acting purely in their own self-interest. They prize
collective survival, stability, and security even higher, and in the pursuit,
preservation and protection of these ultimate values, they act pragmatically.
They become devoted to good (in their own eyes) causes that justify (to
themselves) their use of questionable means. They come to believe in ad-
vances and innovations that get around obstructive social norms and resistant
institutions. In short, they see themselves as enlightened, not just villains, de-
ceivers, evil-doers, and immoral egoists in the eyes of others.
Theorizing about corruption, like theorizing about most things, is a haz-
ardous venture but probably even more so. It requires speculation and con-
jecture, conclusive proof based on the evidence, and universal acceptance.
Speculation can be wide of the mark. Accumulated facts can be quite decep-
tive and misleading. Universal acceptance can be impossible to achieve given
the variety of belief systems that exist at any one time. This is the case in
virtually every field of research, even in such successful disciplines as
mathematics, physics, astronomy, and medicine where the human senses
have been fortified by wondrous inventions of detection and total objectivity.
The social sciences lag so far behind these, and still lack such sophisticated
tools as the physical sciences now possess. Furthermore, the more social sci-
entists delve into human behavior, the more complications arise and the more
contradictions appear. This complexity just clutters up the picture even more.
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The virtue of theorizing is that it strives to reduce the confusion, to simplify
the evidence, to discard the obsolete and unverifiable, and to incorporate new
thinking. In fast changing times, it is important once in a while to pause and
stand back to see what has been achieved and what still needs doing to over-
come ignorance.
Of all topics, corruption is one of the most elusive despite being around
since the dawn of civilization, and is likely to persist as long as human beings
are imperfect. For much of its existence, it has been a taboo topic in polite
society because of its uncomplimentary nature. Its content has changed in
time and if anything seems to have expanded although what is known still
constitutes only a fraction of what exists. It arouses so much emotion that few
can remain as objective as they would like, as few can avoid bringing with
them their internal beliefs, and hold fast to ideas and notions based often-
times on pure speculation. If this were not enough to confuse and baffle the
best experts, the closer researchers get to specific forms of corruption the
more they resemble the parable of the blind men and the elephant, that is, by
concentrating only on one part (psychological, sociological, economical, po-
litical, religious, cultural, legal, administrative), they fail to see the whole and
thereby oversimplify. To put things in their proper perspective, they need to
step back a little and interact more with specialists in other fields.
Despite their differences, the theorists of corruption acknowledge that
they share the unavoidable ambiguity of its essence. Throughout human his-
tory, human behavior has been judged as being good or bad, right or wrong,
fair or unfair, just or unjust, beneficial or detrimental, ethical or unethical,
honest or corrupt. By corrupt, people refer to conduct that is objectionable,
conduct that they resent, deplore and disown, and those found guilty of such
conduct ought to be ashamed of themselves, ostracized, and punished if only
to deter others from indulging in like behavior. In principle, corruption is un-
acceptable, disgraceful, and a breach of social conventions. The difficulty is
that universality is rare. At its core, there has been some agreement over the
ages embodied in the Golden Rule of most religions, i.e. treat others as you
would want them to treat yourself, or, the opposite and less idealistic, don’t
do to others that you would not want them to do to you. In addition, there is
specific misconduct or misbehaviors, such as deceit, misrepresentation, mis-
appropriation, misuse of authority, and neglect of commonly accepted duties
and obligations. To this list has been added much of what is now considered
hateful, and similar unworthy acts that denote flaws of individual integrity
and trustworthiness, acts that are considered sinful, unlawful, and criminal,
altogether disreputable and offensive, by taking into account not just the act
itself but also likely motivation (self-seeking), evident consequences (disas-
trous), and probable remorse (regret coupled with offer to compensate). So
what constitutes corruption can be drawn as narrowly or widely as anyone
wishes but all of this is fair game for research. What further unites theorists is
the recognition that research into corruption is not exactly welcomed, en-
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couraged, or supported, that theorists are held at arm’s length, that their mo-
tives are suspected, and there may well be personal risks and repercussions if
they delve too deeply and reveal too much about corrupt activities.
What most divides the researchers and theorists is that too often they are
rebuffed or ignored not just by the indifferent at large but by their own soul
mates. If this were not so, there would be less room for debate and dispute
among them. Most people understand that corruption is a fact of life every-
where (and in some places even a way of life). They take it for granted
whether or not they indulge in it themselves or want to do anything about it.
Revelations come really as no surprise unless the scandals are gross and un-
suspected in which case they can be quite titillating and entertaining, but
hardly truly shocking. Otherwise, most people just shrug their shoulders and
quickly forget until the next revelation of misconduct. To do anything more
is like banging one’s head against a wall. But most theorists resent this indif-
ference. They want their findings, propositions, and recommendations to be
heeded and acted upon. They want in their heart of hearts to be influential on
a par with their counterparts in the physical sciences who no longer face the
risks of prying into matters that should not concern them as they once did.
The theorists have not given up on their ideals, no matter how strongly held
or tepid and abstract these might be. For them, reason remains authoritative.
Its purpose is not just to know things but to change them, to improve on what
exists, to demand better of human behavior, and to enhance individual integ-
rity. Keep this in mind while reading this contribution on the state of the art.
Gerald E. Caiden, Los Angeles, September, 2009

Chapter 1:
Introduction: Causes of Corruption – The Right
Question or the Right Perspective?
Gjalt de Graaf, Patrick von Maravic, and
Pieter Wagenaar  
1. Introduction
What causes corruption? Although no one would dispute how difficult that is
to answer, the question is perfectly clear. Isn’t it? Well… no. The Good
Cause is more about the question than an attempt to answer it.
A first difficulty is defining the explanandum. What do we mean by cor-
ruption? In our daily language and across the many academic disciplines that
study corruption, the definitions are numerous. The norms defining what cor-
ruption is (or integrity for that matter) vary across both societies and aca-
demic disciplines.
But more than the concept of corruption is troublesome to the question.
As stated by Caiden, Dwivedi, and Jabbra (2001: 21), ‘[j]ust as there are
many varieties of corrupt behavior, so there are multitudinous factors con-
tributing to corruption (…) So many explanations are offered that it is diffi-
cult to classify them in any systematic manner.’ Heywood (1997: 426) adds
that ‘[t]he complexity of the phenomenon makes it impossible to provide a
comprehensive account of the causes of political corruption’. Caiden,
Dwivedi, and Jabbra (2001: 21-26) list sources of corruption as psychologi-
cal, ideological, external, economic, political, socio-cultural, and technologi-
cal. But factors that contribute to corruption are, of course, not causes of cor-
ruption. ‘In sum, corruption can be attributed to almost anything (…). But
while the opportunities exist everywhere, the degree of corruption varies
widely among individuals, public agencies, administrative cultures, and geo-
graphic regions’ (Caiden/Dwivedi/Jabbra 2001: 26). Fijnaut and Huberts re-
mark: ‘Research shows that a conglomerate of social, economic, political, or-
ganizational and individual causal factors are important to explain cases of
public corruption’ (2002: 8).
More than corruption’s multiple factors make the question difficult: there
is also disagreement on what constitutes cause in scientific theory (see
Gerring 2005; Tilly 2000). We can think, for example, of a well-known, clear
corruption case and ask, why did it occur? To answer, we would first have to
ask what we want to know. Do we mean, why did the case start? If so, we are
looking for the immediate causes and circumstances of the corrupt transac-
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tions and decisions, the corrupt acts themselves. Or do we want to know why
the case continued over a period of time and in connection with other cases?
If so, we are more interested in why a specific official had the readiness to
become corrupt. Perhaps we want to know why this particular corruption case
occurred rather than not. Were there alternatives for the corrupt official(s), or
were they in some way forced to do what they did? Was corruption, given the
causes and conditions, their only course of action? This raises the debate on
determinism versus free will. Maybe we are looking for the causes of the
particular case of corruption, the issue that gets most attention in corruption
research. In this context, are we interested in the causes external to the cor-
rupt act itself? The first is the most popular in the literature – not surpris-
ingly, since social sciences usually deal with concepts (see for example
Geddes 2003; Gerring 2001; Moses/Knutsen 2007) rather than processes and
thus ‘freeze’ reality (Schinkel 2004: 8). Corruption is then studied in an ab-
stract sense, looking for the governing laws of corruption at a micro, meso or
macro level. Another possible interpretation of the why question is: are you
interested in the reasons and motives for the official(s) to become corrupt?
This brings us to an issue often raised in philosophy, that is, whether reasons
for action can or should be seen as causes of action and, if so, in what sense
can they be treated (Schinkel 2004: 8).
2. Causality and corruption
A core subject of social sciences is understanding causal relations and ex-
plaining ‘phenomena in the world of our experience’ (Hempel/Oppenheim
1948: 135), which means nothing more than answering one of the now fa-
mous ‘why’ question. The concept itself, however, is subject to debate and
throughout the history of scientific discovery highly contested (Mackie
1985). Two fundamental positions seem to divide the issue. Positivists argue
in the unitary or logical deductivist tradition of Hempel and Oppenheim: all
causes need to be understood according to ‘general laws’, be a ‘logical con-
sequence of the explanans’, and the explanans must be empirical in nature in-
sofar as they can be tested or observed (Hempel/Oppenheim 1948: 137). Plu-
ralists, on the other hand, challenge the view of ‘invariant universal[s]’ (Tilly
1995: 1597) laws and argue instead that different types of causes, which are
not necessarily commensurable, exist (Gadenne 2001: 1562). For example,
Mr. Adams, a senior civil servant, accepts a bribe because he is heavily in
debt. But he could have taken the bribe in any case, so that owing a large sum
of money was not necessary to acting in a corrupt manner. Multi-causality is
normal rather than exceptional. As the least common denominator of a defi-
nition of cause, Gerring (2005: 169) suggests defining causes as ‘events or
conditions that raise the probability of some outcome occurring’, which im-
plies a ceteris paribus condition.
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In the philosophy of causality, an epistemological and an ontological tra-
dition can be distinguished (Schinkel 2004). In the first tradition, a cause is
the coinciding of phenomena where, because the cause always precedes the
consequence, a belief exists that there is a cause (Hume 1990/1739). This
kind of causality cannot be found in any scientific theory on corruption, how-
ever, because no cause can be identified that always coincides with the con-
sequence ‘corruption’. This leads all too often to confuse correlation with
causation. Causes identified in corruption research are not assumed always to
lead to corruption. The so-called necessity criterion, often named as a crite-
rion for causation (if A is the cause of B, B must occur when A occurs) is
such a strong one that it is not used in corruption theories, which makes cor-
ruption studies not too different from other social analyses.
In the ontological tradition, causality is seen as something that actually
happened. In social science this is often hard to identify, so neither is this
very helpful in corruption research. For example, in what way does GNP or
leadership exist, and how can it cause a particular corruption case? Bourdieu
has warned against ascribing intrinsic aspects to social phenomena since it
would amount to naturalizing something that is socially constructed
(Schinkel 2004: 14). An often-noted and general problem for corruption re-
search is that individual corruption cases are rarely being studied; the identi-
fied causes, therefore, are not triggering but most often predisposing. This
makes it difficult to explain corruption.
3. Theories of the causes of corruption
Taking these remarks as a departing point, in the following chapters we will
seek to identify different theories and schools of thought and analysis (which
can but do not necessarily map to disciplines) to understand their way of con-
ceptualizing the causes of corruption. Having mentioned the problem of de-
fining the explanandum in the beginning of this chapter, which is the cause of
corruption, the remainder of this chapter focuses on the theories of the causes
of corruption. How are causes of corruption theoretically framed? Under-
standing how different theories define, conceptualize, and eventually deduce
policy recommendations will amplify our understanding of the complexity of
corruption and illustrate the spectrum of possibilities to deal with it analyti-
cally as well as practically.
Corruption is a much-debated subject in both popular and in scientific
discourses (see for example Heidenheimer/Johnston/LeVine 1989). Relevant
research from a variety of scientific disciplines by a variety of scholars has
steadily accelerated in the last decade. The economic approach (e.g. Kauf-
mann/Kraay/Zoido-Lobatón 2000; Klitgaard 1991; Lambsdorff 2007; Rose-
Ackerman 1978, 1999, 2006; Treisman 2000) is arguably the most dominant
but certainly not the only scientific discourse on corruption.
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A glance at the growing number of different scientific studies on corrup-
tion leads to more questions than answers. Confusion exists in the literature
even within specific scientific disciplines. Which anti-corruption methods
work best under what circumstances? The answer is equivocal. It seems that
the theoretical model chosen to research corruption largely determines the di-
rection of the proposed solutions. Different causal chains lead to different
discourses on corruption prevention and control. Problems with comparisons
of the different perspectives and attempts to come to an accumulated body of
knowledge are hampered by the sometimes very different theoretical under-
pinnings. Confusion starts with the perspectives using different conceptuali-
zations of corruption. Our motivations for this book stem from a need to help
clear the confusion and the hope of uncovering less prominent theories of the
causes of corruption. ‘Outmoded’ conceptions of the causes of corruption
may help amplify the analytical and policy spectra, informing parties in both
domains.
The main question of this book is: how are the causes of corruption stud-
ied? The more we know about the causes of corruption, the better we can
choose the policy instruments to combat it. The more we know about the
policy instruments (dominantly) used and recommended the more we need to
know about the underlying conceptions of the causes of corruption.
The book presents the state of the art in a comparative study of the causes
of corruption. Different authors in the field of corruption analysis from dif-
ferent schools of thought shed light on the issue of corruption from different
theoretical perspectives. Corruption is currently studied within different dis-
ciplines and from different theoretical perspectives (Alemann 2005). Crimi-
nology, sociology, philosophy, public administration, economics, political
science, history, and psychology, for example, may have within them a rather
narrow set of theories and research methods that do not communicate well
with each other. Part of the problem seems to be the different conceptual and
theoretical starting points of the disciplines, leading to a ‘dialogue of the
deaf’. By making these differences explicit, The Good Cause will further the
important project of making the different corruption discourses intelligible to
each other within academia. Obviously, certain theoretical perspectives enjoy
at a certain place and time more prominence than others. This book aims to
emphasize that (1) each theory has its strengths and weaknesses, and (2) the
most prominent or hegemonious theory in practice and academia (such as the
economics of corruption in the last twenty years) is not necessarily the ana-
lytically strongest or most useful one. Taking account of the (dis)advantages
of different theoretical perspectives, such as structural functionalist theory,
new institutional economics of corruption, criminological, postmodern, and
systems theories, and others could therefore help analysts as well as practi-
tioners be aware of the blind spots in developing policies to fight corruption
and push researchers towards interconceptual analysis. The Good Cause
takes into perspective what has been done so far in conceptualizing and em-
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pirically studying the causes of corruption and what needs to be done in the
future.
4. Academic corruption discourses
The variety of scholarly disciplines within which corruption is studied results
in several academic discourses. Hoetjes (1977), a scholar studying develop-
ment administration, distinguishes four such clusters of corruption theories:
Weberian ideal-typical, structural functionalist, institutional economics, and
ecological. Since Hoetjes’s dissertation on corruption in India, however,
other academic corruption discourses have come into being. To the four
clusters we therefore add system theoretical, institutional design, post-
positivist, and criminological perspectives. Let us briefly introduce the eight
perspectives.
1. The Weberian-idealtypical approach (see Rubinstein/von Maravić, chap-
ter 2) sees corruption as a lack of rationalization of the public service. To
its proponents it is a phase on the route from patrimonialism to rational
legal authority (Hoetjes 1977: 53-55; Hoetjes 1982: 65-67; see e.g. Ru-
binstein 1983). Loopholes exist in the not fully developed bureaucratic
system for corrupt acts to occur.
2. The structural functionalist approach (see de Zwart, chapter 3) looks at
society as a collection of coherent systems in which all societal phenom-
ena have a function. Structural functionalist-inspired scholars therefore
ask themselves which function corruption fulfills in a certain society
(Hoetjes 1977: 55-57; Hoetjes 1982: 67-69). ‘Brokerage’, for example, is
such a function when corrupt officials facilitate action between the central
and the local levels (Blockmans 1988; Campbell 1989: 334; Huiskamp
1991, 1995). Corruption can serve to tone down unduly harsh laws
(McFarlane 1996: 58-59) or provide protection and influence for social
groups with material wealth but little or no political power (Waquet 1992:
62). The most elaborate example of a structural functionalist approach to
corruption can be found in Fred Riggs’s theory of the prismatic society
(Riggs 1964).
3. Adherents of the institutional economics approach (see Rose-Ackerman,
chapter 4) see corrupt officials as rational utility maximizers who simply
take the most profitable course of action (Hoetjes 1977: 57-60; Hoetjes
1982: 69-71; Klitgaard 1991; Lambsdorff 2007; Rose-Ackerman 1978).
Rose-Ackerman says of this style of analysis, ‘[i]n a study of corruption,
one can make substantial progress with models that take tastes and values
as given and perceive individuals as rational beings attempting to further
their own self-interest in a world of scarce resources’ (Rose-Ackerman
1978: 4). Rose-Ackerman’s work on the causes of corruption within or-
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ganizations gives us a first idea for exploring the topic. Her conclusion is
that each organizational structure is vulnerable to exploitation by unscru-
pulous officials but the structures vary with respect to the locus of cor-
ruption (1993: 817). Rose-Ackerman argues that the structure of the bu-
reaucracy determines the discretionary power of an actor and the expected
costs of accepting a bribe (1993: 803). As new forms of administrative
systems emerge, the question of where to identify potential risks of cor-
ruption in the systems is relevant to a better understanding of the situa-
tion. The institutional economics approach consists of several sub-
theories and -streams such as rent-seeking and transaction cost theory
(e.g. Lambsdorff 2002a, b).
4. The ecological approach involves combining micro, meso, and macro
levels of corruption research. Mackie’s (1985) INUS (Insufficient but
Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient) conditions play an im-
portant role in this approach. Huberts introduces a similar concept in the
multi-approach (see Huberts, chapter 9).
5. System theory is Niklas Luhmann’s (cf. Brans/Rossbach 1997) approach
to corruption (see Hiller, chapter 5). Society is divided into separate, self-
referential, autopoietic value systems. Corruption results from overlap-
ping systems, for instance, when values from the economic system pene-
trate the legal or political system (Luhmann 1995a), resulting in the abuse
of another system’s logic (‘Sinnlogik’; Hiller 2005: 61).
6. Adherents of the institutional design of political systems (e.g. Ger-
ring/Thacker 2004; Johnston 2005; Kunicova/Rose-Ackerman 2005; Ma-
now 2005) approach believe that institutions shape behavior and that
therefore some political systems are more prone to corruption than others
(see Peters, chapter 6).1 The study of the link between political institu-
tions and ergo-political governance arrangements and corruption empha-
sizes the different impact of types of political systems. The core theoreti-
cal concept is grounded in the assumption of political competition, which
                                                          
1 Unlike interest-based theories, neo-institutional theories emphasize the embeddedness of in-
dividual preferences and action in collective social settings (DiMaggio/Powell 1991: 11;
Goodin 1996: 7). Individual behavior is shaped by rules, symbols, routines, norms, scripts,
and templates (Hall/Taylor 1996: 15). Institutions therefore make behavior predictable by
mitigating ambiguity and unpredictability in complex and dynamic social settings
(March/Olsen 1989: 22-24). Actors follow rules they consider legitimate, i.e., those that
have a shared understanding of what is right, true, reasonable, and good. Seeking identity or
fulfilling the expectations and obligations “encapsulated in a role” (March/Olsen 2006: 689)
is a central element in this theory. Instead of calculating the net benefit of alternative op-
tions, conformity or the logic of appropriateness explains decisions. Not consequence, like-
lihood, or value matter but “criteria of similarity and congruence” (March/Olsen 2006: 690).
To act appropriately simply means to act in accordance with institutionalized practices of a
collective. Corruption or deviance from accepted norms and standards occurs when institu-
tions do not fulfill this “sense-making” function and therefore create uncertainty and disor-
der; the “aggregative” institution (March/Olsen 1989: 118, 137) itself starts to propagate to
maximize the net benefit of alternative options.
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emphasizes the ideal of elections as sufficient means of control and ac-
countability. Such an analytical perspective seeks to explore disparate
causal mechanisms such as openness and transparency, party competition,
decision-making rules, or collective action problems. It often tries to ex-
plain political corruption with deficits of competition. Are parliamentary
democracies more prone to corruption than presidential ones, or do uni-
tary systems lead to lower levels of corruption than federal systems?
7. The post-positivist approach focuses on how corruption is socially con-
structed (de Graaf/Wagenaar/Hoenderboom, chapter 7). The American
political scientist Michael Johnston has defined corruption as ‘the abuse,
according to the legal or social standards constituting a society’s system
of public order, of a public role or resource for private benefit’ (Johnston
1996: 331-334). He invites us to investigate how the content of notions of
abuse, public role, and private benefit are contested in specific places and
at specific times. Johnston is interested in finding out how clashes over
the boundaries between public and private, politics and administration, in-
stitutions and sources of power, state and society, private and collective
interests, and the allocative limits of the market develop, because it is
precisely during such conflicts that concepts such as integrity and corrup-
tion acquire their meaning (Johnston 1996). From such a cultural or con-
structivist perspective, corruption manifests as a specific type of social
relationship. Its social meaning must be understood with reference to its
social setting (Sissener 2001). Consequently, the meaning of deviancy
varies from society to society and throughout history. There is neither a
universal understanding of corruption (or nepotism or deviancy) nor are
the phenomena grounded in the dark side of humans. Instead they repre-
sent social mechanisms to achieve solidarity between and within kinship
groups (Tänzler 2007). According to this understanding, focusing on the
perceptions of corruption reveals the social construction of reality. Em-
pirical research therefore emphasizes the importance of narratives and ar-
guments in understanding the subjective perspective of reality.
8. Those who take the criminological approach (Huisman/Vande Walle,
chapter 8) are interested in individual corrupt officials and apply crimi-
nological theories to them. De Graaf and Huberts (2008) studied ten
Dutch corruption cases and drew attention to the importance of the psy-
chological make-up of the perpetrators involved. Corrupt officials in the
Netherlands, it turns out, are often highly popular with their colleagues
because of their openness and flair, and especially their ability to ‘get
things done’. They are usually males, whose orientation to problem solv-
ing rather than problem creating tends to make them valuable to their or-
ganizations. Yet it is precisely their unorthodox, results-oriented mode of
operation that makes them cross the thin line between laudable and lam-
entable behavior.
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The Good Cause is structured to allow the variously schooled authors to in-
troduce you to their particular perspectives. They discuss the definition and
models used within them, give examples of empirical studies, describe their
research methods (for example, quantitative or qualitative), and evaluate their
inherent strengths and weaknesses. Last, the authors review the perspectives’
empirical insights to show what they add to the discussion at hand: the ques-
tion of what causes corruption.
Chapter 2:
Max Weber, Bureaucracy, and Corruption    
William D. Rubinstein and Patrick von Maravic   
1. Introduction
Max Weber (1864-1920), the great German sociologist, was probably the
most formative intellectual progenitor of the theoretical framework in which
bureaucracy has been studied and approached during the past century, and
has obvious relevance to our knowledge of corruption and corrupt practices.
It does not appear that Max Weber (1864-1920) wrote anything of a
lengthy and considered nature about corruption in modern societies; his
thoughts on this subject, in so far as they exist, appear to be contained in his
views on bureaucracy and ‘modernity’. In so far as Weber had a view of po-
litical or bureaucratic corruption, then, it is fair to term it an evolutionary
one: corruption was the hallmark of an earlier, more ‘primitive’ stage of soci-
ety, and would eventually vanish with the triumph of a professionalized bu-
reaucracy. Weber’s implicit views on corruption are chiefly contained in his
writings on bureaucracy (Weber 1922) and, to a lesser extent, in his writings
on the ‘vocation’ of politicians (Weber 1948).
Although Weber for the most part insinuates the notions of corruption and
favouritism, the conceptual and empirical implications arising thereof will most
certainly pique the interest of a student of corruption analysis. To trace the dis-
tinct Weberian perspective, our first section will characterize the time and Zeit-
geist of Weber’s writings in terms of nepotism and corruption in Europe and
abroad; the second will link the historical evolution of a Weberian bureaucracy
in England in the nineteenth century to cases of patronage and nepotism. And
what will we learn? First, and as will be argued in the third section, a Weberian
thinking about corruption must start with the distinction between three ideal
types of domination (traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational) that form the
basis for analysing the relationship between rulers and the ruled. Second, the
Weberian perspective on corruption offers both (1) a lens for the analysis of
systemic forms of corruption that have the character of a ‘web of reciprocities’,
where corruption and its causes are located in the wider context of a specific
form of domination and personal rulership (see Huberts, this volume); and (2) a
concept of legal-rational order that lays the foundation for an explicit under-
standing of corruption, one which has the misuse of public power for private
gain and deviance from legitimate order at its conceptual heart.
William D. Rubinstein and Patrick von Maravic22
2. Weber and his time – The Dreyfus Affair, the Panama
Canal Scandal etc.
Although Weber was well-informed on corruption in local American politics,
to a certain extent, his silence is somewhat surprising, since there were, in
Weber’s lifetime, many corruption scandals in ‘modern’ societies of which
he must have been aware. In France, the Panama Canal Scandal of 1889-92
brought the Third Republic to its knees, and is seen as paving the way for the
Dreyfus Affair a few years later. In it, 104 deputies in the French Parliament
(some sources claim 510 deputies) were accused of taking bribes to keep
quiet about the financial difficulties of DeLessup’s Panama Canal Company,
which hoped to construct the Panama Canal, eventually built by the Ameri-
cans. One of those accused of bribe-taking was Georges Clemenceau,
France’s wartime Prime Minister (Tombs 1996: 457). Some of those accused
of bribe-taking were Jewish financiers, who were singled out for attack by
the same sources on the French right as would launch the more celebrated
Dreyfus Affair three or four years later. In supposedly incorruptible Britain,
there occurred in 1912 the Marconi Scandal, in which four high-ranking
Ministers in H.H. Asquith’s Liberal government, among them future Prime
Minister David Lloyd George, were accused of what would now be termed
‘insider trading’ in shares in the British Marconi Company, just before it was
awarded a lucrative government contract for the construction of wireless in-
stallations around the British Empire. This affair became a cause célébre in
Britain at the time; the four men were acquitted of any wrongdoing by a Par-
liamentary committee which voted along partisan lines. A number of other
scandals involving government finance also occurred in Britain at this time
(Searle 2004: 434-438). But Europe’s corruption was obviously dwarfed by
that which had occurred in the United States since the end of the American
Civil War of 1861-65. American urban governments, in particular, became
virtually synonymous with political ‘bosses’ and endemic bribery and the
misappropriation of public money. Perhaps the most notorious corrupt
American urban machine politician was William M. Tweed (1813-78),
known as ‘Boss’ Tweed. He was the head of Tammany Hall, the Democratic
party’s machine’s headquarters in New York. In 1870-72, just after the Civil
War, Tweed and his allies stole a sum estimated at between $40 million and
$200 million from New York City. They typically operated by inflating the
cost of public works and pocketing most of this inflated sum. Their most no-
torious theft was that in the construction of the so-called ‘Tweed Courthouse’
in New York, which cost taxpayers $13 million, of which $10 million went
into the pockets of Tweed and his friends. Tweed himself was eventually
convicted and jailed, but this type of corruption certainly continued into the
twentieth century, with cities such as Chicago, Jersey City, St. Louis, and
Kansas City (among many others) becoming synonymous with corruption,
kickbacks, and bribery. Many of these political ‘machines’ were built on the
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votes of new non-English-speaking immigrants, who were provided with jobs
and welfare benefits in exchange for political loyalty. The endemic nature of
political corruption at the local (but not to the same extent or as blatantly at
the national) level was remarked upon by many foreign observers of the
American scene, who also noted the virtual abandonment of urban political
life by ‘respectable’ old stock elite Anglo-Saxons, and the dominance of most
urban machines by ethnic politics (See, for instance, Benson 1978: 17-88).
It is difficult to believe that someone as ubiquitously intelligent and well-
informed as Max Weber was not well aware of the extent of political corrup-
tion in many ‘modern’ societies – although Germany itself appears to have
been relatively free of such political corruption, or at least of notorious scan-
dals emerging from accusations of corruption. Perhaps this is why Weber’s
explicit and implicit critiques of corruption were apparently confined to dis-
cussions of bureaucracy rather than of the political process and elections in
‘modern’ nations. Weber held a realistic view of ‘machine politics’ in the
United States, which he toured in 1904 (Gerth/Wright Mills 1948: 14-18). He
visited such cities as Chicago and St. Louis and was fully aware of the cen-
trality of corrupt ‘machines’ to local politics, which he regarded as a neces-
sary evil. He also believed that political ‘spoils’ would necessarily diminish
with the professionalization of the civil service and of welfare provisions
(Gerth/Wright Mills 1948: 18; Weber 1948: 110-111).
In so far as Weber had a view of political or bureaucratic corruption, then,
it is fair to term it an evolutionary one: corruption was the hallmark of an
earlier, more ‘primitive’ stage of society, and would eventually vanish with
the triumph of a professionalised bureaucracy. America’s apparent exception
to this was the result of its anomalous position as a frontier society with ex-
tremely large numbers of impoverished immigrants from more ‘primitive’
societies in eastern and southern Europe, Ireland, and elsewhere, and would
also eventually vanish.
3. Weber, Bureaucracy, and Corruption: How Accurate?
A number of points ought to be made about Weber’s views on corruption.
First, it is consistent with other evolutionary views of the progress of the state
and society which appeared either at about the same time as Darwin’s theory
of evolution, or were influenced by it. In England, an analogous view to
Weber’s, at least by implication, was voiced by the famous English legal
historian Sir Henry Sumner Maine (1822-88) in his 1861 book Ancient Law.
In Maine’s famous phrase, the evolution of laws in the Western world was
‘from status to contract’, whereby law by divine authority evolved into gov-
ernance by aristocracies and then into formal law codes – a progression not
dissimilar to Weber’s celebrated ‘ideal types’ of authority (see below).
Maine’s view, as a major legal and academic authority in Victorian England
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(he was Regius Professor of Civil Law at Cambridge University), also re-
flected the hegemony of laissez-faire capitalism and of free trade, which
gained ascendancy in Britain in 1846, when the United Kingdom abolished
all, or nearly all, tariffs and the high mark of Victorian England’s prosperity
and industrial zenith were reached. It also had something in common with the
liberal ideology of Maine’s contemporary John Stuart Mill, who argued that
rationality and rational decisions could only grow out of the free and unfet-
tered exchange of ideas and opinions. Weber himself had relatives in Man-
chester who were engaged in the cotton trade, and his brand of conservative
liberalism, seldom associated with German politicians or intellectuals at this
time, was probably influenced by his affinity with England and the English-
speaking world. His ‘Protestant ethic’ theory also plainly saw an affinity
between British, American, and German Protestant capitalists, and would
perhaps implicitly deny the negative and sinister ‘special path’ to modernity
which so many historians have attributed to twentieth-century Germany, al-
beit largely because of events which occurred late in Weber’s life or, more
emphatically, after he died in 1920. Another champion of a distinctly evolu-
tionary view of human society was Karl Marx. In contrast to Weber and
British evolutionary liberals, Marx would surely not have believed that po-
litical or bureaucratic corruption would diminish and wither away in time, at
least in any capitalist society. While capitalists might well favour a system of
laws whose trajectory was from status to contract, the very nature of capital-
ist society ensured the continuation of massive and even pervasive corrup-
tion, and the example of gross corruption in the United States and elsewhere
would have come as no surprise to Marxist theorists, any more than would
attempts by government contractors to succeed through bribery or any other
improper means. A Marxist view of corruption in modern (pre-socialist) so-
cieties was distinctly less starry-eyed than a Weberian view.
Yet there is ample evidence that, broadly speaking, Weber was fairly ac-
curate in his assessment of the gradual but steady diminution in bureaucratic
corruption. This process is well illustrated in England, where a highly corrupt
government infrastructure in the eighteenth century gave way to a govern-
mental structure, and in particular a professional civil service, which were re-
nowned for their impartiality and lack of corruption or corrupt practices.
Britain during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was dominated
by a network of leading government office-holders and their close relatives
who profited enormously and deliberately from government revenue. For in-
stance, James Brydges, first Duke of Chandos (1674-1744), who was Pay-
master of the Queen’s Forces from 1705-13, made £600,000 – an astronomi-
cal sum – from taking a share of everything spent by the British government
on the military during the War of the Spanish Succession. He is regarded as
the earliest British millionaire, and was made a duke, the highest rank in the
British aristocracy. As his entry in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biogra-
phy notes, ‘public office was regarded as a legitimate source of profits’ at that
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time, far beyond an office-holder’s official salary. As late as the early nine-
teenth century, John Scott, first Earl of Eldon (1751-1838), Lord Chancellor
(i.e., head of the British judiciary and a member of the Cabinet) in 1801-06
and 1807-27, amassed a fortune of at least £700,000 (around £70 million to-
day) by receiving a percentage of all the legal fees coming through England’s
superior courts, far beyond his official salary. The period in British history
down to the ‘Age of Reform’ in c1800-35 was marked by what is often
termed ‘Old Corruption’, with vast perquisites and salaries coming to fortu-
nate office-holders, often closely connected with the British aristocracy, often
for holding positions with no duties and which were often absurd in nature.
For instance, in the 1820s Lord Auckland, an aristocratic landowner, received
a salary of £1400 per annum (about £140,000 today) as ‘Vendue-Master at
Demerara’, in British Guiana, ‘where he had never been,’ as one radical critic
noted, and another £1900 per annum as ‘Auditor to Greenwich Hospital’ for,
in the words of this radical ‘doing nothing.’ (Rubinstein 1987: 275). Hun-
dreds of similar examples existed at the time.
All of the historical evidence suggests that this world of ‘Old Corruption’
was thoroughly reformed by the 1840s, so that virtually nothing was left of it
by the mid-Victorian period. A major landmark along the way was the
Trevelyan-Northcote Report of 1853, named for the politician and senior
civil servant who wrote it, which deliberately attempted to stamp out patron-
age in the British civil service, and recruit future civil servants through ex-
aminations. Its recommendations were enacted in stages between 1855 and
1870. It also became absolutely obligatory by that time that political office-
holders such as Cabinet Ministers not profit in any way from their offices be-
yond their official salaries. By 1860 at the very latest, the kind of gross
profiteering from office made by the Duke of Chandos or Lord Eldon had be-
come illegal. In fact (and notwithstanding the Marconi Scandal and other
such rare events), no British Cabinet minister has ever been known to profit
from corrupt practices: certainly none has ever been prosecuted, or become
notorious for such behaviour. The nearest to an exception was probably
David Lloyd George, Prime Minister 1916-22, who allegedly built up a per-
sonal fortune through the sale of honours (titles of nobility and knighthoods)
just after the First World War. To be sure, many British Cabinet ministers
have profited indirectly from their offices, especially during the past forty
years or so, by gaining lucrative directorships after leaving office, from
writing well-paid memoirs, or (in the case of Prime Ministers) embarking on
lucrative lecture tours, but as a rule these have occurred after retirement from
office. Just as remarkably, British civil servants appear to be unusually hon-
est, and it actually very difficult – perhaps impossible – to point to more than
a handful of occasions when civil servants profited illegally from their posts
beyond their official salaries. This generalisation is also true of British ad-
ministrators throughout the Empire, when it existed. Obviously, it is entirely
possible that some dishonest civil servants ‘got away with it’, and some as-
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pects of local politics in Britain, especially in cities where one party is per-
manently likely to be elected, are known for their corrupt practices, at least in
a minor way. Nevertheless, the British governmental and civil service ad-
ministrative structures do appear to have evolved, from c1800-1900, in a
way consistent with the Weberian type bureaucracy (see below). There are a
number of reasons for this which may have been peculiar to Britain. Most
Cabinet ministers of this period and virtually all civil servants were educated
at a British ‘public school’ and at Oxford or Cambridge universities, and ab-
sorbed the ‘gentlemanly’ code instilled there. Many Cabinet ministers were
very wealthy, and did not need to engage in corrupt practices when these be-
came illegal. The official system of auditing of accounts, Parliamentary over-
sight, a free press, and an articulate Opposition made corrupt behaviour very
difficult, especially on a large scale, with the penalties for being caught very
severe, both in terms of long prison sentences and notoriety for the offender
and his family in ‘Society’. Administrative civil servants, although generally
drawn from the lower part of the middle class, were reasonably well paid to
start with and very well paid in senior positions. They enjoyed lifetime tenure
and could look forward to an honour such as a knighthood upon retiring, and
a generous pension. Few were prepared to sacrifice this for the rewards of
petty or even large-sale corrupt practices. It is a fact that no, or virtually no,
such scandal ever occurred in Britain.
British political behaviour was also reformed in a way consistent with
Weber’s theories. Eighteenth century politics in Britain was marked by wide-
spread corruption and bribery, with only small numbers of adult males having
the vote, and thus readily open to various forms of payment in exchange for
their votes, elections being held in public rather than being secret. Defenders
of this situation justified it as indicative of ‘British liberties’: as the famous
historian Sir Lewis Namier put it, ‘No one bribes when he can bully’. These
practices, too, gradually disappeared in the nineteenth century with, for in-
stance, the secret ballot being introduced in 1882 and virtually all adult males
given the vote by 1884, the open briber of voters then being both illegal and
prohibitively expensive.
The Weberian trajectory of Britain, from widespread corruption to the ap-
parent near-complete absence of it, might or might not have occurred else-
where. The violent revolutions experienced in modern Europe, and the pre-
1789 traditions of powerful autocratic royal or noble rule, were quite differ-
ent from the relatively peaceful evolution of Britain’s institutions. Yet Weber
clearly believed that the German bureaucracy of his time exhibited the char-
acteristic of freedom from corruption depicted in his conception of a legal-
rational bureaucracy. Broadly speaking, Weber appears to be correct, at least
in his depiction of the bureaucracies and, less emphatically, the state struc-
tures of advanced, ‘modern’ nations. All international indices of corruption in
the contemporary world invariably show that the least corrupt nations and bu-
reaucracies have the most advanced socio-economic statistics and statistical
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indicators, in terms of literacy and levels of education, high per capita in-
comes, urbanisation, welfare provisions, a free press and media, and so on. It
is, overwhelmingly, Third World nation-states, especially in Africa and the
Arab world, which are found to be the most corrupt, and also score lowest on
most indices of ‘modernisation’. This may seem self-evident, but, as noted in
the British case, Western nations are not necessarily free from even gross
corruption at relatively ‘advanced’ stages of their development.
Many observers would, however, claim that Weber was being far too san-
guine and optimistic in his assessment of the absence of corruption in ‘mod-
ern’ bureaucracies and state structures. Certainly innumerable examples of
corruption, in some cases (such as Italy) reaching to the highest officials in
the land, have been alleged or proven in recent decades in advanced Western
societies, while corruption at all levels is apparently endemic throughout
much of the Third World. Many factors have become evident since Weber
lived and wrote – he died at the age of only fifty-six in 1920 – which were
not apparent then, and particularly during the past thirty or forty years. These
include the phenomenal increase in wealth and incomes among the rich in the
age of ‘globalisation’; the vast size of state bureaucracies, with their vast
contracts for military and civilian works; and universal independence granted
to Third World and non-Western societies, often rich in natural resources,
whose leader and state bureaucracies either entirely lack the Western tradi-
tions of immunity from corruption or, indeed, represent societies where brib-
ery and gift-giving are the norm. Weber also lived before the era of highly
‘professional’ international organised crime rings and money-laundering, or
the ability to transfer illegal or semi-legal funds to international and anony-
mous banking centres and tax havens. In societies such as post-Communist
Russia, the very era since the end of the Soviet Union in 1989-91 is often
termed that of the ‘republic of oligarchs’, where incredibly vast fortunes have
been made almost overnight, often through violent and corrupt means, in a
society where total state control of the economy was the invariable rule for
nearly seventy-five years. Yet even in Russia, the past few years have appar-
ently seen a more settled, orderly, and legalistic state apparatus than was the
case a few years ago. For all of what might be termed its wishful thinking and
unreality, Max Weber’s depiction of evolutionary trends and norms, at least
in the European and Western world, appears to have considerable merit and
accuracy.
Weber’s broader views on bureaucracy and rationality are, however, cer-
tainly not unproblematic insofar as he has attempted to link the two as a vir-
tually inevitable evolutionary process. While many Western bureaucracies
have seemingly eschewed the grosser forms of corruption, they have also, at
least in some political milieus, been complicit in far worse crimes and prac-
tices. The ease with which the German bureaucracy and civil service of the
Wilhelmine and Weimar periods became vehicles for enacting Nazi atrocities
and criminality is notorious, while bureaucracies in other totalitarian regimes,
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including the Soviet Union and its satellites, have also similarly acted as rub-
ber stamps for the enormities of their governments. Indeed, there seems to be
a general rule that bureaucrats will avoid personal corruption far more readily
than they will avoid the crimes against humanity, including mass murder,
carried out by their governments. There are a number of reasons for this. Per-
sonal corruption can often be readily identified and punished, while coopera-
tion in government-sanctioned programmes of persecution or invasion are
rewarded; the very ambiance of totalitarian societies, and especially, perhaps,
their bureaucracies, is wholly unsympathetic to personal dissent; even if a bu-
reaucrat is personally opposed to a governmental policy, he has the excuse of
the necessity to obey orders and of deferring to higher authority. It may be
that (as Namier suggested) personal corruption is tolerated, at least in the
West, in societies with some degree of personal liberty and economic free-
dom, while unquestioning obedience is the invariable rule in totalitarian so-
cieties, whether to the state or in the slightest toleration of corrupt practices
initiated from below or outside the state apparatus.
4. Analyzing Corruption in a Weberian Style?
The preceding historical perspective on Weber’s work establishes his aware-
ness of nepotism and corruption. Indeed, patronage and favouritism were of-
ten regarded as normal. The rise of bureaucracy in England, Prussia, the
United States, and France (Silberman 1993) paved separate paths for public
versus private life, and within the former arose an understanding of corrupt
behaviour in government. The remaining sections will inspect the conceptual
side of Weber’s recognition of corruption and illustrate how his ideas are use-
ful to modern societies.
Weber was interested in how legitimate political and economic order is
created and maintained. His work illustrated how a society effectively re-
strains certain forms of behaviour and encourages others (Scott 1972: 16).
His main focus was on social relationships between, for example, the ruler
and the ruled, how they relate to each other, and how they form an under-
standing of legitimate order. Stable social relationships are explained by the
perception of legitimate order, which guides behaviour and makes it predict-
able. Legitimate and stable order is therefore based on the existence of formal
and informal rules. It is not accounted for by actors’ interests or habits so
much as it is by the acceptance of social regulatory systems. Obedience
within different systems of domination in Weber’s view is therefore firmly
linked to perceptions of legitimacy. For Weber it was clear that societies
change and progress by the process of rationalization, which in turn can
change the sources of legitimacy as well as create friction. His wide-ranging
comparative and historical approach to different types of legitimate political
order, and his writings on the operating modes and administrative arrange-
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ments by which rulers exert authority (Eisenstadt 1959; Fry/Raadschelders
2008; Schröter 2007; Weber 1972) have been extremely influential on social
scientists when thinking about different types of legitimate order.
A Weberian thinking about corruption begins with the distinction between
his ideal types of domination: traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational. The
three form the basis for the analysis of the relationship between the rulers and
the ruled. Briefly said, under traditional rule everything is set in its place;
power is inherited within a clan structure that often forms a centuries-long
dynasty. All members know their places and what is expected of them.
Charismatic societies rely on one great leader or set of cooperative leaders
whose (often brilliant) tenure is terminated only by death. Examples are
founders of religious movements, military leaders, and popular party politi-
cians. Charismatic authority often goes hand in hand with a mission, a prom-
ise of salvation, or an explicit ideology – ends that are not important to the
patrimonial type of rule. People obey charismatic leaders because they firmly
believe in the leaders’ magical power or are drawn to their exceptional per-
sonal attributes (Weber 1972: 221-225), but the dependence on a single per-
son and his or her charisma makes it a fragile type of rule. In contrast, (bu-
reaucratic) power in legal-rational rule is exerted on the basis of clear rules
whereby the ends justify the means of execution. The instrument is run by
competent, trustworthy experts and is guaranteed by professional self-
governance ruled by meritocracy.
Charismatic domination does not seem to offer a discrete perspective on
corruption because elements of patronage can be a strategic part of this type
of domination as well. The most fruitful distinction for the analysis of cor-
ruption derives from the traditional and legal-rational types of domination.
The two types offer a conceptual departing point for an analytical distinction
between (1) a public-office-based definition of corruption as the misuse of
public office for private gain (Gardiner 2005; Nye 1967: 419) under legal-
rational rule, and (2) a favouritism-based definition of corruption that forms
an inherent part of a patrimonial ‘strategy of rulership’ (Roth 1968: 197) to
win personal loyalties by distributing material rewards (commonly known as
nepotism (family) or patronage (friends)). In defining the public official’s
role within the legal-rational system of a bureaucracy, Weber emphasized the
contrasts to common practices in so-called pre-bureaucratic systems, the most
important of which is traditional domination. Jacob van Klaederen, for exam-
ple, has described the Inca society as patrimonial, in which a ruler ‘legiti-
mately’ engages in a self-centred distribution and acquisition of resources.
This type of behaviour must be considered a genuine strategy of personal rul-
ership that no one would challenge as corrupt in the legal-rational sense; it
legitimately establishes order in a hierarchical society (van Klaveren 2005:
83). All too often Weber’s work has been associated with the public-office
definition of corruption rather than the favouritism-based one, despite the fact
that the latter offers a compelling additional perspective for the analysis of
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patrimonial types of corruption in modern states. Unfortunately, it has been
mostly applied to developing countries, which are generally conceived as tra-
ditional societies (e.g. Médard 2005). This undermines the heuristic useful-
ness of Weber’s ideal types for the analysis of modern societies.
Weber’s types of domination are also too often understood as precise de-
scriptions of reality, which is a misinterpretation. They are ideal, not real;
they are neither descriptions of reality nor representations of a normatively
desirable state. There are various ways to describe their usefulness: (1) they
distinguish and delineate social phenomena by describing their core elements,
(2) they serve as an analytical tool of counterfactual thinking to discern the
important elements of a phenomena within a vast sea of empirical facts, (3)
they are idea constructs that help put the chaos of social reality in order
(Rossi 1987), (4) and they can be a measure of empirical deviation from the
ideal in comparative studies (Eliaeson 2000). Conceptually they are pure; in
reality, they usually occur in mixtures (Weber 1922: 45). The categories of
domination should therefore be independent of other distinctions; think, for
example, of classical distinctions in political science between democracy,
authoritarianism, and totalitarianism. Within each of the latter the legitimacy
of a ruler can be based on one or another type of domination. Weber was
critical of the notion that bureaucracy and democracy were two sides of the
same coin, and showed, for example, that feudal lords used the technique of
bureaucracy to govern (see Weber 1922: 36). Without blurring the conceptual
difference between democratic and authoritarian regimes, Weber’s ideal
types allow us to recognize the common elements within them.
4.1 Favouritism, Personal Rulership, and Web of Reciprocities
The belief in the sanctity of tradition, heritage, and customs forms the basis
of patrimonial domination, in which the succession of rulers is determined by
birth, clan membership, and personal loyalty. Rather than abstract definitions
of merit or certificates of education leaders are recruited on the basis of per-
sonal relationships (Weber 1972: 219-221).
Guenther Roth’s work on recently decolonized countries opens a con-
ceptual pathway from Weber’s work to an analysis of corruption in modern
states. Roth reconsiders Weber’s concept of patrimonial rulership and ob-
serves that in many decolonized states ‘traditionalist legitimacy has disinte-
grated’ (Roth 1968: 194) and that Weber’s sociology of Herrschaft (domi-
nance) deals not only with ‘beliefs in legitimacy but also with the actual
operating modes and administrative arrangements by which rulers ‘govern’,
not just ‘rule’’ (Roth 1968: 195). Roth argues against a narrow interpretation
of patrimonialism anchored solely in the ideas of tradition and hereditary
succession. Instead he suggests using ‘personal rulership’ as a subcategory of
patrimonialism. Here, personal loyalty does ‘not require any belief in the
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ruler’s unique personal qualification, but is inextricably linked to material in-
centives and rewards’ (Roth 1968: 196). Roth’s modernization of Weber’s
patrimonial rule offers an opportunity to ‘transcend[s] the dichotomy of tra-
dition and modernity’ (Roth 1968: 197) and the concept can therefore be used
for contemporary regimes.
In a Weberian-Rothian perspective, corruption must therefore be more
broadly seen as a strategy to exert power and influence people through ‘con-
nections [and] favouritism’, as Roth has shown in ‘Personal Rulership, Pa-
trimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States’ (Roth 1968: 203). This
favouritism-based perspective teaches us that corruption can be viewed not as
a singular individual failure but as a coherent strategy to achieve obedience
and regime stability with favouritism having ‘a logic and rules of its own’
(Eilbaum 2006: 4).
Because a public-private distinction is non-existent, patrimonial rulers
consider ‘the state’ – or everything they have control over – as a means to
maximize their personal profit. Weber described the office at the time of the
Middles Ages as a source for extracting private rents (‘ausbeutbaren Renten-
und Sportelquelle’ (Weber 1922: 14, 18-19). This extends to the office-
holder’s staff as they extract rents from the office and consider it their prop-
erty. It is not, of course, a static situation: a patrimonial ruler is in permanent
struggle with his staff over ultimate control, using favouritism as the means
to it (Roth 1968: 195). Guenther Roth observed this typical form of personal
rulership as an ‘ineradicable component of the public and private bureaucra-
cies of highly industrialized countries’ (Roth 1968: 196), noting especially
‘old urban machines’ such as Chicago or Detroit:
‘The old urban machines are a familiar example. They had, of course, some kind of tradi-
tionalist legitimation because of the immigrants’ Old World ties, but they functioned pri-
marily on the basis of personal loyalty – plebeian, not feudal – and material reward; offices
were distributed by a noncharismatic and nonbureaucratic ruler, and occupying them
amounted to holding a benefice. The boss might have had great power, but his legitimacy
was precarious; thus he had little authority and had to envelop his ‘clients’ in an intricate
web of reciprocities’ (Roth 1968: 198).
The ruler distributes favours by either selling or giving ‘jobs’, ‘benefices’ or
‘offices’ that may be used partly for personal gain but demand loyalty to the
ruler throughout their tenure. This ‘web of reciprocities’, as Roth termed it,
obliges the ruler and the ruled to be co-dependent. In the case of ‘machine
politics’ political coalitions use their influence to reward supporters with
public goods, a well-known reflex phenomenon of political parties after an
election victory (Krebs 2005). J.C. Scott argues that this type of political
‘machine’ aims at the ‘political consolidation of the beneficiaries of the pa-
tronage and graft system’ (Scott 1969: 63) and points out that it cannot at-
tribute for more the random or sporadic forms of corruption that often occur
in administrative systems. Taking this point seriously means that not all
forms of corruption fall under personal rulership or machine politics, and that
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the Rothian perspective emphasizes a more stable and systemic form of fa-
vouritism-based corruption whose practices are not considered illegitimate
and ultimately contribute to the stability of the system.
Nicolás Eilbaum seemed to have this in mind when he employed the con-
cept to research corruption in Argentina. He demonstrated that the Menem
administration was stable and illegitimate at the same time, despite the lack
of charisma and rationality (Eilbaum 2006).
‘Corruption can thus be made sense of as part of the government’s pursuit of stability in a
context where no source of legitimacy was available … [It is] inherent to a political regime
where rulership is supported by the personalized distribution of resources, insofar as no
other bases of domination exist’ (Eilbaum 2006: 6).
4.2 Legal-Rational Rule, Corruption, Deviance from Legitimate
Order
An explicit understanding and legally-sanctioned definition of public-office-
based corruption comes into existence with the separation of private house-
hold and public office, which occurs with the rise of a bureaucratic system.
Weber’s feudal system is characterized by the appropriation of benefices to
officeholders; the legal-rational system is dominated by an explicit rule sys-
tem that sanctions the use of public power for private means. As the ideal bu-
reaucracy is necessarily linked to the notion of legal authority, legitimacy is
based on the rule of law. This means that abstract rules are applied to par-
ticular cases, and the impersonal order is dominated by a legal code that
claims obedience from members of the organization. Corruption means there-
fore deviance from legitimate order.
The legal-rational type of domination (Weber 1972: 217-219) stands in
stark contrast to personal rulership types where belief in reason, a constitu-
tionally-regulated legislation, professional training, and efficiency do not
hold sway. Weber saw bureaucracy as the most rational instrument of exe-
cuting legal authority (Weber 1922: 24), the most efficient form of organiza-
tion yet devised by men.1 In its most advanced state the bureaucracy would
be driven sine ira ac studio, ‘without anger or jealousy’ (Weber 1922: 26), a
phrase that emphasizes its professional, impersonal, passion-free, rational
machinery. Highly trustworthy, professional experts within a system of
meritocracy are best to run the instrument. The guiding norm of bureaucratic
authority is a strict hierarchy with a clear separation of tasks and functions
                                                          
1 Despite Weber’s admiration for the rationality and efficiency of bureaucracy, he was aware
of its flaws, among them: (1) the potential for routinisation to hamper the personal develop-
ment of the organization’s members; (2) the capacity for a powerful machinery to overstep
its defined function, ignoring that bureaucracy is subject to the rule of law and not in charge
of it; and (3) an enthronement of bureaucracy such that it could be used for evil as well as
good (Weber 1922: 34-35; see also Bauman 2001).
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following the principle of division of labour. The office, with its specific du-
ties, forms the cornerstone of each organization. Moreover, the resources of
the bureaucracy are distinct from those of its members; owning the means of
administration (Weber 1922: 13) would allow the office to be sold, passed on
by heredity, or misappropriated. As summarized by Reinhard Bendix’s précis
of Weber’s views,
‘officials and other administrative employees do not own the resources necessary for the
performance of their assigned functions but they are accountable for their use of these re-
sources. Official business and private affairs, official revenue and private income are sepa-
rated … Officers cannot be appropriated by their incumbents in the sense of private prop-
erty that can be sold and inherited’ (Bendix 1960: 419).
Corruption from this perspective, although never explicitly stated by Weber,
is related in the eyes of many to deviation from formal rules and duties of a
public role for personal gain (see Heidenheimer/Johnston 2005: 77-78;
Mény/de Sousa 2001: 2824; Mungiu-Pippidi 2006; Nye 1967: 419). Many
political scientists and criminologists have stuck to a public-office centred
definition that focuses on forms of behaviour that violate legal standards. One
prominent example is the often-quoted definition of corruption by Joseph S.
Nye:
‘Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of
private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or vio-
lates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes
such behavior as bribery (use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position
of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than
merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding
uses)’ (Nye 1967: 419).
The advantage of public-office definitions is that they help to disentangle the
complexity of corruption by offering a clear heuristic. They are stable and
objective, often resembling the Penal Code (cf. Huisman/Vande Walle,
chapter 8). As critics have pointed out, however, legal norms often reflect the
ethics of a certain group and are thus socially disputable. Furthermore, they
leave room for interpretation because they relate to a tangible value system of
a specific group at a certain time (see Mény/de Sousa 2001: 2824).
With regard to the causes of public-office corruption we are not left with
an elaborated concept but Weber’s remarks in ‘The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism’, attribute corruption to individual failure, behaviour un-
worthy of true professionals and aristocrats at the bureaucratic apex (Windolf
2003: 190):
‘The impulse to acquisition, pursuit of gain, of money, of the greatest possible amount of
money, has in itself nothing to do with capitalism. This impulse exists and has existed
among waiters, physicians, coachmen, artists, prostitutes, dishonest officials, soldiers, no-
bles, crusaders, gamblers, and beggars. One may say that it has been common to all sorts
and conditions of men at all times and in all countries of the earth, wherever the objective
possibility of it is or has been given’ (Weber 2001/1904: xxxi (italics added)).
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Weber did not, however, hold the opinion that avarice or ‘unlimited greed for
gain’ (Weber 2001/1904: xxxi) was identical to capitalism but that ‘capital-
ism may even be identical with the restraint, or at least rational tempering, of
this irrational impulse’ (Weber 2001/1904: xxxi). Irrational greed is trans-
formed by the institutions of capitalism into the rational ‘pursuit of profit,
and forever renewed profit, by means of continuous, rational, capitalistic en-
terprise’ (Weber 2001/1904: xxxii). Quite analogous to Weber’s depiction of
capitalism as the rational form of profit-making in which passion, avarice,
and greed are tamed by institutions, Weber viewed bureaucracy as the legal-
rational form of executing power and repressing ‘irrational behaviour’ in a
stahlhartes Gehäuse (iron cage). The metaphor of an iron cage refers to in-
creasingly rational societies, which leave little room for personal attributes
such as passion, love, or personal feelings but are dominated by clear means-
end logics (Silberman 1993). Taken seriously, the metaphor implies that cor-
ruption occurs when the system of legal-rational dominance is not yet com-
plete; loopholes remain for the bureaucrat’s private motives. In other words,
the distinction between the private and public role is not clearly delineated,
offering a gateway for behaviour that deviates from official behaviour. The
deviant behaviour might stem from rules that are not explicit enough, subop-
timal methods of sanctioning and supervision, an inferior system of recruit-
ment, or an organizational ethos that has not been fully penetrated by the of-
ficial structure.
It would not do justice to a Weberian reasoning to restrict public office
corruption to modern bureaucracies and the ‘web of reciprocities’ to patrimo-
nial societies. As previously stated, logics and types of dominance merge and
form hybrids. Modern ‘cages of reason’ can be prone to ‘webs of reciprocity’
as well as a logic of patrimonialism. Government departments in many West-
ern democracies, for example, are staffed with officials that fulfil the criteria
of civil servants and are therefore important ingredients of the bureaucratic
rationality; they can also be occupied by political appointees who act as
transmission belts between administrative and political rationalities. Political
scientists have termed this phenomenon ‘politicization’: public officials pay
greater attention to politics and politicians are interested in ensuring that civil
servants are compatible with their own partisan and policy preferences (Pe-
ters/Pierre 2004: 1). This does not imply that patrimonialism is the immediate
consequence of politicization, but it can be a gateway for conflicts of inter-
ests and webs of reciprocities if for example staffing is influenced by party
considerations rather than merit.
5. Conclusion
The Weberian distinction between a rational-legal and a patrimonial type of
domination offers a conceptual departing point to distinguish between (1) a
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public-office based definition of corruption as the misuse of public office for
private gain under legal-rational rule, and (2) a favouritism-based definition
of corruption that forms an inherent part of a patrimonial ‘strategy of ruler-
ship’ to win personal loyalties by distributing material rewards, commonly
known as nepotism or patronage.
The favouritism-based perspective on corruption offers a lens for the
analysis of a systemic form of corruption that has the character of a ‘web of
reciprocities’: corruption and its causes are located in the wider context of a
specific form of domination and personal rulership. Corruption is thus a strat-
egy to influence and exert power over people through forms of favouritism
and patronage. This perspective enlightens us to a corruption that is not a
failure of individuals but a coherent strategy with its own rules and logic to
achieve obedience and contribute to the stability of a regime. It does not ac-
count for the more random or sporadic forms of corruption that often occur in
administrative systems. The perspective emphasizes a specific form of a
more stable and systemic corruption.
An explicit understanding and legally-sanctioned definition of corruption
in the legal-rational sense comes into existence when the private household
and the public office become separate entities, a process that occurs with the
rise of a bureaucratic system. Corruption takes place when the system of le-
gal-rational dominance is not sufficiently diffused, leaving loopholes that will
be exploited by the bureaucrat’s private motives. The distinction between the
private and the public role is not clearly delineated and the fuzzy line offers a
gateway for behaviour that deviates from a person’s official administrative
role.
In modern governmental organizations the clear distinction between these
two types of dominance does not always reflect reality, and patrimonial and
legal-rational modes merge. Max Weber’s explicit contribution to the under-
standing of the logic of different systems of domination stands undisputed,
however his contribution to an understanding of corruption in modern states
– albeit a challenge to a certain extent – has had mainly an implicit impact on
many students and their definition of corruption but will hopefully receive
more explicit attention in the future.
Chapter 3:
Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Prismatic
Societies           
Frank de Zwart              
1. Introduction
Rereading Fred Riggs’s Theory of Prismatic Society (1964) after many years
for the purpose of this essay was an enervating experience. The notes I scrib-
bled in the process contain the same combination of irritation (with esoteric
language and flawed theorizing) and admiration (for the many ideas and as-
tute observations) that so many critiques have put into words ever since the
book appeared. I shall not repeat these notes here1 but instead concentrate on
one aspect of the book: Riggs strongly doubts the relevance of modern public
administration principles and tools for vesting ‘good governance’ in devel-
oping countries. His ‘theory of prismatic society’ substantiates these doubts
and represents a rare stance: it opposes relativism but it also discourages in-
tervention.
As to the question ‘what causes corruption?’, Riggs’ theory exemplifies
the complexities of a comparative approach to this issue. The book can be
read as a study in corruption, but Riggs avoids using that word because it in-
vokes a moral category (see Rose-Ackerman, this volume) and Riggs is care-
ful to judge the behavior he studies. Riggs would agree with De Graaf, Ma-
ravić, and Wagenaar when they write, in the introduction to this volume, that
‘norms defining what corruption is (…) differ from society to society and
from academic discipline to discipline’. But Riggs is no relativist. He is not
concerned with the cultural imperialism or discursive hegemony that critical
scholars ascribe to international anti-corruption drives (for examples see: De
Graaf/Wagenaar/Hoenderboom, this volume). When it comes to key issues
such as economic development, equality, and stability, Riggs considers mod-
ern Weberian administration superior to other forms, and clearly thinks that
the former is prevalent in the West, and pending in the rest.
Riggs’ explanation of that difference (which encompasses his explanation
for corruption) is a text book example of the normative institutionalism that
dominated social science when he wrote his main work. Basically the argu-
ment is that organizations and institutions can only work as their designers
                                                          
1 For critical reviews accounting the rise and decline of the comparative public administration
group (of which Fred Riggs was a prominent member), see for instance: Heady (1996),
Jones (1976), Savage (1976), Siffin (1976).
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intended, if they reflect a society’s normative order.2 Organizational princi-
ples, techniques, and procedures, in other words, are not enough to prevent
corruption for if they do not resonate with a society’s normative order, these
institutions won’t work as intended. Riggs’ approach to the question ‘what
causes corruption’, then, is to inquire why the institutions that prevent it in
some places do not seem to work in others.
Riggs set out in the early 1960s to answer the pressing question why
models and techniques of modern public administration that worked so well
to establish orderly and relatively clean government in the West, did not pro-
duce the same results when exported and implemented in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America (Riggs 1964: 11-12). His answer is that the principles and
techniques of modern public administration reflect the normative structure of
Western, industrial societies, and indeed function to maintain that structure.
Transplanted into a different normative structure, the same principles and
techniques serve different functional requirements, and therefore do not work
in the same way. To illustrate, administrative procedures that guarantee re-
cruitment on the basis of merit reflect universalistic norms and function to
maintain universalism. In a different normative context, however, the same
procedure may also function to maintain particularism.
Riggs’ work contains ample illustration of this basic idea: Things are not
what they seem. Administrative institutions may look familiar (to an observer
from the West) but that is deceiving because these institutions function ac-
cording to a different logic.
‘Certainly we shall find in (…) Asia, Africa, and Latin America today formal agencies of
administration which resemble those of Europe and the United states. Yet somehow, closer
inspection of these institutions convinces us that they do not work in the same way, or that
they perform unusual social and political functions’ (1964: 12).
This conclusion has not made Riggs popular with practically minded public
administration specialists. He basically tells them that American and Euro-
pean administrative models and institutions can be established in other parts
of the world (as they were on a large scale in the 1950s and 60s), but to make
them perform as they do at home would require a normative structure that is
not there. The message is to either await normative change (but Riggs also
stresses throughout the book that there is no reason why this would necessar-
ily occur) or accept a type of public administration that is less efficient and
effective, and more prone to corruption than the ideal in the West.
Clearly this leaves people who are involved in administrative practice and
reform empty handed. As Garth N. Jones, a former advisor on administrative
                                                          
2 In this, Riggs applies an assumption in the work of Talcott Parsons to administrative behav-
ior: Roles – in casu the modern bureaucrat – are only ‘institutionalized when they are fully
congruous with the prevailing culture patterns and are organized around expectations of con-
formity with morally sanctioned patterns of value-orientations shared by members of the
collectivity’ (Parsons/Shills 1951, quoted in Powell/DiMaggio 1991: 16).
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reform in Pakistan, puts it in a review of Riggs’ and other works in the same
tradition: When it comes to practical matters such as trying to reform the
Pakistani financial system, ‘I still believe that the U.N. Handbook [of Public
Administration] in working these kind of situations has more to offer than
anything yet produced, and certainly more than anything found in these (…)
books under review” (Jones: 1976: 99). But Riggs’ point is exactly that the
organizational forms prescribed in administration handbooks serve different
functions in different contexts. The value of this idea, I agree, is not that it in-
forms concrete steps to combat corruption. Rather, its value is to caution
against the wrong steps. ‘Prescriptions which are valid in one context may be
harmful in another’, as Riggs puts it (1964: 11).
Structural Functionalism and Prismatic Society
The basic idea in Riggs’s work is that the import of foreign normative and in-
stitutional orders in traditional societies gave rise to a new type of society.
This ‘new’ society is neither traditional, nor modern, nor necessarily mod-
ernizing. Riggs calls it ‘prismatic society’3 and argues that its characteristics
are generally misunderstood because social theory presumes that societies are
either traditional, or modern, or in transition to become modern.
Riggs’ theory is grounded in the classic modernization studies of Durk-
heim, Tönnies, and Weber, and strongly influenced by Talcott Parson’s
structural functionalism. Riggs characterizes societies with the help of Par-
son’s pattern variables, especially the following three: ascription versus
achievement, diffuseness versus specificity, and particularism versus univer-
salism. Modernization, taken as a process of ongoing functional differentia-
tion, entails an institutional (organizational) and a normative dimension. In
functionalist analysis the two are closely related, however. Social structure is
perceived as a system of rules, and rules are ‘materialized’ norms. As Talcott
Parsons puts it: ‘the structure of social systems in general consists in institu-
tionalized patterns of normative culture (1964: 86, emphasis in original).
The underlying idea in Parsons’ structural functionalism is that societies
are functionally integrated wholes – stable equilibriums – in which ‘endoge-
nous variations are kept within limits compatible with the maintenance of the
main structural patterns’ (Ibid: 87). Riggs concentrates especially on this the-
ory as the basis of a typology of societies. He sketches the ideal type of tradi-
tional and modern societies, using three of Parsons’ pattern variables as a
shortcut. ‘The viewpoint adopted in this book is that a significant tendency
exists for action in traditional societies to be predominantly ascriptive, par-
                                                          
3 ‘Prismatic’ metaphorically conveys the idea that in the societies Riggs talks about, social
structures are functionally fused and functionally differentiated at the same time, like light
inside a prism (Riggs 1964: 27-31).
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ticularistic, and diffuse’, whereas modern societies value achievement, uni-
versalism, and specificity (Riggs 1964: 23). And, as follows from the as-
sumption that societies are ‘functionally integrated wholes’, these character-
istic normative patterns are mirrored in a particular institutional structure.
The classic illustration of this idea, and Riggs also uses it often, is the family
(Ibid: 22). In traditional societies the family performs a diffuse range of
functions: besides biological reproduction it also has educational, political,
economic, and religious functions. Families in modern societies have lost
most of these functions to specific educational, economic, and political insti-
tutions.
Fred Riggs’ work is solidly grounded in the functionalist modernization
tradition sketched above. But Riggs stresses a crucial shortcoming: The ‘un-
derlying models’ implicit in the various social disciplines, he writes, assume
a modern society (in political science, economics, sociology, and public ad-
ministration) or a traditional society (in anthropology). In other words, social
theory assumes that institutions are either functionally specific (in modern
societies) or functionally diffuse (in traditional ones) while societies in be-
tween are under-theorized. The standard concept applied to such societies is
‘transitional’ – indicating a stage on the road towards full modernization. But
Riggs stresses that ‘prismatic society’ is not necessarily transitional. In line
with the functionalist assumption of ‘stable equilibrium’, he argues that so-
cieties where traditional and modern norms and institutions co-exist, have
their own adaptive mechanisms and may thus persist. ‘A prismatic social or-
der might remain prismatic indefinitely. Indeed (...) it has its own equilibrat-
ing mechanisms’ (Ibid: 38).
Riggs thus tries to undo the teleology inherent in the term ‘transitional so-
cieties’ and to conceptualize prismatic society as an ideal-type of its own
(Ibid: 4).
3. Public Administration in Prismatic Societies
Interestingly, Riggs started this exercise in social theory formation for very
practical reasons: as a public administration specialist he was concerned with
the failure of attempts (in the 1950s and 60s) to export administrative tech-
nology from the USA and Europe to newly independent countries. According
to Riggs, the reason for this failure was the misguided idea – prominent in
contemporary political and administrative circles – that administrative sys-
tems can be ‘separated, by discernable boundaries, from the surrounding so-
ciety’ (1964: x). But for public administration to be a separate system, Riggs
argues, a level of functional differentiation is required that prismatic societies
do not possess.
Prismatic societies characteristically contain a mix of specific and diffuse
traits.
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‘New market and administrative systems have displaced but not replaced the traditional
systems (...). Indeed, this mixture of old and new practices, of modern ideas superimposed
upon traditional ones, may be one of the distinguishing characteristics of ‘transitional so-
cieties’’ (Riggs 1964: 12).
Such societies enact laws and establish procedures that, for instance, guaran-
tee recruitment to public office on the basis of qualifications – a modern trait,
signifying differentiation between ascribed status and job opportunities – but
at the same time, families or kinship groups have not ‘lost’ their functions for
the allocation of employment. Consequently, Riggs argues, the institutions
and organizations that are familiar in modern states function quite differently
when they are exported to prismatic societies.
Riggs’ theory of prismatic society can be read as a study in causes of cor-
ruption. Riggs himself uses the term ‘corruption’ only sparsely, however,
which is consistent with his insistence that administrative concepts and prin-
ciples that are developed for modern, differentiated societies are misleading
when used in a less differentiated context. In a prismatic society, the principle
of separating public and private accounts competes with equally valid princi-
ples that may discourage such separation. Riggs calls this ‘poly-normativism’,
and it strikes at the hart of his thinking.
Sometimes Riggs considers poly-normativism in the standard way of ‘un-
even change’ (Eisenstadt 1966) – modern norms are internalized by some
while others live on by traditional norms. But he also uses it in a more psy-
chological way, as conflicting incentives for individuals. Conflicting incen-
tives, coming from two normative orders, cause the ‘normlessness’ (old
norms are invalidated while new norms cannot be enforced) and compro-
mised solutions that characterize prismatic administration (Riggs 1964: 181-
182). ‘Prismatic men’ may endorse the equality of opportunity assumed in a
merit system, for instance, while equally valuing obligations to kin and
friends. The dilemma this poses is resolved in compromise: ‘In practice, the
familistic and ‘merit’ systems are united in a typically prismatic form of re-
cruitment. (...) Using the pretext of eligibility based on examination [an offi-
cial] chooses from the certified those whose personal loyalty he trusts’ (Ibid:
230). Similarly Riggs discusses the conflict between ascribed and achieved
hierarchy and asks by what ‘prismatic compromise’ both can be honored. The
answer is in the concept of rank: ‘Rank is an overriding concern in prismatic
societies. It is awarded for achievement (...) but once attained, it creates an
artificial static hierarchy resembling an ascribed status system’ (Ibid: 178-
179). Riggs applies the same reasoning in passages on rules versus choices
(universalism versus particularism) in administrative practice. Prismatic so-
cieties overcome the conflict between these alternatives in the implementa-
tion phase: enforcement officers appear to enforce universal rules, but these
rules permit a ‘wide variety of personalized choices’ (Ibid: 201).
From the perspective of prismatic administration, corruption, patronage,
clientelism, and favoritism are not flaws in the system that can be corrected
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by proper procedure and law. Riggs rather sees them as inherent to the sys-
tem – proper procedure and law serve ‘improper’ functions. Procedures and
laws that belong to one normative order can be exported into another norma-
tive order, but according to Riggs the effect is that the procedures and laws
become functional to their new environment, not that they change that envi-
ronment.
India’s system of personnel transfers in public administration can illus-
trate this point. Rules stipulate that public servants have to be relocated every
three or five years so as to prevent the growth of particularistic networks in-
side offices, and between officers and clients. In India networks of personal
relationships are commonly associated with (and often equated to) ‘corrup-
tion’.4 Indeed the standard reply officials give to the question why frequent
personnel transfers are necessary is that they ‘prevent corruption’.5
However, this anti-corruption devise is also well known as a source of
corruption. In their implementation, transfer rules leave ample room for deci-
sion makers – top bureaucrats and politicians – to exchange favorable trans-
fers for loyalty or a share in the income that officials earn from bribes
(Chandra 2004: 129-131; De Zwart 1994; Wade 1985). Media, scholars, and
officials in India have considered the transfer-trade corrupt since long, but the
system is remarkably persistent. I first studied it in the late 1980s, and recent
research (e.g. Iyer/Mani 2007; Kingston 2007; Rodden/Rose-Ackerman
1997; Van Gool 2008) shows that nothing much has changed since then.
‘Corruption can be routine and commonplace without being viewed as ac-
ceptable by the population that bears its costs’, Susan Rose-Ackerman writes
(1999: 177), and India’s transfer-trade confirms that. The reason is not only
that the transfer system serves political interests in collecting money and dis-
pensing patronage (both crucial for political survival in India’s democracy),
but also that the ‘routine’ in question is administrative routine. The very rules
and procedures devised to promote modern bureaucracy, have been made
functional for a different normative order – they ‘perform unusual social or
political functions’, as Riggs puts it (1964: 12).6
                                                          
4 The idea is that ‘corruption’ is an inevitable by-product of the personal relationships that
civil servants have or build over time. It includes bribe giving and taking as well as favorit-
ism, patronage, and clientelism. Hence ‘the rule of avoidance’ and frequent transfers: the
former assures that personnel are not appointed where they have many personal relations;
the latter do not allow the time to build such relations (see De Zwart 1994: 62-66).
5 Paul Hutchcroft (1997: 645-46) argues that academic use of the term ‘corruption’ as a con-
tainer concept for rent seeking, patronage, clientelism, or any combination of these – helps
to connect academic discourse with the real world politics and real political discourse. See
also Johnston (2005: 20-21) who criticizes popular corruption indexes and studies based on
their data, for equating corruption with bribery at the expense of studying patronage and
nepotism.
6 See J. P. Olivier de Sardan (1999) for a perceptive account of widespread corruption in Af-
rica, explained in terms of modern administrative procedure that is made functional to tradi-
tional African social custom.
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4. Relativism and Prismatic Society
Unlike many authors that studied similar issues after him, Riggs’ critique on
the export of administrative models and advice does not stem from a relativist
stance. He does not argue that interference in administrative systems abroad
is cultural imperialism. On the contrary, Riggs has nothing against efforts
from Western countries to help developing countries build a modern Webe-
rian bureaucracy. He only doubts that knowledge from the social sciences –
and especially from the discipline of public administration – can contribute to
make that happen.
Because of its inherent moral load, the study of corruption has often in-
spired relativist analysis, especially in cross-cultural studies. Most definitions
of corruption somehow refer to ‘the conduct of officials who infringe the
principle of keeping their public and private concerns and accounts strictly
separate’, as W. F. Wertheim puts it (1970: 563). But since this ‘principle’ is
a product of modern bureaucracy and therefore bound to time and culture, in-
voking it to judge behavior in times and places where it is not widely shared,
is anachronism7 or ethnocentrism.
Relativist analysis in the 1960s and 70s was informed by modernization
theory with its focus on normative change and disruption of social order. It
was a ‘mild’ version of relativism because most authors in this tradition ex-
pected that modernity – including the normative order that accompanies it –
would soon become dominant around the world. Until that moment, however,
they deferred judgment. Many claim that modernization breeds corruption,
Samuel Huntington wrote in 1966, but such judgment should be handled with
care. Modernization is a gradual process and the usual pattern is that modern
norms are first accepted by educated elite who then begin to judge their own
society by these norms.
‘Behavior which was acceptable and legitimate according to traditional norms becomes un-
acceptable and corrupt when viewed through modern eyes. Corruption in a modernizing
society, is thus in part not so much the result of the deviance of behavior from accepted
norms as it is the deviance of norms from the established patterns of behavior’ (Huntington
2002: 254).
In similar vain, Wertheim writes that
When (...) corruption in many newly independent non-Western countries hits the headlines,
sociologists should not be content with the shallow judgment that it is a portent of the im-
minent collapse of these countries. (...) Rather should we analyze the phenomenon within
its own historical setting, taking into account social forces which brand as corruption prac-
tices which in the past may not have been experienced as such’ (Wertheim 1970: 562).
                                                          
7 e.g. Van Leur (1955: 287): ‘A modern strict officialdom was only created with the Napole-
ontic state. Criticism of the integrity of eighteenth-century officials is thus ex post facto
criticism’.
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By ‘social forces’ Wertheim here means the changing normative patterns that
determine modernization. About contemporary Indonesia he writes: ‘Tradi-
tional particularistic loyalties are now seen to be too narrow; but an extended
‘quasi-universalistic’ loyalty towards the Indonesian Republic is for many
still too wide’ (Ibid: 578).
Today relativism as deference of judgment awaiting full modernization
seems patronizing and outdated. To the extent that relativism is still impor-
tant for the study of corruption, it is ‘cultural relativism’ (De Graaf/Wa-
genaar/Hoenderboom, this volume, discuss various examples). Cultural rela-
tivism does not imply deference of judgment but abstention from it. It entails
‘denial of universal morality’, as Rod Aya puts it (2009: 1), and to its adher-
ents this is a matter of principle, not circumstances. ‘Placing morality beyond
culture (...) is no longer possible’, Clifford Geertz writes for instance (2000:
45-46). What is virtuous or criminal varies from culture to culture, and to
criminalize what others consider virtue is ‘not only gratuitous, it is cultural
imperialism’, as Aya sums up the relativist position (2004: 31). Samuel
Huntington puts it very short: ‘[w]hat is universalism to the West is imperi-
alism to the rest’ (quoted in Aya 2009: fn.22).
Not surprisingly, cultural relativist perspectives on corruption are strongly
criticized by scholars and activists alike (Larmour 2008). The Executive
Summary of the Transparency International’s Source Book, for instance,
speaks of the ‘myth of culture’ and notes that ‘any understanding of corrup-
tion begins by dispelling the myth that corruption is a matter of ‘culture’’
(Pope 2000: xix). According to Pope, relativism does not make sense if it
comes to corruption:
‘One could ask why there are laws against corruption in all countries, developed or devel-
oping, if in fact it is ‘part of their culture’? Why, too, one might inquire, have the people of
the Philippines and Bangladesh mobilized against a well-armed military to bring down cor-
rupt leaders? These events hardly square with a popular acceptance of corruption as ‘a part
of culture’’ (Ibid: 8).
Pope has a point here: ‘culture’ is too deterministic a concept to apply to
countries (the usual unit of comparison in corruption studies). The normative
analysis in old modernization studies is better suited for the purpose. As we
saw, an important idea in modernization studies is what S. N. Eisenstadt
(1966) calls ‘uneven change’. Modern ideas and norms are accepted and even
internalized in some circles, while others, in the same country, live by tradi-
tional norms. Moreover, the first to accept modernity are usually educated
elites, and they are the people that make laws, which might answer Pope’s
first question above.
The Source Book’s radical denial of relativism is not the last word in
Transparency International circles, however. On its Website, in answer to
the frequently asked question ‘Can corruption be seen as normal or tradi-
tional in some societies?’, Transparency International takes a milder stance:
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‘The debate over cultural relativism and neo-colonialism is a contested one. Where con-
cepts like public procurement procedures are unknown concepts, bribing public officials to
secure public works contracts does not exist. Norms and values are context-bound and vary
across cultures. Gift-giving is part of negotiating and relationship building in some parts of
the world. But cultural relativism ends where the Swiss bank account enters the scene’.8
Clearly Transparency International also struggles with the basic problem of
moral relativism: to deny it is cultural imperialism, but to accept is to ‘toler-
ate barbarity and atrocity in those cultures. Damned if we do and damned if
we don’t – either way the prospects are bleak’ (Aya 2004: 31).
Riggs’ theory of prismatic society predates the influence of relativism in
corruption studies. Riggs tried to distance himself from both the liberal ex-
pectation that developing countries were necessarily in transition to moder-
nity, and from the cultural relativism that was salient in contemporary
American anthropology (Riggs 1964: 62). There is little relativism and no
apologetic tone in his expose of administration in prismatic societies. To il-
lustrate, Riggs argues that in prismatic society, old customs lose their appeal
while ethical standards borrowed from abroad are not rooted in popular un-
derstanding. Consequently,
‘A limbo develops in which men feel free to disregard both the old heavenly command-
ments and the new earthly ethics – they rely more on cunning, violence, or insolence to
satisfy their short-run private interests. To squat, smuggle, bribe, cheat – indeed to take
what one can (...) become the prevalent rules. (…) Social norms and sanctions are neces-
sary everywhere if raw human nature is to be socialized. But in the prismatic model this
sphere of ‘normlessness’ is enlarged, with far-reaching consequences’ (Ibid: 182).
5. Good Governance as a Side-Effect
In its non-relativist stance, Riggs’ work befits today’s international consensus
more than its contemporaries. It is striking, Michael Johnston (2005: 17-18)
writes for instance,
‘how quickly past debates over corruption – so often hung up on definitions, divided over
the question of effects, and mired in a paralyzing relativism – have given way to extensive
agreement (…) that corruption delays and distorts economic growth, rewards inefficiency,
and short-circuits open competition’.
In contrast to Riggs’ conclusion about export of administrative models, to-
day’s ‘agreement’ is translated, by scholars and powerful international or-
ganizations, into a ‘consensus package’ of anti-corruption reforms that ‘amount
to recommendations that developing societies emulate laws and institutions
found in advanced societies’ (Ibid: 21).
                                                          
8 http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq
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The rejection of relativism thus makes the issue of export and emulation
of administrative institutions pertinent again.9 Like Riggs in the early 1960s,
Johnston doubts the worth of this strategy – albeit for different reasons. Riggs
argues that you cannot transplant administrative models and practices that
were designed to produce ‘good governance’ in the West, into a different
normative order and expect them to function in similar ways. Johnston notes
that recommended countermeasures such as managerial control, greater
transparency, an independent judiciary, a stronger civil society, and free me-
dia – indeed check corruption in many societies. But in those societies these
institutions were the results of political contention
‘and were devised by groups seeking to protect themselves rather than as plans for good
governance in society at large. (...) Historically, many societies reduced corruption in the
course of contending over other, more basic issues of power and justice’ (Ibid: 21-22).
This perspective – good governance as an unintended consequence of group-
interest and political contention10 – is a way out of the stalemate in which
Riggs’ approach leaves anti-corruption efforts. The problem in Riggs’ theory
is twofold: Riggs treats normative orders as given, and suggests that norms
determine behavior. The institutions of modern administration, he argues, can
only function according to the purpose in their design if this purpose reflects
the normative order. Individual behavior is reduced, in this view, to enacting
normative scripts while the formation of such scripts is neglected.
Riggs might have it backward, though. More recent research shows that
the same pragmatic and interest-driven behavior that Riggs calls ‘normless’,
produces the institutions that shape a normative order – be it often as an un-
intended consequence. Democracy and modern bureaucracy in Europe, for
instance, were never designed for the purpose of ‘good governance’ or any
other common good. We may say that people constructed democracy, Char-
les Tilly writes, but it can only mean that people
‘create a set of political arrangements the effects of which are democratic. [The term] con-
struct has the misleading connotation of blueprints and carpenters, when over the last few
hundred years, the actual formation and deformation of democratic regimes has more often
resembled the erratic evolution of a whole city than the purposeful building of a single
mansion’ (1997: 196).
Today’s outcome of this process may seem to reflect a European or Western
normative order, but it emerged out of a long-term contentious process of
bargaining (over a range of conflicting interests such as taxes, rights, and
                                                          
9 Especially since privatization and smaller government – obviously the simplest way to re-
duce administrative corruption, and much in vogue in the 1990s – can only go so far and
have not taken away the need for administrative reform and ‘good governance’(see Hutch-
croft 1997: 640-643).
10 Cf. Charles Tilly (1990; 1997) on the formation of modern states (and modern public ad-
ministration) as side-effect of war-making efforts.
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conscription) between contenders to central power, ‘workers, peasants, and
other ordinary people’ (Ibid: 197).
Johnston formulates a similar thought with respect to the merit of interna-
tional ‘consensus packages’ of anti corruption measures and reform:
‘In the end both reform and systemic adaptation require vigorous political contention
among groups strong enough to demand that others respect their interests, rights, and prop-
erty – not just stability or administrative improvements. Too often we think of reform as a
process of asking people to back off from their own interest and ‘be good’. (...) But in fact
reform will be most sustainable and effective when driven by self interest (...) and defended
by actively contending groups’ (2005: 217).
Like Riggs, then, Johnston doubts the merit of attempts to fight corruption by
exporting institutions and ‘teaching people to behave well’. Unlike Riggs,
however, who left it at that, Johnston offers a perspective. From his work it
follows that articulating group interests, stimulating politics, state formation,
and bottom-up organizations can help the ‘good government cause’. 
Chapter 4:
The Institutional Economics of Corruption   
Susan Rose-Ackerman       
Contemporary research on the institutional economics of corruption began
with theoretical work that built on industrial organization, public finance, and
price theory to isolate the incentives for paying and receiving bribes and to
recommend policy responses based on that theory. My own 1978 book, Cor-
ruption: A Study in Political Economy, is an early example with its relatively
straightforward application of economic concepts to the study of corruption.
It used economic theory to understand what programs were especially sus-
ceptible to corruption and to recommend ways to reduce these incentives.
That book largely relied on journalism to supply the facts because there were
no statistical efforts to measure the harm caused by corruption. The closest
empirical work by Anne Krueger (1974) and Jagdish Bhagwati (1974) mea-
sured the volume of rent seeking and illegal transactions in international trade
by using the two sets of books available internationally – in exporting and in
importing countries. Fortunately, in recent years it has become possible to
move beyond journalism. Although empirical work on a topic that involves
illegal activity remains difficult, empirical work employs a range of clever
devices to generate quantitative estimates.
This chapter summarizes the institutional economics framework that con-
tinues to yield important insights into the causes and consequences of cor-
ruption. After introducing the conceptual framework, it discusses empirical
research derived from this theoretical perspective and includes some thoughts
on fruitful directions for future research.
1. The institutional economics framework
Corruption occurs where private wealth and public power overlap. It repre-
sents the illicit use of willingness-to-pay as a decision-making criterion. A
private individual or firm makes a payment to a public official in return for a
benefit or to avoid a cost. Bribes increase the private wealth of officials and
may induce them to take actions that are against the interest of their princi-
pals, who may be bureaucratic superiors, politically appointed ministers, or
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multiple principals, such as the general public. Illicit payments may also flow
in the reverse direction. Those holding or competing for public office may
make cash payments to private individuals, firms, or other officials to get
benefits for themselves or their political parties. In both cases, pathologies in
the agency/principal relation are at the heart of the corrupt transaction.
Whether the principal is a single, named superior or a diffuse body like
the public at large, the essential point in that corruption represents the viola-
tion of an obligation or a duty in return for a private benefit. Officials or
politicians who accept bribes violate the trust placed in them. Politicians who
pay bribes to obtain political support undermine the legitimacy of democratic
politics. Deterrence either can focus on changing the economic incentives to
pay or receive bribes, or can increase the trustworthiness of agents by other
means, such as seeking to instill a sense of loyalty and commitment to par-
ticular public institutions or to the general public interest. Bo Rothstein
(2010) criticizes the principal/agent approach by arguing that thoroughly cor-
rupt systems lack a benevolent principal. Even when the principal is the gen-
eral public, Rothstein (2010) points out that voters frequently reelect corrupt
politicians, perhaps because politicians pay for voters’ support in the form of
outright monetary payoffs of pork barrel projects. This critique, it seems to
me, proves too much. First, individual identifiable principals who are harmed
by the corruption of their subordinates are quite common, and they can be
expected to support efforts to limit lower level corruption. Second, voters in
some political system do punish corrupt politicians at the polls so long as a
more honest alternative exists. Furthermore, if corrupt candidates are re-
elected, one cannot conclude that voters necessarily approve of corruption
but only that they have not been offered a credible, honest alternative. In the
worst case that Rothstein (2010) posits, where the entire government hierar-
chy is on the take and voters prefer politicians who buy their votes, I agree
that it does not make sense to consider piecemeal reforms. In such a system,
with no separation between personal enrichment and public service, the
agency/principal model is not a useful explanatory tool or guide to policy.
However, it does not follow from the possible existence of such pathological
cases that the principal/agent model is not a useful framework for the general
run of cases.
Rothstein (2010) stresses the problem of vicious spirals where the cor-
ruption of some breeds the corruption of others until almost all are corrupt.
This phenomenon is well-recognized in the economic analysis of corruption
and can arise both from limited law enforcement resources and from rein-
forcing attitudes in which those who observe others’ corruption begin to view
such behavior as acceptable simply because it is common (Andvig/Moene
1990; Bardhan 1997: 1330-1334; Rose-Ackerman 1999: 107-109, 124-125).
Rothstein (2010) argues that in such cases corruption cannot be limited
through piecemeal, incremental reforms, and I agree. However, that conclu-
sion is not a refutation of the principal/agency approach. The two approaches
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are complements, not substitutes. Multiple equilibria models with vicious and
virtuous cycles can arise under any of the principal/agent situations outlined
in the institutional economics literature. Thus an entire police force or cus-
toms service can become corrupt over time with the level of corruption in one
period leading to a higher level the next period. True, such corruption could
move up the hierarchy over time, but that is not a necessary result of such
spirals at one level.
Rothstein (2010) provides an interesting analysis of one set of conditions
favorable to vicious spirals – programs that target a portion of the population
and require officials to make individualized judgments in allocating benefits
or imposing costs. This can, as Rothstein argues, undermine a norm of im-
partiality and produce corruption. However, Rothstein (2010) wants to define
corruption as equivalent to this norm violation. He follows Oscar Kurer’s
definition of corruption as occurring when ‘a holder of public office vio-
lat[es] … the impartiality principle in order to achieve a private gain’ (Kurer
2005: 230). To me, this definition confuses a normative issue – one type of
harm caused by corruption – with the phenomenon under study. It exces-
sively narrows the field of study to one particular, if important, type of harm.
Although I agree that defining corruption as the misuse of public power for
private gain leaves the key terms underspecified, it opens up a broad field of
debate over the meaning of ‘misuse’ which may indeed vary across societies.
Some of the most interesting issues in corruption research involve just such
debates over the relative costs of different types of corruption in different
settings. Rothstein (2010) would simply short circuit that debate by privileg-
ing one of the many costs of systemic corruption.
For me, a more fruitful approach is to describe the range of phenomena
under study and to assess the relative costs of each relative to the costs of
prevention. This may involve difficult tradeoffs between competing values
that cannot easily be measured using a common metric, but that approach
promises a richer and more nuanced set of research questions. Thus, I do not
see the principal/agent approach as a restrictive one. It may fail to take ac-
count of dynamic factors and social forces, but it provides a valuable place to
start and places the burden of proof on those wishing either to add additional
complementary factors, such as vicious cycles, or to substitute an entirely dif-
ferent approach.
What then is the essence of that approach? Principals and agents operate
within an institutional context. The insights of institutional economics are
closely related to the economic analysis of corruption. Institutional econo-
mists and their political science fellow travelers stress the way the institu-
tional context affects the behavior of individuals. They respond to the incen-
tives, both carrots and sticks, created by institutions, broadly defined. The
next step in the analysis is to study the incentives that face those with politi-
cal and economic power to change the institutional structure in their favor.
For a good introduction to the ambition and scope of the approach one should
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consult the seminal work of Douglas North and his collaborators spanning
thirty years (e.g. North 1981; North 1990; North/Weingast 1989; North/
Wallis/Weingast 2009. See also Greif 2006). A top public official or private
firm executive might reorganize an organization to create a more centralized
structure or, conversely, to decentralize decision making to give more
authority to those lower in the hierarchy or even to eliminate the hierarchy
entirely (Williamson 1975). Political economists with an institutional focus
study such questions as the impact of bureaucratic reorganization on public
performance, the effect of privatizing formerly public services, the relative
merits of presidential and parliamentary democracies, and the role of inde-
pendent courts, central banks, and regulatory agencies. They study both how
people and firms respond to existing institutions as well as the political and
economic incentives to change institutional forms (for overviews see, e.g.,
Mueller 2003; Weingast 2002; Weingast/Wittman 2006).
Some of this analysis, both theoretical and empirical, discusses corruption
along with other incentives to shirk through laziness or a desire for leisure or
views it as part of the general tendency toward rent seeking in public life
(North/Weingast 1989; North/Wallis/Weingast 2009). It asks how political
incentives change with changes in government organization and studies how
incentives and opportunities can lead to institutional change. However, cor-
ruption is seldom the subject of detailed analysis. Recent work on corruption
from a wider range of scholars is helping to remedy that lack, but it needs to
be more closely integrated into the general fields of political economy and in-
stitutional analysis (for one example of such an effort see Glaeser/Goldin
2006).
The economic analysis of corruption models private individuals and firms
outside government as active players. They do not passively vote for politi-
cians, apply for public benefits, or bid for contracts. Rather they strategically
interact with officials and politicians to further their own interests. Corrupt
officials may pressure them for payoffs by, but they may also actively seek to
subvert public programs to favor themselves. They may accept payoffs from
politicians in return for their votes or pay politicians to get private benefits.
The basic framework follows research on rent seeking in institutional eco-
nomics but is more nuanced and complex. The problem for principals is not
just to incentivize agents but also to confront the three-sided nature of trans-
actions between principals, public agents, and the outsiders with whom they
must deal. Some of the insights generated by the analysis of corruption in the
public sector apply to any hierarchy, public or private. Although mechanisms
of control may differ between public and private entities, many of the same
incentives for corruption arise (Rose-Ackerman 1978: 189-209).
The institutional economics of corruption highlights the way bribery af-
fects both the efficiency and the fairness of public sector actions. Agency/
principal relations pervade government, and most agents either deal directly
with the public or have access to public resources that could be appropriated
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for their own benefit. Hence, it is important both to find loci of corrupt in-
centives and to ask how corruption might affect the effectiveness of govern-
ment action. In other words, there is both a positive and a normative aspect to
the analysis. Some institutional economic analysis claims to be purely posi-
tive. It does not make judgments but simply reports how the incentives cre-
ated by different institutions can be expected to affect behavior. This neutral
stance is not possible in the analysis of corruption, a loaded term that comes
with its own normative baggage. Rather one needs to combine institutional
economics with welfare economics to assess the impact of corruption on
government functioning in terms of both efficiency and fairness.
Begin with a simple corrupt situation. Bribes paid to agents may distort
their choices away from the aims of their principals. If those aims further the
efficient allocation of resources, bribery is inefficient. The analysis, however,
extends beyond efficiency. If, for example, the goal of a public program is to
benefit the poor or to select the most qualified, substituting willingness-to-
pay for these criteria undermines the program’s goals. In general, bribes are
not just transfers from one pocket to another. They affect the behavior of
those who pay and those who receive payoffs. In this they are similar to
prices or to contractual terms. They provide incentives that work against the
aims of a public program or, at least, increase its cost to the beneficiaries
(Rose-Ackerman 1978: 137-166; 1999: 7-26).
To proceed, I differentiate between low-level opportunistic payoffs, on
the one hand, and systemic corruption, on the other, that implicates an entire
bureaucratic hierarchy, electoral system, or overall governmental structure
from top to bottom.
Low-level corruption occurs within a given institutional framework where
basic laws and regulations are in place, and implementing officials seize upon
opportunities to benefit personally. Here is where the principal/agent model
is most obviously applicable. There are several generic situations.
First, a public benefit may be scarce, and officials may have discretion to
assign it to applicants. Suppose that superiors cannot observe payoffs but can
easily check if any unqualified applicants receive the benefit. Then the quali-
fied applicants with the highest willingness to pay and the fewest scruples
will get the benefit in a corrupt system. This would seem the least problem-
atic case from an economic efficiency perspective. The payoff is a transfer,
and the benefit goes to those who value it the most in dollar terms. The main
problems are the transaction costs of corrupt deals and the elimination of
qualified beneficiaries with high scruples. The obvious policy response is to
sell the benefit legally. It is a good test of this strategy to ask if any signifi-
cant public policy goal would be violated by charging fees as a rationing de-
vice. For example, if a country has a limited supply of import licenses to al-
locate, selling them to the high bidder will usually be the efficient strategy.
Most economists would recommend doing away with import quotas entirely,
but if that is not an option, an auction is second best. Related cases are trans-
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parent auctions for privatized firms and broadcast licenses, and competitive
bidding for contracts.
Second, consider the ways in which the first example is idealized. In par-
ticular, suppose that low-level officials are required to select only qualified
applicants and that their exercise of discretion cannot be perfectly monitored.
The overall supply may be scarce, as in the above example (for example,
university places or government-subsidized apartments), or open-ended (for
example, driver’s licenses, business firm registration, certificates of occu-
pancy for new construction). In either case, the officials’ discretion permits
them to collect bribes from both the qualified and the unqualified. The level
of corruption will depend upon the options for the qualified. For example,
can they approach another, potentially honest, official? If they can, no indi-
vidual corrupt official has much bargaining power and so cannot extract high
payoffs. In some cases, inter-official competition might push bribes so low
that they are no longer worth accepting given the risks of disclosure (Rose-
Ackerman 1978: 137-150, Shleifer/Vishny 1993). Incentives for payoffs will
also depend upon the ability of superiors to monitor allocations. For example,
a firm that builds a shoddy building may be able to hide the flaws, at least until
it is tested in a fire or an earthquake. Government contracting and the sale of
state assets by lower level officials also often fit this case. Superiors cannot per-
fectly monitor official behavior so lower level bureaucrats can collect bribes
that permit contracts to be given to poorly qualified firms and that allow asset
sales to bidders who do not provide the state with the highest return.
Third, the bureaucratic process itself may be a source of delay and other
costs. In that case incentives for corruption arise as applicants try to get to the
head of the queue or otherwise get better service. To further exploit their cor-
rupt opportunities, officials may create or threaten to create red tape as a
means of extracting bribes. This strategy is plausible in many real world ap-
plications because even honest officials need to take some time and trouble to
process applications.
Turn next to cases in which officials impose costs rather than benefits –
for example, they seek to collect taxes or threaten citizens with arrest. They
can then extract payoffs in return for overlooking the illegal underpayment of
taxes or for tolerating illegal gambling and drug operations. More pathologi-
cally, they can demand payoffs in exchange for refraining from arresting
people on trumped up charges.
Each of these potentially corrupt situations raises the question of how
bribery occurs. What explaines difference across individuals and societies in
the incidence and level of payoffs? Part of the answer lies in the institutional
framework that determines the nature and extent of the opportunities outlined
above. However, within a given institutional environment, economic theory
is poorly equipped to explain variation across individuals who face the same
structural incentives. Some people clearly have more moral scruples or fear
of exposure and punishment than others. Long-term, stable trusting relation-
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ship further corruption in some cases and substitute for bribery in others.
Both individual attitudes toward illegal activities and interpersonal relations
affect the extent of corruption and the choices of individuals. However, given
some background level of individual scruples and inter-personal solidarity,
economics predicts that institutional changes that increase financial benefits
and reduce costs will increase the incidence of corruption. The level of bribes
paid is a function of the benefit at stake, the relative bargaining power of
bribe payers and recipients, the risk of exposure, and expected punishments.
Both cultural factors and objective measures of deterrence are important.
Consider, for example, Fisman and Miguel’s (2007) study of violations of
traffic laws in New York City by United Nations diplomats. During a period
when the law was not enforced against them, the level of violations was
roughly correlated with Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index. However, the overall level of violations fell dramatically after a
change in policy that gave the embassies an incentive to pay. Both financial
penalties and ‘culture’ mattered.
In general, low-level corruption can lead to the inefficient and unfair dis-
tribution of scarce benefits, undermine the purposes of public programs, en-
courage officials to create red tape, increase the cost of doing business and
limit entry, and lower state legitimacy. Notice, however, that corruption may
have political benefits for incumbent politicians. The bribes may be paid at
the lowest level in the hierarchy, but they may be part of an organized system
that is used to favor political allies and to build campaign war chests, and not
only to obtain individual cash benefits. At that point low-level corruption
merges with high-level corruption.
 ‘Grand’ corruption shares some features with low-level payoffs, but it
can be more deeply destructive of state functioning – bringing the state to the
edge of outright failure and undermining the economy. The analysis of grand
corruption must account for the possibility that top officials and politicians
will create institutional environments that facilitate their illicit enrichment.
Unlike low-level corruption, the institutional structure can be modified to in-
crease the value of corrupt deals. To capture the reality of some cases we
need to take account of the role of powerful non-governmental actors, be they
large firms, criminal mafias, or other powerful bodies. Here, I assume that the
general public is the principal and is harmed by grand corruption. However,
this harm can occur even if ordinary citizens know nothing about corruption
and the harm it causes. In that case, they are not in a position to correct the
problem. Efforts at reform initiated by outsiders need to begin by convincing
the populace that their interests are being undermined by corruption. In some
cases, however, even if the damage done by corruption can be documented,
no one may have the power or the political will to make systemic changes. I
distinguish three variants.
First, a branch of the public sector may be organized as a rent extraction
machine. For example, top police officials may organize large scale corrupt
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systems in collaboration with organized crime groups, who are given a de
facto monopoly on illicit activities. In practice, it may be difficult to know
whether the police or the criminals have the upper hand. In the extreme, po-
lice may even arrest members of competing groups so as to maintain the
dominant group’s monopoly. Policing is probably the most dramatic example
here, but tax collection agencies and regulatory inspectorates, to name just
two, can also degenerate into corrupt systems where high-level officials man-
age and share in the gains of their inferiors (Das-Gupta/Mookerjee 1998;
Rose-Ackerman 1978: 109-136; 1999: 27-38). These cases provide particu-
larly strong examples of the vicious spirals discussed above. The princi-
pal/agent model still applies, but the proximate principal inside the bureauc-
racy becomes a pure rent-extracting body. Reform cannot occur without a
thoroughgoing restructuring of the corrupt body that will require replacing
personnel, changing its tasks, and introducing outside oversight, perhaps
from civil society (Bardhan 1997: 1330-1334; Rose-Ackerman 1999: 107-
109; Rothstein 2010).
Second, a nominal democracy may have a corrupt electoral system, with
money determining the outcome. Here, there are many slippery slopes and
difficult lines to draw. Political campaigns require funds from either public or
private sources. Voters need to be persuaded to support particular candidates
in one way or another, and corruption can enter in four ways. It can under-
mine limits on spending, get around limits on the types of spending permitted
(that is, no direct quid pro quos), and subvert controls on the sources of
funds. Finally, politicians may make payoffs to voters to get their support.
There is no agreement about what should count as ‘corrupt’ in this context.
The extremes are clear – vote buying and outright quid pro quo purchases of
public benefits, but the more subtle distinctions are hotly contested (Rose-
Ackerman 1978: 15-85; 1999: 127-174). Here as well, the analysis of cor-
ruption supplements work that studies the tradeoffs between the search for
campaign funds and appeals to ordinary voters but ignores illegal behavior.
Third, governments engage in large projects can transfer assets in ways
that have a significant effect on the wealth of domestic and foreign busi-
nesses. For example, they regularly contract for major construction projects
such as highways and port improvements, allocate natural resource conces-
sions, and privatize state-owned firms. High-level politicians may organize
state institutions so that they can use their influence to collect kickbacks from
private firms in all of these areas. The relative power of government officials
and private interests may, in practice, be difficult to sort out. The extremes are
kleptocracy, on the one hand, and state capture by powerful private interests, on
the other. In some cases, concentrated power exists on both sides, and the in-
stitutional structure is a bargaining situation similar to a bilateral monopoly in
the private market (Andreski 1968; Johnston 2005; Kahn/Jomo 2000).
Grand corruption can undermine state legitimacy and economic func-
tioning. Most problematic is bilateral monopoly, where a narrow set of pow-
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erful public and private figures controls the state. Some scholars dispute this
claim. Using a market analogy, they observe that a monopolist seeks produc-
tive efficiency, and, in the presence of external effects and free riding, it is
better to centralize power over resources. In Mancur Olson’s term (1993), a
‘stationary bandit’ is better than a large number of ‘roving bandits’. The evi-
dence suggests, however, that most kleptocrats do not act like efficient mo-
nopolists. They are not that powerful. Far from choosing efficient projects
that maximize monopoly profits, they need to buy off supporters. Given the
risk of losing power, they often transfer their profits outside the country for
safekeeping. The analogy to a private monopolist misses these aspects of
kleptocratic government (Rose-Ackerman 1999: 114-124; Rose-Ackerman
2003).
Some claim that deep historical factors are the fundamental determinants
of corruption and also can explain the impact of corruption on economic
growth and other variables. If true, then one might conclude that countries
cannot escape their history – some countries’ pasts inexorably generate cor-
ruption. But that policy conclusion is overly pessimistic. Some statistical
work uses historical factors for identifying purposes because they are clearly
independent of present-day institutions. Thus, they solve the problem of si-
multaneous causation. Statistical work variously finds that settler mortality,
colonial heritage, religion, and distance from the equator are good proxies for
today’s institutional structures (e.g., Acemoglu/Johnson/Robinson 2001). But
these results do not imply that a country with background conditions associ-
ated with corruption and low growth cannot change, although it does suggest
that change may need to be more radical and far reaching than in other coun-
tries. The massive transformations that have occurred in Central Europe, the
former Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam demonstrate that change is possi-
ble and can occur quite rapidly. The transitions to democracy in Latin Amer-
ica and Asia, however unfinished and rough-edged, demonstrate the same
point. Furthermore, in countries where widespread corruption has gone along
with a strong growth performance, one can seek to understand both why cor-
ruption did not hold back growth and whether corruption had a disparate im-
pact on particular sectors and social groups who bear the brunt of the corrupt
gains earned by others. Such research could provide a more nuanced ap-
proach to policy-oriented studies that aim to understand how government and
private sector institutions affect economic outcomes and the legitimacy of the
state.
Research in anthropology and sociology stresses that cultural and social
factors determine the level of corruption and explain why behavior is seen as
corrupt in some societies but not in others (see de Zwart, this volume). Here
too, the important issue from a policy perspective is whether these factors are
exogenous or whether people react to others’ behavior. For example, trust
and trustworthiness can be a function of the behavior of others (Hardin
2002). A rational person will trust only those he or she believes are trust-
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worthy. A person may be trustworthy not only as a result of moral scruples
but also as a way of benefiting from the trust of others over time. In addition,
people’s view of the legitimacy of government may also depend up the fair-
ness and even-handedness with which it operates. If some obtain benefits
through corruption, others may view the state as illegitimate and become cor-
rupt as well. As Rothstein (2010) argues, one advantage of universal benefits
is that the state avoids having to decide who qualifies.
2. Empirical studies of the institutional economics of
corruption
Empirical research on the economic determinants of corruption takes several
forms. I describe research based on cross-country indices, studies that con-
centrate on institutional structures, results from surveys and experiments, and
individual sector studies (see Rose-Ackerman 2004; 2006 for more details
and references).
2.1 Cross-country studies
Cross-country research is mostly based on two similar indices of corruption
developed by Transparency International (TI) and by the World Bank Insti-
tute. Both data sets are derived from perceptions of corruption as reported by
the international business community and by experts in particular countries
and regions. Thus, the indices do not represent hard measures of corruption,
but both appear to capture, in a general way, its level as perceived by knowl-
edgeable observers.
These indices have spawned a large number of studies demonstrating that
corruption is associated with harmful outcomes and that institutions matter
for growth. High levels of corruption are associated with lower levels of in-
vestment and growth, and corruption discourages both capital inflows and
foreign direct investment (Lambsdorff 2003a; Mauro 1995; Wei 2000). Ace-
moglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) find that when the risk of expropria-
tion is high, growth rates tend to be low. Most measures of institutional qual-
ity are correlated, and in this case, expropriation risk and corruption go hand
in hand so that the same association holds for corruption. Corruption lowers
productivity, reduces the effectiveness of industrial policies, and encourages
business to operate in the unofficial sector in violation of tax and regulatory
laws (Ades/Di Tella 1997; Lambsdorff 2003b; Kaufmann 1997).
Highly corrupt countries tend to under-invest in human capital by spend-
ing less on education, to over-invest in public infrastructure relative to private
investment, and to have lower levels of environmental quality (Mauro1997;
Esty/Porter 2002; Tanzi/Davoodi 2002). High levels of corruption produce a
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more unequal distribution of income under some conditions, but the mecha-
nism may be complex – operating through lower investments in education
and lower per capita incomes (Gupta/Davoodi/Alonso-Terme 2002; Gupta/
Davoodi/Tiongson 2001). Corruption can undermine programs explicitly de-
signed to help the poor. For example, Olken (2006) shows how corruption
and theft undermined a rice distribution program in Indonesia. Corruption
and theft apparently turned a welfare-improving program to one that was
welfare-reducing.
Corrupt governments lack political legitimacy (Anderson/Tverdova 2003)
although the political supporters of corrupt incumbent governments, not sur-
prisingly, express more positive views. Surveys carried out in four Latin
American countries in 1998 and 1999 showed that those exposed to corrup-
tion had both lower levels of belief in the political system and lower interper-
sonal trust (Seligman 2002). Surveys of firms in countries making a transition
from socialism provide complementary findings. Firms with close connec-
tions with the government did better than other firms, but countries where
such connections were seen as important for business success did worse
overall than those where political influence was less closely tied to economic
success (Fries/Lysenko/Polanec 2003).
In circumstances of low government legitimacy, citizens try to avoid
paying taxes, and firms go underground to hide from the burden of bureauc-
racy, including attempts to solicit bribes. Using data from the World Values
Survey and Transparency International, Uslaner (2010) shows that high lev-
els of perceived corruption are associated with high levels of tax evasion.
Similarly, Torgler’s (2006) study of attitudes toward tax evasion in Central
and Eastern Europe show that when individuals perceived that corruption was
high, they were less likely to say that people have an obligation to pay taxes.
Thus, one indirect impact of corruption is to persuade people that it is accept-
able not to pay taxes because government has been captured by corrupt offi-
cials and those who support them. As a consequence, corrupt governments
tend to be smaller than more honest governments, everything else equal (Fried-
man/Johnson/Kaufmann/Zoido-Lobaton 2000; Johnson/Kaufmann/McMil-
lan/Woodruff 2000). Thus in corrupt governments, the individual projects are
excessively expensive and unproductive, but the overall size of the govern-
ment is relatively small.
Unfortunately, the consequences of corruption are difficult to distinguish
from the causes; the causal arrow appears to go both ways. Most of the re-
sults reported above could be flipped so that causes become consequences.
An iterative process may operate where corrupt institutions limit growth and
low growth encourages the development of corrupt institutions. Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006) examine the issue of causation econometrically
and claim that the dominant direction of causation is from weak governance,
including high corruption, to low growth. Under this view, the prescriptions
of economists who urge countries to get their macro-economic incentives
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right will not work unless the state has institutions capable of putting such
policies into effect. Even if there is a feedback mechanism from low growth
to high corruption and from high growth to low corruption, the growth proc-
ess cannot begin without reasonably well-functioning institutions.
However, there are distinct limits to cross-country research. It assumes
enough regularity in the phenomenon so that a single statistical model can
cover the world. The relation between macro variables and corruption will
indeed distinguish between very corrupt and very clean states. In the former,
state failure is so pronounced that pro-growth policies cannot be carried out
by the government. In the latter, the state is competent, and citizens support
high taxes because their funds are used effectively to provide public services.
But most countries fall in the middle range, and here the connection is less
clear. Countries with similar rankings have very different institutional envi-
ronments so that corruption is concentrated in different sectors. Furthermore,
indices based on the perceptions of business investors may miss corruption
experienced by ordinary people. This diversity in the middle counsels an em-
phasis on research at the sector and country level.
2.2 Corruption and government structure
Cross-country research does not test the actual mechanism that connects in-
stitutional measures to economic outcomes. Some research, however, has be-
gun to explore these connections. These studies ask whether the specific na-
ture of corrupt deals can help explain their impact and whether a country's
constitutional structure is a determinant of the levels and types of corruption.
Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005) study the links between constitu-
tional structures and voting rules, on the one hand, and perceptions of cor-
ruption on the other. They distinguish between corruption that enriches
elected officials and legal public spending programs with regionally concen-
trated benefits – ‘pork barrel’ politics. Only the former falls under their defi-
nition of corruption. They show that presidential systems are more corrupt,
on balance, than parliamentary democracies and that proportional representa-
tion systems are more corrupt than first-past-the-post systems. The worst
systems combine strong presidents with proportional representation under
which a powerful executive can negotiate with a few powerful party leaders
to share the spoils of office. Their results confirm Persson and Tabellini’s
(2003) finding that proportional representation system are more corrupt than
first-past-the-post systems but contradict their more favorable results for
presidential systems (see also Peters, this volume).
Federalism and decentralization add another dimension. One simple view
derives from work in the political economy of institutions. Drawing on Barry
Weingast’s notion of market-preserving federalism, this view holds that de-
centralization will limit corruption both by making it easier for ordinary peo-
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ple to monitor government officials and by giving them an exit option if offi-
cials are overtly corrupt (Weingast 1995). However, some work finds that
federal states are more corrupt than unitary ones (Treisman 2000). Moreover,
there are conceptual reasons to doubt a strong connection between decentral-
ized government and integrity. Smaller polities may contain more uniform
groups of people so that politics may be less competitive, leading to increased
corruption. Local elites may seize control of a town or village government, but
they may face greater collective action problems in larger government units
(see Peters, this volume). A local kleptocracy may be especially difficult to
control in rural areas in poor countries where wealthy landlords exercise po-
litical power and ordinary people have no realistic exit options (Bardhan and
Mookherjee 2006). 
2.3 Surveys and Experiments
Much recent research uses surveys and experiments to understand how busi-
ness people and ordinary citizens experience and evaluate corruption. Sur-
veys help to capture the way corruption affects different parts of society, and
they highlight the connections between corruption and government legiti-
macy. Experiments permit a more controlled assessment of human behavior,
but they may miss the nuance of real world situations where subtle inter-
personal cues may operate to encourage or discourage payoffs.
The best survey work is based on households’ experience with public of-
ficials, not just individual attitudes. Jennifer Hunt (2006), for example, uses
detailed data from Peru to calculate the ratio of bribes paid to usage rates.
She finds that the judiciary is the most corrupt institution, followed by the
police. Surveys of business firms provide another window on the phenome-
non of corruption. For example, World Bank surveys in Central and Eastern
Europe document the specific ways that corrupt officials and intrusive rules af-
fect businesses and show how corrupt environments impose costs (Hellman/
Jones/ Kaufmann 2003; Hellman/Kaufmann 2004; Johnson/Kaufmann/McMil-
lan/Woodruff 2000).
Surveys demonstrate how firms manage to cope when legal institutions
are weak. Informal relationships built on trust and private sanctions exist but
cannot easily bear the entire burden of maintaining business deals. Weak
states produce widespread corruption, private protection rackets, and the
flouting of regulatory and tax laws. As I noted above, the system may be
caught in a trap in which corruption breeds even more corruption in the fu-
ture until it is all pervasive.
One institution that is particularly important is the security of property
rights. In Eastern and Central Europe countries with more secure property
rights have higher levels of new investment by established firms (John-
son/McMillan/Woodruff 2000; 2002). Property rights are less secure if brib-
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ery and protection payments are common and if the courts do not enforce
contracts. Thus, corruption is not a route to a secure relationship with the
state but opens up possibilities for extortion. Furthermore, if firms pay for
protection, either to private mafias or to the police, this reduces the security
of rights as well (Johnson/McMillan/Woodruff 2002). Trust in the state as a
reliable actor seems important. Firms appear willing to substitute legal and
impartially administered taxes for the uncertainties of bribe payments and the
dangers of relying on private protection services (Friedman/Johnson/Kauf-
mann/Zoido-Lobaton 2000). Thus, when corruption becomes part of the in-
stitutionalized business environment, it has serious feedback effects on the
operation of private markets.
One way to study the impact of institutional arrangements on behavior is
to construct experiments where the institutional environment can be manipu-
lated to study behavioral responses. In the study of corruption, a few experi-
ments exist, and this appears to be a fruitful area for future research. The ex-
periments provide an interesting twist on the large body of research on trust
games (Abbink 2006). Under a common laboratory scenario, payoffs in trust
games are highest if players completely trust each other, but strict rationality
predicts that players will maximize short-term gains by acting in untrust-
worthy ways. Experimental results are usually somewhere in the middle. The
twist is that, in conventional games, trust is a desirable trait, but in corrupt
situations trust permits illegal corrupt deals that are harmful for society. In
the experiments the players exhibit some trust, meaning that they are willing
to make payoffs that are destructive of other goals. Players do not take into
account the social losses of their actions and are most strongly deterred by
the possibility of punishment.
Researchers are beginning to carry out field experiments to see how cor-
ruption affects the delivery of public services or the allocation of licenses.
Much of this work is still in progress, but a study of corruption in obtaining
drivers’ license illustrates their potential (Bertrand/Djankov/Hanna/Mullai-
nathan 2006). That study documented how corruption raised the price of ob-
taining a license and permitted many unqualified drivers to be certified.
2.4 Sector Specific Anti-corruption Policies
Corruption is sometimes discussed as if it were a broad generic concept. In
practice, however, it operates at the sector level. Thus, it is important to study
how the institutional environment creates incentives for corruption in the de-
livery of particular public services, such as education, health, highways, or
national defense. A World Bank publication provides an excellent introduc-
tion to this approach and draws on related work based on analyses of gov-
ernment service delivery, public works, tax collection, and customs (Campos/
Pradhan 2007). This research highlights the importance of melding techno-
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cratic institutional reform based on economic reasoning with a sophisticated
understanding of the politics of systems that permit corruption to persist over
time.
Reinikka and Svensson (2004) carried out a detailed study of the connec-
tion between accountability and corruption in the delivery of public services
based on primary school financing in Uganda. They documented the severe
leakage of central government funds as it was passed down to the grass roots
– one dollar of central government funds only produced $0.13 in budget for
local schools. This finding galvanized public opinion, and central govern-
ment officials took action. They introduced a simple, information-based
strategy combined with better monitoring from the center. After the reform’s
introduction, one dollar expended by the center produced $0.80 of local
school funds, and school enrollment rose. Much of the improvement can be
explained by a newspaper campaign that allowed parents to know how much
money their children’s school was supposed to obtain.
This example shows how institutions interact to produce or to stymie re-
form. An information strategy cannot be effective on its own. In Uganda, al-
ready existing parent-teacher groups used the information to monitor school
spending. In other countries, more costly and complex interventions might be
necessary. Education may be a special case because it is a service used by
children on a daily basis, unlike, say healthcare, where demand is more epi-
sodic, and sick and injured users are vulnerable to exploitation.
Public works are a common locus of corruption. Golden and Picci (2005)
have studied public works in Italy. They combine measures of the physical
public capital stock with measures of historical costs to estimate the relative
efficiency of public spending throughout Italy. Building on research that
finds that corruption and waste go together, they assume that corrupt officials
encourage wasteful projects as a way of generating rents. Overall, the physi-
cal index favors the northern part of the country, and the financial index fa-
vors the south. The ratio of the two provides a rough measure of the relative
levels of corruption and inefficiency. Golden and Picci go on to show that re-
gions with unproductive public spending tend to have more than their share
of deputies accused of corruption. Political corruption is associated with
waste and kickbacks in public contracts.
Tax and customs collection are a frequent locus of payoffs, and interna-
tional financial institutions have many times attempted to reform these ac-
tivities through institutional innovations. Research in Africa and Latin
America has studied the impact of semi-autonomous revenue agencies
(Taliercio, Jr. 2004) and of customs reform (De Wulf/Sokol 2004). The aim
is to limit political interference and to get away from the constraints of the
civil service system. In most cases reforms initially produced gains in reve-
nue collection and falls in corruption. But as with many initiatives, the gains
often were not sustained over time. For example, Fjeldstad (2006) studied the
Uganda Revenue Authority (URA). After marked initial success, revenue be-
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gan to fall, and corruption reemerged. He argues that the relatively high fi-
nancial rewards given to the staff were ineffective in deterring corruption.
Employment in the relatively well-paying URA escalated workers’ obliga-
tions to provide financial support for their extended families creating incen-
tives to take bribes. Political interference and patronage also undermined re-
form goals. The tax law was complex and unclear and left room for
widespread discretion. This encouraged people to use connections to get spe-
cial treatment.
To avoid these political and social dynamics, it is sometimes possible to
turn over an aspect of government operation to an organization located en-
tirely outside the country. Yang (2006) has examined the most prominent
real-world example – private pre-shipment inspection (PSI). PSI firms value
imported goods before they leave their port of origin and then earn a fraction
of the value of the imports. More than 50 developing countries have hired
PSIs over the last two decades. At the aggregate level, these programs appear
successful and cost effective. Reductions in corruption are a prominent cause
of these increases. But success is not guaranteed, and the failures shed light
on the conditions under which such programs are likely to succeed. Yang fo-
cuses on two countries: the Philippines and Colombia. He finds that if PSI
only covers a subset of potential methods of avoiding import duties, then
there can be substantial displacement to alternative methods. Furthermore,
PSI firms and their employees must not be corruptible themselves.
3. Conclusion
The study of corruption is well suited to the institutional economics frame-
work. An understanding of the incidence and effect of corrupt payoffs and
private networks requires one to understand how institutions work – both
formal structures and informal networks. Further, corruption benefits the re-
cipients of bribes and may also benefit those who pay if they can obtain un-
deserved or expedited benefits in return. Hence, on the one hand, corrupt of-
ficials and politicians may seek to reorganize the state to increase the
opportunities for enrichment. On the other hand, satisfied bribe payers have
no incentive to blow the whistle on the practice. As I recognized in my first
1978 book, corruption is an archetypal topic for political economic analysis.
Even if one evokes cultural and social factors, one cannot deny that self-
interest plays a prominent role. Reform may seek to change the norms of of-
ficials and private individuals, but it must also deal with the underlying in-
centives for payoffs by rearranging the rewards and costs of corrupt and hon-
est behavior. Institutional reform is a necessity and must take into account the
insights of institutional economic analysis.
To see how corrupt incentives operate in practice, this chapter has selec-
tively summarized empirical research on corruption that emphasizes the role
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of institutions. Common patterns recur throughout the world and across sec-
tors, so that the lessons learned in one area have relevance elsewhere. But it
is also essential to examine the institutional structure of particular systems or
sectors. The underlying economic incentives for corruption in public works,
the police, the judiciary, tax and customs collection, and procurement are
common throughout the world. Yet the incidence and severity of the problem
vary widely. Effective policy cannot just concentrate on catching and pun-
ishing ‘rotten apples’. Policy must address the underlying conditions that cre-
ate corrupt incentives, or it will have no long-lasting effects. The sorts of
structural and incentive-based policy responses that are outlined here – both
the successes and the failures – can guide governments that are genuinely
committed to reform.
Yet, I end on a note of caution. Clever technical solutions, based on eco-
nomic incentives, may not be enough. If corruption is one of the pillars sup-
porting a political system, it cannot be substantially reduced unless an alter-
native source of revenue replaces it. Powerful groups that lose one source of
patronage will search for another vulnerable sector. Strong moral leadership
is necessary but not sufficient. Tough political and policy choices need to be
faced squarely. It is little wonder that effective and long-lasting corruption
control is a rare and precious achievement. But it is not beyond the power of
determined and intelligent political reformers.
Chapter 5:
Understanding corruption:
How systems theory can help     
Petra Hiller              
1. Introduction
Network relations have been a principal focus of empirical policy and ad-
ministration research at least since the 1980s.1 Examples that immediately
spring to mind are the debate on neo-corporatism and the ‘cooperative state’,
not to mention the abundance of literature that has analysed policy networks.
Viewed from the perspective of political and administrative science, net-
works of this kind react to difficulties in the administration of national policy.
Networking is an attempt to control environmental uncertainty. Less often
discussed in this context, however, is the perception that under conditions of
this kind, the opportunities for corruption also increase.
More recent studies have shown that corruption primarily takes place in-
side a network of structures interlinking politics and business (Bannenberg
2002; Höffling 2002). The economisation of the public sector proceeding un-
der the banner of ‘New Public Management’ seems to be giving further im-
petus to this trend (Maravić 2007). If this is true, then we must ask (a) why
corrupt networks are mainly found in politics and (b) how sociologists can
best explain this.
I develop a proposal in this article that seeks to answer these two questions
by considering the issue of ‘corruption and networks’ within the context of so-
cial theory. The adoption of a social theory perspective entails that the termi-
nology and standpoints habitually applied in corruption research may require
some adjustment. The following deliberations thus begin with the conviction
that a sociological analysis must break free of the concepts of corruption devel-
oped by political science research (2). The alternative I propose is to explore
corruption from an organisational and social perspective. This will allow us to
conceive of corruption as a linkage of different horizons of meaning in social
communication and therefore to identify a structural affinity with the constitu-
tive conditions of networks (3). In a further step (4), I will investigate why the
political domain appears to be particularly susceptible to corruption. The an-
                                                          
1 This article is based on an earlier German version entitled ‘Korruption und Netzwerke. Kon-
fusionen im Schema von Organisation und Gesellschaft‘, in: Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie
25, 2005, pp. 57-77.
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swer lies in the nature of moral observation, which personalises political com-
munication and in this way fosters scandalisation of behaviour. Section 5 por-
trays network formation as a linkage technique that (in exactly the same way as
corruption) represents a breakdown in functional differentiation. The conclud-
ing remarks on corruption and networks sum up this notion (6).
2. Corruption research
Corruption research is still guided by Joseph S. Nye’s definition of corruption
as ‘behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because
of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-
regarding influence’ (1967: 419). Thus, research on political corruption un-
derstands it to mean abuse of political power, where abuse implies a breach
of regulations involving the exchange of political power for other resources.
And so political corruption denotes a manner of exerting influence on politi-
cal decisions in order to serve particular interests at the expense of the gen-
eral public. The classical definition thus depicts corruption as a kind of anto-
nym to the ‘common good’ (Gebhardt 2003: 16). This conception of corruption
has been refined in a variety of ways (cf. Gardiner 2005; Kurer 2003; Philip
2002). Approaches inspired by democratic theory now suggest that the dis-
tinction between private and public – which is a crucial element of the tradi-
tional definition of corruption – should be replaced by a distinction between
inclusion and exclusion (Warren 2004). Generally, however, research on this
topic situates political corruption at the level of individual behaviour and
motive attribution (e.g., Graeff 2005; Jain 2001), and so crucial queries re-
garding the conceptualisation of its subject matter can only be resolved in
definitional terms and not with the means offered by a social science theory.
Some criticism has been voiced about this very issue. It has been asked, for
instance, why corruption research should be restricted to examining eco-
nomic advantages gained by individuals, why the acceptance of advantages
on behalf of third parties (beyond family or private clique structures) should
be excluded, why corruption should refer only to abuse of public resources,
when legitimate exercise of influence turns into corruption and how this defi-
nition applies to the phenomenon of corruption networks. Problems of this
kind, which are inevitable given a conception of corruption built on case
studies and patterns of deviance, are discussed by Gardiner (2002). I argue
that this type of approach fails to make use of the full potential of corruption
research. It remains limited to describing types of behaviour and to charac-
terising individual cases. Thus, corruption research does not arrive at a theo-
retically solid grasp of its subject.
My thesis is that this failure has the following cause: While it is true that
corruption occurs through the exercise of influence and the assertion of inter-
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ests at the level of organisations and networks, it is also true that corruption
cannot be explained theoretically at this level. Sociological considerations
must therefore approach the question at a more fundamental level and ask in
which social structural conditions corruption arises. Consequently, a socio-
logical exploration will not allow its viewpoint to be narrowed by political
science considerations. The first task is to describe what happens in terms of
the formation of social structures when corruption is observed in organisa-
tional contexts.
To this end, we must first examine the relationship between organisation
and society and then strictly abide by the resulting distinction between sys-
tem levels. The main theoretical and conceptual underpinnings used in this
perspective have their basis in differentiation theory, which is the approach I
will maintain in the following. I proceed on the assumption that only a con-
ception of corruption which is grounded in social theory and which deviates
from the popular conceptualisation found in the literature permits an adequate
understanding of the problem. It will become clear following my proposed
definition that the phenomenon of corruption does indeed have a special af-
finity with network formation, but that this association can also only be re-
constructed within an analysis guided by social theory. Moreover, the analy-
sis of organisation and society from the perspective of differentiation theory
confirms the notion that structural formations such as corruption and net-
works should be described as effects of functional differentiation and not, as
sometimes assumed, as a ‘de-differentiation’ phenomenon taking place in
modern society.
In this theoretical perspective, the concept of corruption is used in a non-
ontological manner. Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory with its differentiation
theory perspective, which I will use in the following, is a constructivist ob-
servation theory. The epistemological background implies that systems the-
ory does not consider the ontological characteristics of an object, rather asks
how and by whom something is observed. In other words, within the frame-
work of this epistemology, there are no definitions that are independent of the
observer. Theory formation takes place at the level of second-order observa-
tions. A corresponding constructivist theory of corruption, which distin-
guishes itself from action theories, will thus not ask what corruption ‘is’ and
what the causes of corruption ‘are’. Instead, the central question asked by
such a theory will be how and by whom corruption is observed. Systems the-
ory thus differs substantially from causal scientific theories of knowledge. Its
method is functional analysis – a prerequisite of theory formation by abstrac-
tion. The advantage of this approach for the acquisition of knowledge is that
one can use it to evidence general structure formations in society, which can
then be compared in respect of functional equivalents (Luhmann 1970: 9-30).
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3. Differentiation
These considerations lead us to the question as to what we would see if, in-
stead of treating the phenomenon of corruption at the level of organisations
and networks, we were to look at it from the point of view of functional con-
texts in society. Smelser (1971) has already presented a proposal of this kind
based on differentiation theory. Drawing on Parsons’ theory of generalised
interchange media, Smelser describes very precisely how social differentia-
tion is a prerequisite for corruption.
Under Niklas Luhmann’s project of systems theory, social communica-
tion is structured in accordance with specific functions (politics, law, busi-
ness, etc.). Here, Luhmann’s theory departs radically from Parsons’ ideas in
that it switches from ‘action’ to ‘communication’ as the basic unit of opera-
tion of social systems. Moreover, Luhmann holds that functional systems in
society are autopoietically closed systems. When functional codes are repro-
duced, only communications that are specific to the respective meaning sys-
tem are recognised. This means, in turn, that at the level of functional sys-
tems, political decisions can only be justified politically and economic
decisions can only be justified economically. Linkage between the codes of
different meaning systems is therefore excluded. The legal system deals with
each communication by distinguishing between legal and illegal, because this
is the only kind of operation that has meaning for the legal system and is
therefore suited to reproducing it (Luhmann 1981). All other types of com-
munication, in other words communications that cannot be identified as being
either legal or illegal but that may nonetheless arise in organisations of the
legal system (political, economic, aesthetic, or religious decisions, for exam-
ple), are not attributed to the functional system of law but to its social envi-
ronment. Thus, in the functional differentiation is a mechanism that avoids
confusion among functionally differentiated systems.2
But everyday experience tells us a very different story. Take the neo-
liberal ‘reforms’ of the European welfare state over the last twenty years, for
instance. In areas of this kind, policy decisions are not only motivated politi-
cally, but increasingly also economically. And this does not only apply to
politics. If we shift our focus to the legal system, we see that juristic deci-
sions are not motivated purely legally, but that economic, pedagogical and
sociological considerations are just some of other factors also brought into
the equation. These examples demonstrate that the functional differentiation
of society is by no means maintained at the organisational level. Functional
systems quite evidently follow their own logic and, as a type of social sys-
tem, this also goes for organisations. Thus, we must make a distinction be-
                                                          
2 I borrow the term ‘confusion’ from a formulation used by Luhmann (2000a: 92) to deal with
the differentiation between role and person.
Petra Hiller68
tween functional logic and organisational logic. This insight gives us impor-
tant pointers for an understanding of corruption based on social theory.
In everyday communication, the label of ‘corruption’ is primarily applied
in cases where money has changed hands. The allegation of corruption im-
plies that politicians and political organisations can be bought. From a sys-
tems theory perspective, the allegation of corruption simply means that the
political system has been infiltrated by the logic of an extraneous system. In
this particular case, power is exchanged for money and political decisions are
no longer determined only by political concerns. More specifically, if cor-
ruption is the abuse of political power, then it is abuse in favour of a different
logic – in this case an economic one. And this brings us to the proposed defi-
nition of corruption already found in Smelser (1971): What is observed as
corruption is actually the linkage of different horizons of meaning in social
communication. But how do these linkages of meaning that we call corrup-
tion come about? The answer to this question is not found in the functional
contexts of society but at the level of their organisations.
In order to develop this argument, we must take Smelser’s considerations
an important step further. Smelser’s conceptualisation does no more than ob-
serve an overlap in particular situations of different media of interchange
between the public and the private sector. If we want to carry out a more
thorough analysis, however, we must take the relationship between organisa-
tion and social differentiation into account (Luhmann 1975: 9-20). And so we
arrive at a question which is given too little consideration in corruption re-
search. As far as I can see, corruption research makes no systematic distinc-
tion between the political system and political organisations. And yet an
analysis guided by differentiation theory of the relationship between organi-
sation and society can yield much more telling insights. Some observers sug-
gest that organisations can be allocated one-on-one to particular functional
systems, or that they should be viewed as subsystems of functional systems.
But we cannot resort to shortcuts here, such as linking organisations back to
functional systems and seeing the latter as the determinants of organisations’
decision-making. The system type ‘organisation’ is not structured in accor-
dance with the coding of functional systems (Nassehi 2002). For this would
mean abandoning the distinction between organisation and society or, more
precisely, abandoning the differentiation between system levels and system
types in the framework provided by the theory of functional differentiation. A
differentiation theory perspective will thus proceed on the assumption that
there are complementary processes of system formation and will describe the
reproductive link between organisational and functional systems in terms of a
relationship of reciprocal conditioning (Lieckweg/Wehrsig 2001). If we con-
sider that organisation has differentiated itself as a separate category of sys-
tem that cannot be derived from functional systems, then we can achieve a
more precise understanding of the problem by distinguishing between organi-
sation and society. We can then acknowledge that organisations participate in
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several different functional systems and that their decisions are not governed
by just one logic of meaning. In order to survive in society, organisations fre-
quently have to give weight to different criteria when making decisions. At
the same time, it is clear that most organisations have a basic orientation to-
wards a certain functional logic to which they are then assigned. It is only
when we see a preeminent orientation and corresponding attributions to
functional systems that we speak of economic, scientific, political, etc. or-
ganisations.
The distinction between organisation and society is also important in an-
other respect in any exploration of corruption. We had already established
that functional systems are meaning systems: they are responsible for coding
communication. As functional subsystems, they cannot make decisions and
they cannot communicate. This is not the case for organisations, however,
which are social systems that reproduce themselves by means of decisions
and that communicate through decisions. This is very significant when it
comes to the issue of corruption, for when corruption is observed, then it is in
the form of decisions. Thus, corruption arises when organisations (networks,
groups or individuals) that are assigned to particular functional contexts fail
to uphold the appropriate functional logics in their decisions. Corruption is an
example of organisations ‘using the codes of functional systems in accor-
dance with their own logic’ (Lieckweg/Wehrsig 2001: 40). Alfons Bora has
shown that these processes must on no account be considered as phenomena
of de-differentiation of modern society. What is interesting is that such proc-
esses show that functional differentiation is maintained at the level of func-
tional systems. Moreover, it is the very differentiation of specific horizons of
meaning in communication (truth, money, power) that allows the linkage of
different logics of meaning. If society were not functionally differentiated,
then corruption could not be observed (cf. Smelser 1971). Using the example
of the politicisation of legal decisions, Alfons Bora demonstrates empirically
that functional differentiation is a prerequisite for the confusion of horizons
of meaning, for these can only occur within this framework (Bora 1999). So-
cial trends such as politicisation, juridification, scientification and economi-
sation are thus consequences of decisions taken at the organisational level
whose genesis cannot, however, be adequately described by organisational
sociology. Each of these trends exemplifies the observation that the dominant
orientation of an organisation’s decision premises has allowed itself to be
corrupted by another logic of meaning. Now we may ask whether certain
types of organisation are more susceptible to corruption than others, although
it will not be possible to develop this question within the framework of sys-
tems theory. Systems theory’s strength lies in the elaboration of a general
theory of formal organisation. But a general theory cannot achieve a re-
specification with respect to particular types of organisation. While systems
theory does differentiate organisations in terms of functional systems by as-
serting – as pointed out above – that organisations have a basic orientation
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towards a certain functional logic, it does not provide a theoretical explana-
tion for this (implicit) typologisation of formal organisations (cf. Tacke
2001).
To sum up, infiltration by an extraneous logic does not take place in the
functional systems of society, rather at the level where decision-making is
determined. This insight, which is owed to systems theory, takes us a deci-
sive step further than Smelser’s analyses. The decision premises of organisa-
tions adopt extraneous criteria, and so it is at the level where decision-making
is programmed that logics of meaning can become confused. Thus, it is not
politics that is corrupt, nor even the political system, but the organisations,
networks and individuals who belong to the political system (cf. Baecker
2000).
If we generalise this observation and view corruption in differentiation
theory terms as a linkage between different system logics, then there are im-
portant consequences for a sociological perspective on the topic of corrup-
tion. On the one hand, it becomes clear that corruption emerges as society is
differentiated. On the other hand, it likewise becomes clear that the phe-
nomenon of corruption cannot be restricted to linkages between politics and
business. This can be demonstrated by an example from the German health
system known as the ‘heart-valve scandal’, which took place in the mid-
1990s and involved a total of 1,860 doctors and technicians working in 418
hospitals.3 This group of people cheated the German health insurance funds,
and thus their contributory members, by overcharging for heart valves and
technical appliances. The intersection of different horizons of meaning, in
this case medicine and business, is also evident in this example. And it is
only because there is this intertwinement of functional systems that we call
corruption. When norms are breached within the confines of the context of
medicine, then this is considered malpractice or a violation of the Hippocratic
Oath. In the context of business, such deviations from the norm are said to
constitute fraud, bribery, or white-collar crime in general. But corruption is
only observed when different horizons of meaning intersect. And there is no
need either for money to change hands or for the law to be broken in order
for corruption to be observed. The conceptualisation of corruption I have
proposed here as the linkage of different horizons of meaning in social com-
munication allows us to compare very different forms of corruption from the
same perspective.
An example of corruption without money changing hands can be found in
the practice of linking science with politics. In other words, scientists are cor-
rupt when their work is guided by political rather than truth criteria.4 Such
work is then recognised as being ‘partisan’, for example as being too friendly
                                                          
3 The numbers involved are provided simply to give an idea of the empirical dimensions of a
corruption network. For additional data and a description of this case, cf. Scheuch (2002).
4 The example does not refer to a kind of science that can be bought, rather to science that
proceeds on the basis of a particular ideological standpoint.
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to trade unions, and is filtered out of scientific communication. The same
kind of corruption can be found in the art world, especially in the case of
commissioned work. An artist can be rapidly judged to have succumbed to
corruption when expectations that are external to art (e.g., political correct-
ness) become relevant.
Another example of a system being infiltrated by an extraneous logic is
when political decisions are based on religious arguments – for example, in
the case of political decisions regarding the application of reproductive medi-
cine, or when the question of tolerance of religious symbols in schools is on
the political agenda. There are many other examples, and in every single case
what we are clearly dealing with is a breakdown in functional differentiation
at the level of organisations and networks.
This conception of corruption, which is grounded in social theory and de-
fines itself in terms of differences in meaning and the linkage of different
meanings, reframes the questions at the heart of corruption research. It does
not distinguish between conformist and deviant behaviour, nor does it deal
with any of the particularities of the abuse of public goods. The shortcomings
of the latter kind of conceptualisation are all too familiar. Even the question
as to what exactly constitutes ‘abuse’ can bog the debate down in definitional
disputes.5 And so we arrive at a conception of corruption that may irritate
some readers because it diverges so significantly from the customary defini-
tions. This is not only because a theory-driven vision of corruption must ig-
nore the boundaries of the public sphere in order to be able to show in a so-
cial theory analysis that such structural intersections occur in all sectors of
society, not just in politics. Unlike everyday communication, in which cor-
ruption is always considered to be reprehensible,6 a theoretical reconstruction
dispenses with normative preconceptions. This allows us to describe the con-
stitutive conditions of such structural formations and also to examine cases of
positively assessed corrupt behaviour.7 The evaluation of corruption does not
                                                          
5 In the simplest scenario, a change in the law would suffice to render corrupt behaviour ac-
ceptable. Possibilities that spring to mind are funding for political parties and the ‘second’
jobs of parliamentary deputies. Indeed there have been many cases (not only in Italy!) of
these and other kinds of corruption being legalised (Kurer 2003: 46).
6 In their reflections on the concept of corruption in everyday language, Fleck and Kuzmics
point out that ‘what is considered morally reprehensible and whether certain behaviour is
considered in this way varies from time to time (and from place to place), but the fact that
attributing the label is equivalent to an evaluation is as good as unaffected by social change’
(1985: 7, original emphasis). This observation is also confirmed by the word’s etymology.
Corrumpere: ‘spoil’, ‘debauch’, ‘damage’, ‘demolish’. Incidentally, the same connotation
has also penetrated political and social science analyses. Cf., for example, C. J. Friedrich’s
influential work ‘The Pathology of Politics’ (1972).
7 We are in good sociological company here, as shown by a glance at Max Weber’s work:
‘Weber consistently makes ‘technical’ use of the corruption and bribery vocabulary of
Western culture, but he never adopts the values with which these labels are charged and sen-
sationalised. Corruption and bribery are placed in a relational context and in most citations
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take place at the level of its constitution, but at the level of its observation by
society. And this brings us to the topic of ‘morality’.
4. Morality
It is easy to see that the social observation of corruption is a matter of moral
communication. In the perception of third parties, the intermingling in poli-
tics of different logics of meaning is considered morally reprehensible. Ob-
servers can invoke the expectation that particular horizons of meaning
(power, truth, etc.) should be upheld. When this does not happen, then we are
faced not only with a violation of norms, but in a very moral sense with po-
litical or scientific or some other kind of abuse. Interestingly enough, such
moralisations can be highly selective. If an entrepreneur against his or her
own economic wisdom does not shut down a business outlet that is operating
at a loss and motivates this decision politically in terms of a sense of respon-
sibility for local employment and for the development of the region (thus
linking the meaning horizons of politics and economics), then this entrepre-
neur would never be considered a corrupt businessperson. Likewise, the deci-
sion to keep operations afloat would never be considered morally reprehensi-
ble. On the contrary, an entrepreneur of this kind would become the object of
an unusual degree of moral esteem. Thus, morals do exist in business, and
they also make a difference. A good example here is the Brent Spar case.
Brent Spar was the name of an oil-storage platform located in the North Sea
that the Shell company decided to sink on site in 1995 because this was likely
to be cheaper than disposing of the structure on land. In a campaign that at-
tracted huge media attention, the environmental protection organisation
Greenpeace succeeded in persuading the company to dispose of Brent Spar
on land after all for ecological reasons. In this case, too, then, there is an evi-
dent fusion of system logics that was by no means considered morally repre-
hensible. The same applies to the example mentioned above of religious ar-
guments infiltrating politics. This type of linkage of different logics of
meaning is usually not called into question for moral reasons. At least in
Germany, one rarely hears the allegation that politics has allowed itself to be
abused or corrupted by religion. So how do such differences come about? We
will clarify this question in the following, for otherwise the proposed con-
ception of corruption would appear substantially less plausible.
The observational framework of morality, that is, approval versus disap-
proval of behaviour (Luhmann 1978), is clearly applied selectively, for the
linkage of different system logics is not always subject to disapproval. In
fact, once again ‘at the end of the day it is the communicative purpose that
                                                                                                                            
they are identified clearly as ‘structural’ social realities, not as motivational phenomena or
universal moral standards’ (Schmidt 2003: 72).
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gives a moral quality to a meaning or a sign’ (Luhmann 1978: 52). The fact
that the presence or absence of corruption depends on observation becomes
very evident within the context of morality. And this becomes even clearer
when an additional distinction is introduced, that is, the distinction between
self-serving and selfless corruption.8
It can be assumed that politics is particularly exposed to moral judgement
and that bribery in politics is considered especially reprehensible. One of the
likely reasons is that political power is bestowed by third parties and also
constitutes a relationship of subordination, so that the exercise of political
power comes attached to moral expectations. This bond is further strength-
ened by the fact that moral communication has a strong personalising effect,
which increases the likelihood of conflict. Thus, moral communication finds
a particularly welcoming ground in politics, for in the political system, too,
decisions are attributed to a substantial extent to individuals (Luhmann
2000b: 380). The strong tendency of moral communication towards person-
alisation and its associated tendency to engender conflict together facilitate
the scandalisation of events in the political system (e.g., the exposure of cor-
ruption) – something which is much less easy in other subsystems of society.
But one can also find examples where there is no moral condemnation of
political corruption. Morality is not always dosed out in the same way. Evi-
dently, the moral observation of corruption depends on whether or not a spe-
cial advantage has been obtained. The impetus to moralise wanes when the
particular gain that arises as a result of corrupt behaviour is not received by
an individual but actually benefits a collective interest (however ‘particular’
that interest may be). We are familiar with the moral evaluation of deviant
behaviour when it takes place in a ‘selfless’ way. For instance, there is
something altruistic about the destitute mother who steals to feed her chil-
dren, and even criminal law takes her circumstances into account. Self-
enrichment for reasons of greed, by contrast, is reprehensible. So we see that
the judgement varies depending on whether exclusive advantage has been
obtained or whether third parties have benefited. This is an example of the
‘double standard’ of moral communication (Luhmann 1978). It makes a sig-
nificant difference to moral judgement if evidence of altruistic motivation can
be found behind deviant behaviour. This is why moral judgement tolerates
advantages obtained on behalf of third parties. As an example of the ‘double
standard’ of morality, we note that until 1999 in Germany, bribes that were
paid to attract foreign contracts were tax deductible as business expenses.
The reason given for this practice was that it did not damage the German tax-
payer in any way; on the contrary, when the bribes paid off, the taxpayer
would be rewarded through the overall increase in tax revenue.9 In the moral
                                                          
8 This leads to an interesting departure from current definitions of corruption, which are based
on the distinction between damage to the common good and no damage to the common
good. Morality is interested in whether or not personal advantage has been ‘earned’.
9 This and the following example are taken from Scheuch (2002).
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observation of corruption, therefore, it makes a difference whether the latter
is seen as personal enrichment (self-serving behaviour) or as selfless corrup-
tion (Scheuch 2003). The party-funding scandal under the Kohl government
demonstrates this distinction again quite clearly. When the then Federal
Chancellor was accused of illicitly receiving two million Deutschmarks, he
defended himself by saying that he had violated the German Political Parties
Act only for the good of his party and that he had in no way personally en-
riched himself. In other words, he had engaged in corruption for the benefit
of the corporation, as Scheuch dubs this pre-modern practice. And again mo-
rality (the moralising of society) makes a distinction here.
There are therefore thresholds of tolerance in the moral observation of
corruption and these thresholds are based on just one convention: corruption
carried out in the interests of the collective tends to be tolerated. This obser-
vation entails a whole package of other explanatory factors that cannot be
detailed here. But it is now clear why international organisations are believed
to be particularly corrupt. There are many familiar examples: member states
of the European Union that exploit the EU budget for the good of their own
countries (Warner 2000); the United Nations, which is believed to be so cor-
rupt that the USA managed to refuse to pay its U.N. dues for years on the ba-
sis of this argument; the World Bank, which was pilloried by its own direc-
tors when corruption there got completely out of hand (Eigen 2003). Network
relations in international and global organisational contexts offer the perfect
structural conditions for the practice of selfless corruption.
Taken together, these considerations suggest an answer to the questions
posed above as to why there is an absence of disapproving moral judgement
when religious provinces of meaning infiltrate politics or when economic or-
ganisations act politically. The reason is that no self-interest is observed in
these cases. Thresholds for moralisation vary depending on attribution. This
is why politics can be corrupted by religion, science, law, etc. without this
causing moral indignation. Likewise it explains the many examples of cor-
ruption for the benefit of the corporation (company, political party, school,
etc.) that are not considered to be instances of corruption in everyday com-
munication. And it also explains why politicians are often forced to resign as
a consequence of relatively harmless cases of illicit gain: this is more likely
to happen when their behaviour is considered to have been directed towards
personal enrichment. These preliminary considerations indicate that the
moral observation of corruption is one of the most exciting areas of corrup-
tion research. Thus, both for theoretical and empirical research, the most im-
portant question in the field becomes the problem of the second, moral ob-
servation of linkages of meaning – this is the challenge against which a
definition of corruption based on differentiation theory must prove itself.
What still remains unclear, however, is the relationship between corrup-
tion and networks. This question will be dealt with in the following section.
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5. Networks
If we think about networks in politics, then the spoils system comes to mind.
Political organisations appear to specialise in controlling official posts and
power advantages by means of networks of relations (Luhmann 2000a: 110).
In the political domain, vacancies are usually not filled on the basis of exter-
nal recruitment but as a consequence of internal promotion (Bosetzky 1974;
Luhmann 2000a: 104). Networks of contacts are activated in order to push
through exclusionary decisions (Luhmann 1995a: 237-264). While, on the
one hand, careers are owed to the selection procedures practised by organisa-
tions (Luhmann 2000a: 101), on the other, selections (decisions) are always
under-determined by formal criteria. Even supposedly ‘rational’ personnel
decisions are influenced by particular interests. And yet patronage is not al-
ways met with disapproval. There are examples observed in political and
economic organisations that demonstrate that the acquisition of loyalty
through selective recruitment is socially acceptable. This applies, for exam-
ple, to enterprises that favour the children of their employees when recruiting
apprentices. There are strong indications that such family network structures
also come into play in the allocation of apprenticeship places in the public
administration and in connection with careers in party organisations.
We see patronage as the forecourt of corruption. In other words, we devi-
ate from the familiar understanding of the concept, which includes patronage
under the label of corruption as a form of ‘abuse of political power’. But if
our point of departure is that corruption corresponds to the linkage of differ-
ent horizons of meaning, then it becomes clear that patronage is a different
type of use of political power. Contact networks of this kind do not seek to
link different functional logics. Their brand of particularism organises re-
cruitment within the confines of system contexts (political, economic, scien-
tific, etc.). At the same time, however, this can constitute a kind of prepara-
tion for corruption, for in this way expectations can be established. Just as it
is generally accepted in the case of gift exchange (Mauss 1990), it is not the
good that is given that creates an advantage for the patron, rather the obliga-
tions that are created through the giving (and receiving!), however indetermi-
nate these obligations may be. Patronage establishes expectations of reci-
procity (Stegbauer 2002).
When what is at stake are not apprenticeship places or patronage, rather
leadership roles for which external candidates are sought, networks become
important in another sense. In this case, it is the contacts enjoyed by indi-
viduals that seem to legitimise a style of personnel recruitment that draws on
personal relationships. In a sense, what is recruited is the candidate’s net-
work, which is counted as a gain for the organisation. When it comes to fill-
ing leadership positions, professional personnel recruiters are actually ex-
pected to adopt this kind of approach. Thus, when it seemed that Deutsche
Bank would soon need a new chief executive, it was felt that it might be a
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good idea to offer the position to a well-known politician because he or she
would be certain to have good contacts in Brussels. In this case, an individ-
ual’s network is explicitly identified as an outstanding characteristic and as a
reason to consider a politician for the job and not, for instance, a candidate
from the financial sector.10 This is a patent example of linkage between the
meaning horizons of politics and business being viewed positively. Indeed,
when it comes to positions on supervisory boards or advisory committees,
this is one of their very functions. The same applies to the advisory commit-
tees of other organisations, such as in science, sports, or art. Their purpose is
to act as a conduit for the infiltration of foreign rationalities into their own
organisational context. Networks of this kind serve as a means of coordina-
tion with the organisation’s environment (Luhmann 1995a: 237-264). Such
links are suspected in everyday communication as being corrupt when no
visible ‘payment’ is made for the indulgences that are disbursed. For even if
there is no proof of direct influence on the decision behaviour of individuals,
everything we know about reciprocity tells us that ‘some kind’ of payment
will be made.11 Reciprocity as a universal norm tells us that one-sided pay-
ments must always be seen as advance payments that imply the expectation
of subsequent settlement: ‘Because reciprocity is a general guide to action
with which everyone is familiar, it is almost unthinkable that a person could
receive a gift without giving something else in return, especially when the
names of the givers have remained a secret’ (Stegbauer 2002: 71). What im-
mediately spring to mind here are anonymous donations to political parties.
But the same also applies to white corruption, such as including politicians
on the payroll of enterprises.
Both network research and corruption research identify particularism as
the driving force behind the establishment of such arrangements. Differentia-
tion theory takes a different perspective in that it examines the relationship
between functional systems and organisations or networks. It thus becomes
evident that different logics of meaning cross paths at the organisational and
network level. The particularism of such structural formations can then be
described as a secondary effect that only emerges as a result of the confusion
of different meaning horizons. And the question as to which structural pre-
conditions render networks susceptible to corruption can now be clarified.
When organisations establish networks between politics and economics, they
also create linkages between functional areas of society. In other words, net-
work formation is a linkage technique.
This conception of network formation as a linkage technique draws on a
proposal developed by Veronika Tacke (2000) in the context of network the-
ory. She believes that networks are constructed by means of a reflexive com-
                                                          
10 Cf. ‘Aktionärsrevolte: Hedgefonds will Deutsche Börse verkaufen’. Spiegel Online, 10 May
2005. URL: http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,355331,00.html.
11 Let us recall at this point the ‘do ut des’ principle of Roman contractual law: ‘I give so that
you may give’.
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bination of addresses that are embedded in different contexts of meaning.
Addresses are thus said to be ‘polycontextural’. The construct of addresses
indicates that organisational networks – just like personal networks – do not
link individuals, but the characteristics of individuals (or positions or official
functions). This means that networks link specific – not arbitrary – addresses.
These considerations evince the structural similarity existing between cor-
ruption and networks. It is therefore no surprise that the increased signifi-
cance of personal and organisational networks discussed in the literature
since the mid-1980s has also been seen in relation to ‘de-differentiation’. As
Veronika Tacke shows, however, networks, in order to develop, require a
functionally differentiated social structure. For it is only in such conditions
that polycontextural addresses can emerge at all and then be re-combined in
response to the new opportunities created by the linkage. We can also apply
this reasoning to the level of organisational and contractual relationships and
ascertain that the purpose of hybrid organisational networks is not to dissolve
organisational boundaries; on the contrary, the parasitic nature of networks is
evidenced by the fact that they latch onto existing structures: ‘Networks of
this kind lack an independent existence from the outset, as many traditional
interpersonal networks have. They only develop where exploitable institu-
tions already exist’ (Teubner 2001: 561).
The structure of networks of personal contacts teaches us that successful
relationship networks really do establish a link between addresses from dif-
ferent context meanings. Their particular characteristic is to constitute a
bridge across ‘structural holes’ (Burt 1992). Ronald Burt has examined this
quality in the organisational context, using the example of personal networks
that transcend departmental, functional and group boundaries. Burt believes
that the success of these structural formations lies in the intersection between
‘social worlds’ and that this is evidenced by the ‘heterogeneity of the con-
tacts’ (Burt 2004). In the language of differentiation theory, address networks
of this kind create a link between different horizons of meaning in communi-
cation. In this context, Burt emphasises the technique of brokerage underly-
ing the linkage of addresses. And he also discusses the corrosive effects that
may accompany brokerage, such as fraud, organised crime and corporate
misgovernance (Burt 2004: 354).
If we want to look at networks of contacts between politics and business
that are found beyond organisational boundaries, then we can examine this
linkage technique in an area of the service sector that specialises in the crea-
tion of networks of addresses. I am referring to lobbyists who act as commis-
sion brokers or ‘PR advisors’ and who play a vital role in the realm of cor-
ruption. The particular service provided by these address brokers is to
connect people from different functional contexts. Here, too, it is not the in-
dividuals themselves but the specific characteristics they possess – such as
capacity to exert influence – as a consequence of their position in a particular
organisation that make specific addresses interesting for networks. Both the
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recruitment of specific addresses and the motivation to participate in a net-
work are guided by the following consideration: What possibilities that I cur-
rently do not have can become available to me through the possibilities of
others? The possibilities in question can range from access to intentions re-
garding future investments to decisions regarding the provision of intensive-
care facilities in a particular federal state. Addresses are thus created de-
pending on the particular opportunity of the moment. At the local level, and
especially in the building trade, it is engineers’ offices and ‘project consult-
ants’ who act as address brokers between business, politics and the public
administration (Rügemer 1996). In every case the goal is to improve the
available options, and this requires links that extend beyond system bounda-
ries. Contact networks within and between organisations are activated when
people begin seeking access to something that otherwise would be precluded
to them.
The heterogeneity of contacts also becomes significant for another reason,
and this requires a brief explanation in the context of corruption and net-
works. The fact is that the heterogeneity of the constituent contacts of net-
works significantly enhances their stability. This is because
‘there is a lack of instruments for returning favours and repaying assistance, provision of
access and brokerage across the boundaries of meaning; as a result, the question of social
compensation for services rendered must be shifted into the time dimension as a kind of
credit against as yet unspecified return services’ (Tacke 2000: 305).
However, the possibility provided by polycontextural addresses to postpone
and leave indeterminate the recompense not only extends to the temporal di-
mension. Gouldner (1960) speaks of heteromorphic reciprocity when who
exactly is going to repay the debt remains unspecified. Thus, we can imagine
that instead of the recipient of the original favour, a third party might step in
who ‘some day’ will extend an as yet unspecified courtesy. Recalling how
Tacke describes generalised reciprocity as a mechanism that stabilises net-
work relations, this explains both how corruption arises through the estab-
lishment of relationships of dependency within networks and how such
structures manage to survive over the long term. Höffling (2002) accurately
reconstructs corruption as a social relationship. The significance of this in
empirical terms can perhaps be illustrated by the case of a former German
Bundestag deputy who was sentenced in 2003 to three years in custody for
fraud involving bid rigging, among other offences. When it came to the repa-
triation of the monies involved and the public prosecutor offered the enter-
prises that had suffered the damage the funds seized from the guilty party, the
former declined to enforce a claim. In this way, the six-figure sum was re-
stored to the corrupt ex-politician.12 Thus, another stabilisation mechanism
can also take effect in the context of corruption: The ‘resource of illegality’
(Luhmann 1995a: 256) is used by networks to protect themselves against dis-
                                                          
12 Cf. ‘Justiz pfändet eine Insel’. Neue Westfälische, 10 May 2005.
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appointed expectations. Participation in an illegal network renders one sus-
ceptible to blackmail and it is especially because of this that a network of re-
lationships can achieve a high degree of stability. Illegality can thus be used
as a resource to protect the structure of such arrangements against deviance.
And this is all the more true when the exit option can only be contemplated in
association with the acceptance of one’s own downfall (Luhmann 1995b).
6. Corruption and networks
The above considerations have shown that both public opinion and research
on the subject assume that there is a certain affinity between corruption and
networks, despite the lack of a theoretical contribution that explains this con-
stellation. The question that arises, then, is what form a sociological approach
to the phenomenon might take. This text develops the theory that established
definitions of corruption, which describe corruption in terms of exercise of
influence and defence of interests, cannot provide satisfactory answers to this
question. I argue that the structural conditions of modern society behind the
emergence of corruption and networks cannot be reconstructed within the
terms of this kind of definition. Thus, I propose the adoption of an approach
based on differentiation theory. The latter theory provides an analysis of the
social structural conditions of corruption and can reveal the way in which the
macrostructure of modern society is circumvented at the organisational level.
The comparative strengths of systems theory lie in analysis guided by social
theory. If we look at corruption from the perspective of the functional con-
texts of society, then we come up against structural ‘confusions’ that are not
provided for within functional differentiation. We find linkages between ho-
rizons of meaning that appear to deviate from social differentiation. Such ob-
servations generate irritation and society responds with an increase in moral
communication.
But how is it possible that system logics can be ruptured and the structural
and ideological premises of functional systems not be maintained? I argue
that the explanation can be found in the distinction between organisation and
functional system. System differentiation seen in terms of meaning differen-
tiation organises social communication in accordance with its codes. But the
social operation of communication does not take place at the level of func-
tional systems, rather at the level of organisations, networks, groups and peo-
ple. And so it is only by distinguishing between system level and system type
that we can gain insight into how confusions in the scheme of meaning can
come about. Once a distinction has been made between organisation and so-
ciety, it becomes evident that organisations make use of the codes of func-
tional systems according to their own needs (Lieckweg/Wehrsig 2001). Or-
ganisations operate as multi-referents and this means that their decision-
making is not necessarily guided by a single logic. Seen from the perspective
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of functional differentiation, therefore, corruption appears to correspond to a
feeding in of foreign meaning logics at the programming level of organisa-
tions. And so it is the organisations of the functionally differentiated society
that allow the primacy of functional differentiation to collapse and that de-
liver it to deviance.
What can we learn from all of this for coping with corruption? We cannot
derive direct recommendations as to how to combat corruption from systems
theory analyses. At the same time, this much becomes clear: The situation of
politics is paradoxical. As Burt’s work (1992; 2004) and research inspired by
it have shown, heterogeneous networks are seen as social innovations. Cross-
linkages that transcend boundaries of meaning lead to an incrementation of
options and, in favourable cases, result in socially desired outcomes. This is
why politics promotes network formation between research institutes and
enterprises, for example. Moreover, the catchword ‘public governance’ char-
acterises heterogeneous organisational networks as efficient structures of po-
litical management. This means, on the one hand, that cross-linkages between
public and private organisations may manifest performance advantages that
are not perceived as corruption. On the other, political arrangements of this
kind suffer from a legitimacy deficit which is currently the subject of intense
discussion in governance research (cf. Pierre 2000; Rhodes 2008). The
structural affinity of the constitutional conditions of networking and corrup-
tion are not highlighted as a problem in governance research carried out in
the context of political science, and the question begs itself: Why ever not?
But even regardless of the answer to this question, the dilemma of politics is
evident to the empirical observer: If politics wanted to prevent the infiltration
of foreign provinces of meaning into the decision-making premises of politi-
cal organisations, then it would have to fall back on the Weberian model of
bureaucracy, which – ideal typically – guarantees the differentiation of func-
tional contexts at the level of formal organisations. Nobody would ever seri-
ously want to recommend this solution. Modern society uses the term ‘public
governance’ to describe the phenomenon whereby inter-organisational net-
works have become a paradigm of political management across functional
boundaries. This development is also accompanied by the second observation
from the moral perspective. The debate in governance research on the legiti-
macy deficit is registered in social communication as a loss of confidence in
the organisations of representative democracy.
The observance of a linkage between meaning horizons draws attention to
structural affinities between corruption and networks. Network formation can
be reconstructed as a linkage technique aiming at a reflexive combination of
addresses (Tacke 2000). It has been established that successful networks de-
rive their performance advantages through the linkage of different meaning
contexts (Burt 2004). Unlike action theory approaches, which see the par-
ticularism of defending one’s own interests as the structural characteristic
shared by both corruption and networks, the argument presented here con-
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cludes with an outcome supported by social theory. On this view, it is not par-
ticularism that renders networks susceptible to corruption, for not every net-
work is corrupt: There are supplier networks in the car industry, research net-
works in sociology, networks of artists in the visual arts, etc., that cannot be
associated per se with corruption. In fact, we only observe corruption when the
meaning horizons of communication from different functional contexts are
linked and when these linkages are judged to be morally reprehensible.
Thus, the proposal developed here can be extrapolated in three steps: (1)
It is based on the observation of a functionally differentiated society. Func-
tional differentiation means that at the level of the functional systems of soci-
ety, communication is structured in accordance with specific codes (law,
power, knowledge). Functional systems are meaning systems (i.e. horizons of
meaning). Their codes operate exclusively. The differentiation of diverse
functional contexts is the prerequisite for the observation of corruption. (2)
The level of functional systems must be distinguished from the level of or-
ganisations. The differentiation of meaning horizons that takes place at the
level of functional systems is not always maintained at the organisational
level. Unlike functional systems, organisations (just like people, groups and
networks) are systems that are capable of decision-making. Their decisions
can (but do not have to) link different meaning contexts. When such linkages
of different meaning structures occur, then the logic of functional differentia-
tion founders at the level of organisations. In the observational framework of
functional differentiation, it thus becomes evident that the logic of the func-
tional system to which an organisation is ascribed is being corrupted at the
organisational level by another value. This ‘first observation’ of the linkage
of meaning is none other than the observation of a structural question in the
scheme of functional differentiation. It is connoted neither positively nor
negatively. (3) Only in a third step, that of the ‘second observation’ within
the moral scheme, are such structural linkages evaluated in social communi-
cation and labelled as acceptable or reprehensible.
We thus make a distinction between conditions of constitution and their
observation (1) and (2), and the evaluation by society of social phenomena
(3). When it comes to the second observation of social communication,
which of the structural linkages described are labelled as reprehensible and
denominated colloquially as corruption depends on current morals and is thus
contingent on history. What are not contingent, however, are the structural
conditions that must be observed in order that a phenomenon can become the
subject of a moral discourse and in order that corruption can potentially be
labelled as reprehensible.
An examination of morality provides possible preliminary answers to the
question as to why politicians are particularly vulnerable to allegations of
corruption. Moral communication has a personalising effect and thus shows a
strong tendency to generate conflict. Just like morality, politics is based on
the personalisation of decisions and on playing out conflicts. The attribution
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of decisions to individuals and the moral evaluation of these individuals are
more common within the context of competition between political parties
than in contexts where society observes business or science. This opens up
new questions that this text can do no more than mention, for example re-
garding the ‘double standard’ of a morality that tolerates unselfish corruption.
How society reacts to corruption is decided within the observation scheme of
morality, which adheres its own rules of attribution. This is where the main
research questions of this area of study are to be found.
The strength of systems theory is that it can render evident these different
observational conditions. As a constructivist theory of observation, its epis-
temological interest is to reconstruct, with the help of social theory differen-
tiations, how and by whom something is observed. It considers the attribution
of causes and the packaging of ontological characteristics into definitions as
observer-dependent constructions. This text has demonstrated this process in
relation to the observation of corruption.
Chapter 6:
Institutional Design and Good Governance   
B. Guy Peters   
Much of the discussion of ‘good governance’ has defined that term as virtu-
ally synonymous with the fight against corruption. For example, the indices
created by the World Bank and other international organizations focus on the
capacity of governments to suppress corruption or other forms of irregular
governing (Kaufmann/Kraay/Mastruzzi 2007; Transparency International
2008). Associated with that approach to limiting corruption, there has been a
great deal of emphasis on accountability and transparency in the public sec-
tor. These measures also indirectly assess the capacity of these political sys-
tems to control corruption and to enforce proper standards of behavior within
the public sector.
The task for this paper is to relate the institutional design of political sys-
tems to the quality of governance provided by a government, or perhaps more
precisely the quality of governance that is provided by the overall system of
governing. That is, we need to extend questions of institutional design be-
yond the formal limits of governments also to consider how to design the in-
teraction between state and society in ways that facilitate the quality of gov-
ernance, defined broadly, as well as to minimize the probability of corrupt
practices. Indeed, somewhat paradoxically, some attempts to enhance effi-
ciency and democracy have had the unintended consequence of creating more
opportunities for corruption.
We also need to bring institutional theory to bear on questions of corrup-
tion and good governance. Institutional theory is itself rather diverse, but
several of the strands within the theory have direct relevance for understand-
ing corruption. Most clearly, the normative version of institutionalism associ-
ated with March and Olsen (1989) stresses the central role of ‘appropriate-
ness’ within organizations and institutions and assumes that individual
behaviors, including eschewing corruption, can be shaped by institutional
values, symbols, myths and routines. Those values will, of course, have to be
positive if they are to have a positive impact on behavior.1 In this approach,
                                                          
1 By positive here I mean values that support the functioning of the institution with corrup-
tion.
B. Guy Peters84
therefore, corruption is understood as rejecting the values of public organiza-
tions in pursuit of personal gain – the consequentialist approach to political
life that is rejected by normative institutionalists.
The rational choice approach to institutions is an alternative that can help
understand the observed behavior of individuals who are presented with the
opportunity for corruption. In particular, institutions contain a set of rules that
can be used to control individuals. Those rules may be in the form of incentives
or in terms of prohibitions. Further, the rules may be the result of constructivist
processes in which interactions between formal and informal structures, e.g.
cultures, shape the expectations about the behavior of individuals within the
society (see Collier 2002). Those rules may be confined to the particular insti-
tutional arena or it may be framed more broadly for a range of structures.
1. Institutional Design and Political Choices
This task that I have been set also raises interesting theoretical questions
about the extent to which institutions can constrain individual behavior. That
ability of institutions to constrain individual action is always an assumption
of institutional theorists (Ostrom 1990) but it often remains just an assump-
tion and rarely has it been thoroughly tested. It is clear from the available
evidence that an institutional structure can shape the strategic behavior of
legislators and voters, but it is perhaps less clear that institutions can effec-
tively shape the moral behavior of individual politicians or administrators.
The differences among regimes being discussed in this paper represent dif-
ferent sets of institutions that may or may not be able to constrain behavior.
To some extent the capacity we assign to institutions is a function of the
conception that we have of institutions. For example, if we begin with the
normative model of March and Olsen (1986), and a number of sociologists,
then controlling moral choices may be considered central to the definition of
the institution. If, however, we adopt a more structuralist conception of an in-
stitution, e.g. one based on veto points, then making the link to behavior is
more difficult. In such a view preferences are largely exogenous, so the po-
tentially corrupt politician or administrator will simply have to work his or
her way through more or less complex structures in order to achieve their
goals – whether corrupt or noble. In this perspective the solution for corrup-
tion may be to construct more veto points, with stricter enforcement, but that
will not be a guarantee.2
We could also adopt a more common sense, descriptive approach to in-
stitutions and examine the impact of some empirical structures on the ability
of political regimes to govern effectively and to govern in an open and trans-
                                                          
2 The logic becomes that of qui custodient ipsos custodes, with a potentially infinite number
of layers of control over behaviors.
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parent manner. Weaver and Rockman and their colleagues (1996), for exam-
ple, provided an extensive analysis of the differences in performance between
presidential and parliamentary political systems (see also the discussion of
Schmidt (2002) below). These analyses have been concerned more with the
capacity of these systems to make and deliver policy rather than with their
capacity to do so in a non-corrupt manner. As will be discussed in more de-
tail below there may be some theoretical linkage between political structures
and the level of corruption in the system. In particular, the greater the com-
plexity involved in making decisions the more functional corrupt practice
may be for any political system.
2. Corruption and Irregular Politics
The term corruption is used rather broadly to capture a range of behaviors
that are beyond the pale of what is now commonly accepted behavior in the
industrialized democracies. Corruption is, however, often like Justice Potter
Stewart’s idea of pornography – he could not define it but knew it when he
saw it. Some behaviors, e.g. bribery, ‘kickbacks’, nepotism, and the like are
clearly corrupt (see Philip 2002). These behaviors undermine fairness and
probity in governing and make it apparent to the public that appropriate stan-
dards of integrity are not being followed by their public officials. These be-
haviors have been the targets of numerous efforts at reform from interna-
tional organizations and national governments.
Other practices, however, represent informal styles of political behavior
that may not be as overtly illegal but which still may undermine any sense of
equality and fairness in the political system, and therefore tend to foster pub-
lic cynicism about the political system. For example, clientelism has been a
familiar description of political life in Southern Europe (Piatoni 2001), Latin
America (Blake/Morris 2009) and other parts of the world (Kawata 2008).
The basic idea of clientelism is that a politically powerful patron provides fa-
vors to his/her clients in exchange for political support. Those favors may be
of a variety of sorts but generally include some form of divisible goods cre-
ated by the public sector, especially public jobs. It should be observed here,
however, that these patterns of behavior are institutionalized, so that govern-
ing institutions may themselves be corrupt and require other remedies to cre-
ate more circumspect behaviors.
But where does clientelism end and proper government begin? For exam-
ple, in the United States members of Congress tend to base a significant part
of their appeals to their constituents on their ability to ‘bring home the ba-
con’. Fiorina (1992) has argued that whenever Congressmen in the United
States take stances on policy they tend to alienate at least a portion of their
voters, but if they merely ensure that there is spending in the district and
good constituency service then they alienate no one (except perhaps voters
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especially interested in fiscal responsibility). The increased use of ‘ear-
marked’ expenditures has meant that those Congressmen interested in fiscal
probity often do not have an opportunity even to become aware of the ‘pork’
until it has been enacted into law.
This pork-barrel component of public expenditure is a form of ‘collective
clientelism’. The patron in the national capital provides benefits for constitu-
ents in exchange for their votes. The deal involved in this relationship is
never expressed quite so directly, but that is the deal nonetheless. The clien-
telistic character of pork-barrel spending in the United States has been rein-
forced by the use of Congressional earmarks that tend to produce very par-
ticular benefits for localities or for organizations, and make the linkage
between the patron and the numerous members of the clientele all the more
obvious. Although more explicit in the US than in most other places, this ter-
ritorial form of patronage is certainly found elsewhere (Tavits 2009).
It appears that in some ways scholars and practitioners tend to be more
concerned with corruption on the retail than the wholesale level. That is, a
large proportion of the efforts directed at reducing corruption have been ad-
dressed at relatively minor administrative corruption, while large-scale use of
the power of the public sector for partisan and individual gain seems to be
more accepted. This emphasis may be a function of the relative power posi-
tions of the actors, or there may still be some sense that certain types of ir-
regular behavior are actually functional for governing. Some economists have
argued that some level of corruption is indeed functional by facilitating trans-
actions, and certainly not worth the resources needed to stamp it out.
More generally, students of informal institutions have argued that particu-
larly in less developed political systems, informal institutions can contribute sig-
nificantly to governance capacity. Helmke and Levitsky (2004), for example,
have developed a model of how informal institutions interact with formal insti-
tutions in governance. They adopt an extremely broad conception of informal
politics, ranging from the overtly corrupt to understandings about appropriate
behavior in legislatures. These all depend upon shared rules and values that are
not codified but which still have a strong impact on behaviors. Further, they ar-
gue that the informality is crucial to the success of many political systems, in-
cluding many systems that may appear to be perfectly capable of governing on
their own. The analytic question that this raises in the context of this paper is to
what extent these informal aspects of governing are functional, and how irregu-
lar they can be and still reside within the bounds of ‘good governance’.
In this paper I will be concerned with a wide range of actions that deviate
from what might be considered an idealized model of governing. In that
model governance would be controlled by values such as universalism,
achievement, and affective neutrality.3 These terms are usually discussed as
components of political culture, and indeed much of the discussion of politi-
                                                          
3 These are, of course, the familiar Parsonian pattern variables.
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cal corruption has a strong culturalist element. These same values have been
used to describe patterns of political and social development. The question I
will be posing is whether the structure of political regimes affects the level of
irregular political activity, and therefore also can we design institutions that
will minimize unwanted forms of irregular politics.
Most of this paper will be concerned with political institutions and their
role in corruption. Much of the discussion of corruption in the public sector
has been concerned with public administration, and with petty officials taking
bribes for moving a file along, or ignoring violations of building codes, or a
host of other relatively minor indiscretions. This type of corruption has been
both more manifest as corruption and easier to control. For example, both
Singapore and Hong Kong once had famously corrupt administrative systems
but have been able to clean them up largely through stringent enforcement.
Political corruption may be more difficult to cope with simply because it is at
times less clearly defined and also because those involved have substantially
greater power within the political system.
3. Institutional Design and Informal Politics
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether formal institutional ar-
rangements have an impact on the level of corruption, and if so what sort of a
theoretical story can we tell that would explain the linkage. A priori, we
might not expect any such linkage, a fact made apparent by recent events in
the United States. The rather blatant corruption of Governor Rod Bogjona-
vich of Illinois has made us aware first that there is a good deal of corruption
at the level of state governments in the United States, and second that the
level of corruption is substantially different across the states (see Table 1).
The marked variations in the level of corruption appear even though the in-
stitutional structures of the state governments are very similar. Indeed, Illinois
identified as one of the more corrupt states is adjacent to Iowa and Wisconsin
which appear to be two of the less corrupt states. The constitutions of all of
these states are similar, but the behavior of individuals in office appears mark-
edly different. Why? Further, if I examine the levels of corruption in the state
governments using some of structural variables that might have an influence,
e.g. the number of elected officials and size of state legislatures, there appears
to be little relationship. Further, to the extent that there is one there are relation-
ships they appear to be inverse to what might have been expected. For exam-
ple, the states in the upper Midwest have a relatively large number of elected
state officials4, but have some of the lowest rates of corruption.
                                                          
4 South Dakota, for example, elects (in addition to the usual officers of governor and lieuten-
ant governor) offices such as Insurance Commissioner, Agriculture Commissioner, and sev-
eral education officials.
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These observations create some doubt about the relevance of macro-level
political structures for explaining corruption, clientelism or other deviations
from ‘good governance’. That said, however, some aspects of more micro
and meso-level structures may be relevant for the explanation than are the
macro-level characteristics of governance arrangements. To examine these
potential relationships more thoroughly I will examine two macro-institutional
characteristics of political systems – presidentialism and federalism (and their
opposites), attempting to provide a logic theoretical explanation for a linkage
and then determining whether there is any support for that logic. I will also
examine the role of electoral systems and parties as meso-level institutional
features that may influence decisions to engage in irregular political behav-
ior.
4. Presidential and Parliamentary Systems
The most familiar dichotomy in institutional design of political systems is the
difference between presidential and parliamentary government. This distinc-
tion has been used to explain a number of aspects of the performance of po-
litical systems, notably the stability of systems (Linz/Valenzuela 1994), and
their general governance capacity. Manfred Schmidt (2002), for example, has
examined the impact of different types of democratic regimes on the general
performance of those regimes. He has used the contrast between ‘majori-
tarian’ and consensual systems as described by Lijphart (1999) and further
uses the logic of negotiated democracy (Scharpf 1993) to describe the con-
sensual forms of governing. Although the evidence used is rather weak,
Schmidt appears convinced that consensual systems do perform better than
do majoritarian systems.
Although the simple dichotomy has substantial utility, it is also a rather
simplistic distinction. There is perhaps less variation among presidential sys-
tems, but there is still some important variation. For example, presidents dif-
fer in their ability to veto legislation, control public spending, and issue their
own decrees without approval of the legislature. Further, the semi-presidential
system (Roper 2002) that attempts to balance the virtues (and vices) of presi-
dential and parliamentary system are themselves rather diverse, with a prin-
cipal difference being the relative powers of presidents and parliaments with
respect to the prime minister.
The variations among parliamentary systems are substantially greater.
One of the most important of these differences is between those few systems
that have a single-party government, as opposed to the more common multi-
party systems.5 Even among the multi-party systems there are marked differ-
                                                          
5 This corresponds closely to Lijphart’s (1999) familar distinction between majoritarian and
consensual governments.
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ences between those systems that have small coalitions versus those such as
Denmark or Belgium that have five or more parties involved. Further, some
coalitions, e.g. those in Sweden, are predictable in advance while others have
to be created after elections and increasingly span the political landscape
from right to left.
Even given the clear structural and procedural differences among these
types of political systems, why should we expect there to be any impact on
the level of informal politics and government? Simply by observation we can
see that presidential regimes tend to have somewhat higher levels of corrup-
tion and clientelism, and indeed of other types of informal governance ar-
rangements. For example, Table II shows the rankings of countries on the
World Bank corruption index related to their type of regime. If we examine
the aggregate figures then there is a relationship, albeit weak. When we in-
troduce levels of economic development, however, the relationships largely
disappear.
Indeed, one might not, a priori, think that presidential systems would be
more subject to corrupt practices. A dominant logic of presidential systems is
a separation of powers (Peters 1997). If the formal arrangements among the
institutions are effective, then the legislature should function as a check on
the powers of the executive to use its powers for corruption or clientelism.
For those formal relationships to function, however, legislatures need to have
the resources (staff, etc.) and the commitment to perform their oversight
function. A (extremely) well-staffed and organized legislature such as the
Congress of the United States may be able to perform that task effectively,
although as will be noted they appear to be engaged in clientelism and cor-
ruption of their own.
Unfortunately, relative few legislatures in presidential regimes appear to
have those resources and are largely ineffective in exercising oversight
(Cox/Morgenstern 2002). Indeed, most legislative bodies in these settings
appear more concerned about using their powers, especially their budgetary
powers, to provide benefits for their constituents and promoting their own ca-
reers. This choice of career strategies may make good sense given that there
may be little to be gained (politically) from exercising oversight while there
may be a great deal to be gained from using the pork barrel.6
There are at least three reasons to expect presidential systems to be more
associated with irregular forms of governing than are parliamentary systems.
The first is that this is actually a spurious relationship, resulting from the
greater number of presidential regimes in Latin American and African coun-
tries with lower levels of economic development and with less institutional-
ized political systems in general. The same argument has, of course, been
made with respect to the apparent instability of presidential regimes (Linz/
                                                          
6 At times oversight appears to be opposition to policies, and if the president is popular politi-
cally questioning his or her policies may have negative political consequences.
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Valenzuela 1994), and the seeming fragility of presidential regimes may be a
function merely of lower levels of economic development (see van der Walle
2003).
The first of the more genuine relationships between presidential regimes
and levels of irregular government is that presidential regimes are, almost by
definition, more personalized with a focus on the leadership of the one indi-
vidual in the center of the system. As well as leadership capacity, being the
president also offers opportunities to distribute numerous benefits to follow-
ers. For example, in the United States the president has approximately 4,500
positions that are legally open for appointment when he takes office.7 Other
presidential systems permit proportionately as many or more legal appoint-
ments, and may also assume that de facto the president can appoint a number
of other officials. For example, even after its attempts to create a functioning
civil service system, the president of Mexico can still appoint numerous pub-
lic employees, even to positions nominally covered by the civil service sys-
tem.8
There are two additional points to be made about the apparent levels of
clientelism in presidential systems as related to the personal power of the
president. The first is that there are a number of official appointments avail-
able to a president, but there are also more informal appointments and pa-
tronage powers in these systems. In part the focus of politics in these systems
on the top executive positions also means that the personal factions within
parties, and within government, emphasizes the ability of would-be leaders to
provide benefits. They may do so by holding other positions in government,
e.g. positions in sub-national governments controlled by the centre. The fac-
tionalism of politics in presidentialist systems such as Uruguay, for example,
leads to a variety of patronage appointment systems associated with different
institutions, e.g. Social Security, within the country.
The second point is that although presidentialist systems tend to have
higher levels of patronage appointments, this seems to be more a matter of
degree than of type. Perhaps because of the increased emphasis on the role of
prime ministers in parliamentary systems, these top officials also have been
increasing their appointment powers. Some of the appointment powers are a
function of changes in the structures of government more generally, with the
creation of more devolved organizations providing more appointment op-
portunities (Skelcher 1998). Especially in multi-party systems the need to
                                                          
7 This is, of course, many fewer than at the height of the spoils system in the Jacksonian era
(White 1954), but the number of appointments has been increasing markedly over the past
several decades as presidents have sought to enhance their control over programs (Light
1995; 2004). Congress must consent to approximately 400 of the more important of these
positions, but most are in the gift of the President.
8 Further, there is some evidence that President Calderon has returned to appointing more of-
ficials than had President Fox (see Mendez 2008).
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provide positions for the adherents of the coalition members may lead to
more appointments.
The second major reason that one can expect greater levels of patronage
and clientelism in presidential party systems has little to do with the regime
type per se, and has more to do with the nature of the political party systems
within those regimes (see also Kunicova/Rose-Ackerman 2005). The basic
argument is that presidential systems tend to have political parties that are fo-
cused toward gaining that one major position. At the extreme there are two
party systems with single member districts for the legislature. In these cases
the candidates tend to be more individual entrepreneurs with highly person-
alized styles of governing, and they therefore require some forms of patron-
age to be able to maintain that personal power base.
Proportional representation electoral systems, that tend to be characteris-
tic of parliamentary systems, also tend to produce strong political parties that
can control the actions of their members in office. Further, those individual
members in the parliament have relatively few resources at their disposal –
most are held by the party. Further, the parties themselves may be less fo-
cused on what they can gain during a short period, in contrast to those seek-
ing control of a central political office. This organizational control of scarce
resources may minimize the personal clientelism, although the parties them-
selves do not tend to be shy in distributing positions to their members, in-
cluding the opportunities to run for public office.
Again, however, the evidence linking electoral systems to clientelism is
not unequivocal. The Irish system is parliamentary and has an STV (single
transferable vote) electoral system, but the common characterization is of a
political system with strong clientelistic ties between members of the lower
house of parliament (Teachta Dálas, TDs) and their constituents. For exam-
ple, Chubb’s (1963) characterizations of the clientelistic relationships have
been amended, but certainly not refuted. More recent studies (Galla-
gher/Komito 2005) have pointed to the continued role of the TDs in constitu-
ency service.
Again, however, the electoral system may play a major role in the pro-
moting clientelism. The STV system creates more of a direct linkage between
voters and their representatives, despite being a form of proportional repre-
sentation. The ability of the voters to choose not only parties but individuals
means that candidates must appeal as individuals, and there are few better
ways of doing that than by providing ‘pork’ for the constituencies. Likewise,
the open list PR (proportional representation) systems used in much of Latin
America, and in some European states, also can contribute to a closer linkage
between constituents and their representatives than does closed list PR sys-
tems which are dominated by the political parties.
The other variable in party systems that may be crucial for explaining
levels of corruption is the type of party finance. At the extreme political par-
ties and more importantly individual candidates in the United States depend
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almost entirely on private funding. As a result, these politicians must con-
stantly scramble for funds and in the process they must make political prom-
ises and deliver policy goods that might easily be argued to be clientelistic or
corrupt. This style of irregular politics tends to be much more acceptable than
even petty administrative corruption, in part indicating the importance of
elaborating the values that are accepted and those which are not when making
statements about corruption.
Although we as external observers tend to classify patronage appointments
and territorial spending as being at least at the margin of corruption, if not actu-
ally corrupt, the discourse in the political systems which use these instruments
extensively tends not to be cast in that direction. For example, in the United
States the discussion of presidential appointment powers more often has been
about the efficiency of the system, and the administrative capacities of the indi-
viduals appointed than about their being corrupt. Even in the more egregious
appointments of the Bush years, the discussion was about policy failure.
Geering and Thacker (2004) attribute the lower level of observed corrup-
tion in parliamentary and unitary systems to the degree of centralization in
these systems and the availability of more unified controls over behavior.
This argument contradicts the usual notion that more checks and balances
within a government will maximize controls. Their findings, and our own ob-
servations above, point toward the need for more overt control structures and
the need to eliminate many of the opportunities for corrupt behavior, that are
presented in more complex institutional structures.
5. Administrative Structures and Corruption
As noted above, a good deal of the corruption that occurs in the public sector
occurs in the administrative system. While to some extent administrative
systems are similar, there are also important differences among those systems
(Peters 2009) that may affect their openness to corruption. At the extreme
systems with few if any rules over personnel recruitment, or procurement or
budgeting are obviously more open to corruption and other irregularities than
are systems with stronger internal regulations.
To some extent the role of bureaucracy in explaining corruption is contra-
dictory and paradoxical. On the one hand, formalized bureaucratic rules and
procedures have been designed in part to prevent corruption and to ensure
that members of the public sector act sine irae ac studio when dealing with
the public. On the other hand, the rigidities usually associated with bureauc-
racies (see Rubinstein/von Maravić, this volume) may make corruption and
clientelism more desirable as means of circumventing those rigidities. If
normal procedures are not able to respond to social needs sufficiently quickly
then bribery and other means of accelerating decisions will become more
valuable for the participants in the administrative process.
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As was argued above, formal structures in bureaucracies may be less im-
portant in explaining the occurrence of corrupt practices than are values and
understandings about appropriate conduct in office. The use of formal insti-
tutions appears capable of helping to create such values, as for example the
anti-corruption office in Hong Kong, but in the end the creation of values
may be more important than building structures.9 That said, some administra-
tive reforms during the past several decades have tended to enhance the op-
portunity for corruption, and the breakup of the traditional civil service in
many systems has eliminated even more constraints on irregular behavior in
public administration.
6. Federalism and Corrupt Practices
Federal versus unitary states is another standard dichotomy in institutional
analysis in comparative politics. To a great extent this dichotomy is clearer
than that between presidential and parliamentary systems. That said there are
both marked differences in both these types of political system. These discus-
sions have been analyzed substantially more for federal systems (see Hueg-
lin/Fenna 2006) than for unitary regimes, although there are certainly marked
differences between the latitude given local communes in the Scandinavian
countries with the relatively strong controls exercised in most Napoleonic re-
gimes (Ongaro 2008).
While the federal/unitary distinction is well known in comparative poli-
tics (Hueglin/Fenna 2006), should it have any influence on the levels of cor-
ruption and clientelism in a political system? One simple hypothesis would
be that if there are more autonomous governments in a political system then
there is simply more opportunity for corruption than in more unified systems.
Further, having multiple levels of government also creates different opportu-
nity structures for politicians so that the ability to deliver pork barrel goods to
a lower level of government may enable a legislator to move into more desir-
able political positions at that lower level, e.g. become a governor (Samuels
2002).
We can also hypothesize that at the sub-national level there is less dis-
tance (geographical and social) between the potential patron and the potential
client. In settings in which patrons and potential clients know each other and
interact more frequently, maintaining any social distance is difficult, and
therefore corruption may be more probable than in systems with greater so-
cial distance. That said, however, the politics in an American state such as
California or in a German Land such as Nordrhein-Westfalen may be as re-
                                                          
9 As in the famous Friedrich-Finer debate, the creation of formalized structures for control
may lead into an infinite regress of control – ipso custodient…
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mote, or more remote, such as that in a smaller country like Estonia or
Malta.10
Finally, sub-national governments tend to have more physical projects –
roads, construction of other type, etc – that may be more subject to corruption
than are less tangible public programs such as pensions or regulatory pro-
grams.11 The procurement process is a major locus for corrupt activity, and if
there are a number of potential bidders – creating a construction company to
build a road does not require a very large investment of capital – with local
contacts then it is perhaps natural that patrimonial practices become common.
In fairness, national level governments also have a good deal of corruption in
areas such as defense contracting, although perhaps for different reasons.
The alternative hypothesis is that having a single government does not
provide any alternative locus for good governance to develop, whereas mul-
tiple governments can do so. For example, Myerson (2006) argues that com-
petition is crucial for democratic accountability and that competition can be
enhanced in multi-level governance systems (see also Bardhan 2002). The
argument is further that having multiple loci providing governance gives op-
portunities for less corrupt governance to develop whereas unitary regimes
tend to enforce uniformity and centralized control, with less chance of evolu-
tion and effective learning.
7. Paradox of Contemporary Governance
One of the paradoxes of contemporary institutional design is that the demands
for more effective and non-corrupt service delivery appear to be occurring in
opposition to much of what has become the conventional wisdom on govern-
ing. Much of what has become that conventional wisdom for improving gov-
ernance is to create more autonomous and more informal structures for making
and delivering public policy (see Christensen/Laegreid 2007). One of the sev-
eral standard recommendations of the New Public Management (NPM) has
been that more autonomous public organizations (agencies) can be more effi-
cient and effective in delivering services. Similarly, the ‘governance’ literature
(Sorenson/Torfing 2007) has argued that self-organizing networks of social
actors will contribute to more effective and democratic governments than those
possible with more traditional political structures.
Both of these styles of reforming the public sector tend to weaken con-
ventional controls and mechanisms of accountability within the public sector.
If the Gerring and Thacker (2004) argument mentioned above is correct then
these reforms are likely to create more opportunities for corrupt behavior.
                                                          
10 I am not arguing that corruption is rife in these countries, only that their small size creates
the great proximity between the potential patron and the potential client.
11 One major exception to that generalization is defense programs that are located in central
government and which are also subject to substantial corruption.
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The NPM reforms have tended to promote the autonomy of public actors and
to provide public managers greater latitude to make decisions on their own.
This enhanced autonomy, combined with the increased opportunities for ap-
pointing public managers from outside the career public service, reduces both
institutional and ethical controls over their actions. There is no certainty that
the New Public Management has increased, or will necessarily increase, lev-
els of corruption, but it does mean that there are many more opportunities for
irregular action within the public sector.
The governance models represent to a great extent an alternative format for
governing that may enhance the opportunities for corruption, albeit generally
not for personal gain so much as for the benefit of members of organizations
involved in the process. Because they tend to involve various social actors in
making decisions in the name of the public, these formats for governing may
represent, in Lowi’s term, the ‘private use of public power’ (Lowi 1973). While
they have been justified in terms of democracy, being a means of involving the
public more directly in governing, networks also involve granting power to the
groups who are considered appropriate for being involved.
The differential involvement of social actors in the processes of govern-
ing raises several questions about the democracy, and probity, of the net-
works format for governance. First, the democratic aspect of the network ar-
gument is weakened when it becomes clearer that not all segments of society
are organized adequately to be able to participate (see Bogason/Musso 2006).
Further, these groups are empowered to make decisions in the name of the
public although they may in fact be representing only their own members.
Thus, in the name of democracy and of enhanced public performance net-
work reforms may have some of the same impact on the actual level of de-
mocracy as do the New Public Management reforms.
For both the NPM approach and governance the basic logic for governing
has been less concerned with problems of corruption than with either effi-
ciency or democracy. Both approaches toward reforming the public sector
appear to assume that the ethical problems are solved in the political systems
where these approaches have been implemented. While the industrialized
democracies in which most of these reforms have been implemented have
developed cultures that do not support corruption, there are changes at the
margin of overt corrupt behavior that lead one to question the contribution of
these schemes to ‘good governance’.
8. Summary
Attempting to link the structures of regimes to levels of corruption is rather
difficult. First, we can find political systems with similar structures with
markedly different levels of corruption, and systems with similar levels of
corruption with rather different structures. The theory that presidential sys-
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tems should be more corrupt seems plausible on its face but any findings of a
relationship appear to be a product, to some extent at least, of the simple fact
that most presidential regimes are in less-developed political and economic
systems that may have greater incentives for corruption, or which have not
had sufficient time to institutionalize controls over corrupt practice.
Further, that distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems
may not be sufficiently fine-grained to capture many of the important differ-
ences among political systems. For example, the capacity of legislative bod-
ies to exercise effective oversight over the executive is not at all identical
across political systems. A legislature with adequate staffing and with a well-
articulated structure will be capable of exercising control and provide coun-
tervailing powers to control the political executive and the bureaucracy.
The basic outcome of this analysis must be that any simple understanding
of institutions as structures is incapable of shedding much light on the likeli-
hood of good governance. There is so much difference within each of the re-
gime types that making any predictions may conceal more than it reveals.
Likewise, the causal linkage between institutional structures and the behav-
iors of the individuals within them is somewhat attenuated so that attempting
to explain something like corruption on the individual level may be difficult,
unless one adopts a conception of institutions that reflects more their value
commitments than their structural features.
Institutions and regime types are important, but explaining how they exert
their importance is more difficult than just asserting it. This paper has sought
to understand how institutions – especially when defined as structures and
regime types – can affect the level of informal political activity in a political
system. Explaining that type of behavior is easier on the wholesale level than
on the retail level, although most of the discussions of administrative corrup-
tion run in the opposite direction.
Table 1: Corruption in the American States
Most Corrupt Least Corrupt
Guilty Officials
per capita
Survey of Journalists Guilty Officials
per capita
Survey of Journalists
North Dakota Rhode Island Nebraska North Dakota
Alaska Louisiana Oregon South Dakota
Louisiana New Mexico New Hampshire Colorado
Mississippi Oklahoma Iowa Maine
Montana Delaware Minnesota Oregon
Kentucky Alabama Kansas Vermont
Alabama Kentucky California Minnesota
Delaware Arizona Utah Montana
South Dakota West Virginia New Mexico Iowa
Florida Illinois Washington Kansas
Source: The New York Times, December 14, 2008.
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Table 2: Mean Corruption Scores
Presidential12 Parliamentary
Total -0.72 -0.83
Above Average GDP Per Capita -1.42 -1.59
Below Average GDP Per Capita -1.04 -0.89
Calculated from World Bank Control of Corruption Data
                                                          
12 Including semi-presidential.
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1. Introduction
As Deleuze and Guattari say to demonstrate the importance of concepts in
philosophy and science: ‘Concepts are not waiting for us ready-made, like
heavenly bodies. There is no heaven for concepts. They must be invented,
fabricated, or rather created and would be nothing without their creator’s sig-
nature’ (1994: 5). Corruption, of course, is the concept of interest here. In this
chapter, however, we will not study what the concept is or means, but discuss
theories and studies that look at how the definitions of corruption have come
about in academic and social discourses, with special emphasis on the effects
of using the concept.
Other chapters in this book (e.g. Huisman/Vande Walle, Huberts, and
Rose-Ackerman) study corruption empirically within a positivistic research
tradition; here we will look at theoretical and empirical corruption research
that can be called post-positivistic, meaning that they are not after one truth,
or out to find and agree on one ‘right’ definition or meaning of the concept
‘corruption’. The corruption researchers we will cite use different terms to
label their theoretical stance. Some call it ‘cultural’ or ‘anthropological’, oth-
ers ‘neo-classical’, and there are even those who use the term ‘post-modern’.
Discussions and controversies about postmodernism are numerous (e.g.
Bauman 1991, 1993; Latour 1991), both in terms of the concept and the en-
suing societal changes of the second half of the twentieth century. Reviewing
them or exploring the rather vague notion of postmodernism is, however,
outside the purview of this chapter. The scholars cited here are interested in
how the actors define corruption. Most other approaches in this book define
what the phenomenon of corruption entails and then look at the causes of that
phenomenon. Here we especially look at the causes and effects of the usage
of the very label ‘corruption’. When looking at corruption in this sense, lan-
guage plays an important role and the concept of discourse becomes impor-
tant.
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2. The social construction of corruption
What is most striking when looking at the definitions of corruption in post-
positivist studies is the emphasis on social constructivism: ‘corrupt’ is what is
considered corrupt at a certain place and at a certain time. Or, as Andersson
and Heywood (forthcoming) put it:
‘The key point is that there are many different types of corruption, which vary according to
the sector in which they occur (public or private; political or administrative), the actors in-
volved (for instance, state officials, politicians entrepreneurs and so forth), the impact they
have (localized or extensive) and the degree to which they are formalized (embedded and
systemic or occasional and sporadic).’
Eleven years ago, Michael Johnston (1996: 331-334) proposed to define cor-
ruption as ‘the abuse, according to the legal or social standards constituting a
society’s system of public order, of a public role or resource for private bene-
fit’. He suggested studying how the meaning of terms like ‘abuse,’ ‘public
role,’ and ‘private benefit’ are constructed at a given moment in a certain
place, and how and why the lines between public/private, state/society, poli-
tics/administration, and institutions/sources of power are drawn.
A wide range of corruption researchers draws attention to the contextuality
of corruption and its various definitions. Huntington’s (1989: 377) much-used
definition of corruption is ‘behavior of public officials which deviates from
accepted norms in order to serve private ends’. But just as ‘accepted norms’
change over time and across cultures, so do the distinctions between public
and private, and between what is and is not corrupt. Many illustrations of this
can be found in Haller and Shore (2005), who offer an array of authors’ per-
ceptions of corruption in different cultural and institutional contexts with case
studies from countries such as India, Bolivia, Portugal, Russia, Romania, and
the United States. An example of their findings takes place in Russia’s transi-
tional society of the 1990s, where personalized agreements between doctor
and patient based on, say, a certain fee plus a few bottles of vodka, eventually
superseded the official fee-for-service framework of state health care. Some-
thing that had been illegal and considered highly corrupt during the Soviet pe-
riod – a physician commanding money for personal gain in exchange for
services – was at that time considered morally acceptable. A patient-
interviewee described such payment ‘as a moral action that conveyed recogni-
tion and respect for the professional's attention and expertise’. A physician’s
demand for high prices was more a sign of his or her medical competence than
a reflection of connections or privilege. On the contrary, it was the institu-
tional state health care system that was eventually regarded as corrupt for fa-
voring the higher strata of the population. Not only does this example prove a
shift in norms concerning appropriate provision of healthcare, it also signifies
that overstepping the boundary between the public and private spheres is not
always adequate in labeling corruption (Rivkin-Fish 2005: 47-49, 63).
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Tänzler (2007), who advocates a ‘cultural approach’ to corruption, tells of
a Philippine Prime Minister forced from office precisely because he was not
corrupt. If the Prime Minister refused to use his power to take care of family
and friends, the line of thinking was, then what could the public expect from
him? Tänzler demonstrates the importance of deconstructing the social reali-
ties of culture to perceive corruption (see also De Zwart, this volume. Note
that De Zwart explicitly distances himself from postmodern approaches).
Sissener (2001), who proposes an ‘anthropological perspective on cor-
ruption’, finds that Western approaches of corruption are often exactly that:
they are peculiarly Western, influenced as they are by Weber’s famous ideal
type of bureaucracy, and not easily applied to non-Western societies. Sissener
then tries to understand the values behind behavior that a Western observer
would probably regard as corrupt, and how the social reality in which the be-
havior takes place is constructed from the inside. In countries like Bangla-
desh, China or Nepal, the public official who issues favors for a remuneration
of some kind within an established network is not corrupt; his or her actions
are simply a social obligation to help. Deals within the network are consid-
ered normal (Sissener 2001).
3. The effects of the corruption concept
The point of the previous section was to lay ground for a concept of corrup-
tion that is heavily contested and socially constructed. Post-positivist corrup-
tion theories demonstrate that the definition and meaning of corruption is
hardly trivial, that the effects of using the label ‘corruption’ can be major,
that ‘what the concept is is less interesting than what it does, a shift in em-
phasis that also allows us to put aside the somewhat stale debate about uni-
versal or culturally relative elements’ (Bracking 2007: 11). Post-positivistic
approaches discussed in the remainder of this chapter focus less on what cor-
ruption is than what the effects of its usage are. We are interested in what
causes the use of the concept of ‘corruption’ and the consequences thereof.
Any specific definition of corruption will automatically lead to a specific
‘solution’ (de Graaf 2007); instead we will look at the causes and effects of
corruption definitions and discourses.
Being labeled ‘corrupt’ usually has an enormous social impact. We once
interviewed a Dutch police officer who was convicted for taking a bribe from
a former colleague, then an attorney. He was convicted for accepting a cell
phone in exchange for leaking some minor information to the attorney during
a long phone conversation. Both he and his wife were fired from the police
force. His wife fought for several years in court before being reinstated. They
lost most of their friends and suffered emotionally. They were largely
shunned at the few social events they still took part in; others did not want to
be in the presence of a ‘corrupt police officer.’
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Because of these enormous social consequences, the most important issue
‘may not be what the term ‘corruption’ means, but rather who gets to decide
what it means and how widely those decisions will be accepted’ (Le Billon
2005: 686). Not surprisingly, accusations of corruption are often used strate-
gically: ‘corruption serves to underwrite elite class formation in Zimbabwe,
as well as being a key concept in discursive and ideological warfare between
Mugabe and his opponents’ (Bracking 2009: 43).
The definition issue also raises questions of cultural bias. As Chadda
(2004: 122) writes on the use of TI’s (Transparency International) definition
in developing countries: ‘To judge transactions originating in the traditional
sphere as corrupt because they clash with the requirements of the legal ra-
tional order can be seen as simply an ideological argument for the rapid de-
struction of the traditional sphere.’ Andersson and Heywood (forthcoming: 5)
go so far as to claim that:
‘the very concept of corruption has been increasingly instrumentalized for political ends
since the end of the Cold War – most especially in those countries where corruption is per-
ceived to be a major issue. Indeed the debate on the meaning and interpretation of corrup-
tion has led to the development of proposed solutions for corruption which focus primarily
on issues of institutional design’.
4. Language and Meaning
In recent decades, discussions on the nature of truth have profoundly affected
social research. Instead of assuming a given world ‘out there’, waiting to be
discovered, attention is being drawn to the language processes through which
the world is represented. The access we have to a reality outside language is
highly problematic. Language does not simply report facts; it is not a simple
medium for the transport of meaning. The meaning and effect of words de-
pend on the context in which they are spoken or written. Du Gay (1996: 47):
‘The meaning that any object has at any given time is a contingent, historical achievement
(…) theorists of discourse argue that the meaning of objects is different from their mere
existences, and that people never confront objects as mere existences, in a primal manner;
rather these objects are always articulated within particular discursive contexts’.
Perhaps it is the case, as some philosophers claim, that what exists in the world
is a necessity (independent of human beings or language), but things can only
be differentiated through language. The world itself does not give meaning to
objects; this is done through language. Stated simply, although things might
exist outside language, they get their meanings through language.
This view of language implies the possibility of describing the context of
corruption (cases) as a discursive construction. The meaning of anything al-
ways exists in particular discursive contexts; meaning is always contextual,
contingent, and historical. The term ‘corruption’, therefore, is always socially
and historically constructed as well.
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How can we transition from an ontological and epistemological stance of
meaning that is always historically and socially constructed to a theoretical
model useful to empirical research? De Graaf (2007) has offered an example
from postmodern corruption research where empirical corruption research is
conducted based on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social action (1977; 1990;
1998; Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992). By combining macro and micro factors and
everything in between, it is an example of how concrete corruption case
studies can be conducted. Contextual research in this way can establish dis-
positions that can lead to corruption. Since dispositions do not always mani-
fest, they cannot be called ‘causes’ in the strict sense of the word. What is
important in this type or research is the receptiveness of an individual to cor-
ruption, and whether the receptiveness is triggered.
5. Discourse and discourse analysis
The concept of discourse plays an important role in most post-positivistic
corruption research and has many meanings. Of its many interpretations (see
Alvesson/Karreman 2000), here we define discourse as ‘a specific ensemble
of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and
transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is
given to physical and social realities’ (Hajer 1995: 44). For example, psychi-
atric discourse brought the idea of an unconscious into existence in the nine-
teenth century (cf. Foucault 1977; Phillips/Hardy 2002: 3). Discourses con-
tain groups of statements that provide a way of talking and thinking about
something, thereby giving meaning to social reality. Discourses are not ‘out
there’ between reality and language; they are not just a group of signs. They
refer to practices that systematically form the objects we speak of. Discourse
is not just a ‘way of seeing’ – a worldview – but is embedded in social prac-
tices that reproduce the ‘way of seeing’ as ‘truth.’ Discourses are constitutive
of reality (de Graaf 2001). What is and is not true cannot be seen outside dis-
course; it is internal to it. By looking at what people say and write, we can
learn how their world is constructed.
Since discourses in our context institutionalize the way of talking about
something, they produce knowledge and thereby shape social practices. Cor-
ruption cases cannot be understood without the discourses that give them
meaning. Discourses contain the conditions of possibility of what can and
cannot be said. The fact that a question arises about corruption is as interest-
ing as the question asked (and the questions not asked). And every question
asked gets some form of an answer (including no answer), which has conse-
quences. Discourses help us understand that a certain question is asked, and
give us the spectrum of possible solutions to problems arising from it, i.e.,
what is or is not seen as a viable solution to a specific moral problem. A
problem’s definition inevitably predisposes certain solutions, and vice versa
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(Eeten 1998: 6; Kingdon 1995; Rochefort 1994; Wildavsky 1987). Compare
this with the following quote from Schön and Rein (1993: 153):
‘When participants (…) name and frame the (…) situation in different ways, it is often dif-
ficult to discover what they are fighting about. Someone cannot simply say, for example,
‘Let us compare different perspectives for dealing with poverty,’ because each framing of
the issue of poverty is likely to select and name different features of the problematic situa-
tion. We are no longer able to say that we are comparing different perspectives on ‘the
same problem’, because the problem itself has changed.’
Like meaning, values are immanent features of discourse. When we give
meaning to something, we are also valuing it. Even though a Durkheimian
view is clearly not endorsed here (our emphasis is on language, not institu-
tions), there is a parallel. To Durkheim social institutions, collective ways of
thinking, feeling, and doing are not empty but full of values (values give
meaning to relationships). In similar fashion, discursive practices are not
empty; they are filled with values. By giving something a name, we highlight
certain aspects. But in that same process, all other possible qualities are
placed in the background or even ignored. Values, causal assumptions and
problem perceptions affect each other. In our daily lives, we jump so often
between normative and factual statements that we do not realize how much
our views of facts determine whether we see problems in the first place. But
when we study those discussions more carefully, we can see that ‘is’ and
‘ought’ are intertwined. Seemingly technical positions in discourses on cor-
ruption (‘was he bribed or not?’) conceal normative commitments. Dis-
courses make more than claims of reality – they accomplish what Schön and
Rein (1994) have called the ‘normative leap’, or the connection between a
representation of reality and its consequences for action. Within most ver-
sions of discourse theory, the strict dichotomy between facts and values
ceases to make sense. Facts and values here are not treated as ontologically
different; discourse theory treats them as different sides of the same coin. The
‘is’ and ‘ought’ shape each other in countless ways. Language is thus neither
neutral nor static in communicating meaning. The awareness that language
does not neutrally describe the world is important to corruption research.
Subtle linguistic forms and associated symbolic actions shape our convictions
and presuppositions (Van Twist 1994: 79).
How does research with discourse theory work? A researcher conducts
discourse descriptions or analyses, the basis of which are texts. All verbal and
written language can be considered. A discourse analysis shows which dis-
cursive objects and subjects emerge in social practices, and which conceptu-
alizations are used. Consequently, what is left out in social practices also
emerges. It is not the purpose of discourse analysis to retrieve what authors
meant or felt. Discourse analysis is not a search for meaning in texts, empiri-
cal or otherwise. The analysis focuses on the effects of the texts on other
texts. Hajer (1995: 54): ‘discourse analysis investigates the boundaries be-
tween (…) the moral and the efficient, or how a particular framing of the dis-
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cussion makes certain elements appear fixed or appropriate while other ele-
ments appear problematic’.
A discourse analysis inquires into forms of problematization and offers a
narrative about the production of problems. Why is corruption considered a
problem (or not a problem)? Some postmodern corruption scholars would an-
swer that it is because of neo-liberal or Western interests (cf. Bahre 2005;
Brown/Cloke 2004, 2005; Doig/Marquette 2005; Le Billon 2005; Roberts/
Wright/O’Neill 2007; Szeftel 1998; Whyte 2007). We will return to this topic
later.
In conducting a discourse analysis on corruption, we can establish the
limits of what can and cannot be said in a particular context, what Foucault
(1977) called ‘the conditions of possibility’ of a discourse. The analysis can
identify the rules and resources that set the boundaries of what can be said,
thought, and done in a particular (organizational) context or situation. Mauws
(2000: 235):
‘Thus, if we are to comprehend how decisions are made (…) it is by examining the condi-
tions of possibility in relation to which these statements are formulated, that is, the often
implicit institutionalized speech practices that guide what is and what is not likely to be
said (Bourdieu)’.
Describing a corruption case in this tradition makes the discourses the objects
of study, rather than the (corrupt) moral agents. By doing so, moral aspects
come to the fore. In the case of Zimbabwe, for example, Bracking (2009: 35)
argues that ‘only through a critical poststructuralist analysis, which examines
how ‘corrupt’ subjects are fixed discursively, can one find a consistent posi-
tion on when concessionary state redistribution becomes constitutive of pat-
rimonial state practice.’
Brown and Cloke (2005) explore the limitations of the dominant neo-
liberal perspective on governance, showing how international financial insti-
tutions have been promoting a specific discourse on corruption in Nicaragua
that separates it from its historicity and the specific political economy within
which it developed. Within this discourse, governance and institutional re-
form are seen as ways to combat corruption and are within the limits of what
can be said in corruption discourse, whereas possible solutions that look at
the historical roots of the Nicaraguan culture, like closer private sec-
tor/government relations, are not.
Lazar (2005: 212, 223-224) focuses on everyday corruption and local
politics in the highland city of El Alto in Bolivia, looking at perceptions of
corruption at different political levels. Corruption and its ‘necessary counter-
part’, public works (obras), serve as the key discursive elements for citizens
to assert expectations of their leaders. Lazar recognizes the typical clientelis-
tic structures pervading politics in which issues such as the extent to which
public money is used for private gain, but especially redistributed in the form
of obras or jobs to the people, are central. Rumor and gossip serve as a
means for the people to hold their leaders accountable pre-emptively, to es-
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tablish the notion of a public good that their leaders should serve. Corruption
discourse can also serve to express powerlessness and dissatisfaction to lead-
ers not listening to the needs of the people, and in doing so, to offset citizens’
limited capacity to hold their leaders accountable.
Ruud (2000: 271-272, 291) researches petty corruption of ordinary people
in the rural eastern Indian state of West Bengal, trying to understand corrup-
tion on the basis of the levels and places of corruption’s occurrences. He em-
phasizes that the practices exist within a fully developed normative system
that is no less moral that any other (i.e., Western) normative system. We
should not regard corruption as an isolated act with a particular body of ideas
and values, but take into account parallels in other social practices (and other
bodies of ideas and values); otherwise, corruption would be difficult to un-
derstand. The distinction between public and private, often the basis upon
which something is defined as corrupt or not, does not seem to carry the same
moral weight in all societies. From Ruud's case studies it becomes apparent
that the application of the public/private distinction in individual cases is
sometimes limited by ‘other more weightier considerations’.
6. Storylines and metaphors
One way to study how discursive practices about corruption are shaped is to
look at storylines and metaphors. Our own particular worldviews and dis-
courses position us within discussions in terms of the concepts, metaphors,
and stories of that discourse. For corruption researchers, it is important that a
discourse analysis can show how forces in language influence moral posi-
tions by looking at the role metaphors and storylines play within a discourse.
Discourse analysis can also gain perspectives into the structure, dynamics,
and directions of conflicting discourses, like narrative strategies.
Stories play an important role in people’s lives; in large part, they give
meaning to them (Watson 1994). If you want to get to know someone, you
ask for a life story. Stories tell about what is important and what is not. Phi-
losophers like Johnson (1993) or McIntyre (1991) would go so far as to argue
that stories are central to creating human understanding: ‘I can only answer
the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question, ‘Of what
story or stories do I find myself a part?’ (O’Connor 1997: 304). Fisher (1987:
xiii) claims that ‘all forms of human communication need to be seen funda-
mentally as stories’. It is therefore not surprising that stories are also impor-
tant to studies of corruption. Many scholars agree that stories are filled with
information and are efficient at conveying it (Roe 1994: 9). Boje (1991: 106)
argues: ‘People engage in a dynamic process of incremental refinement of
their stories of new events as well as ongoing reinterpretations of culturally
sacred story lines’; (1995: 1001): ‘In sum people do not just tell stories, they
tell stories to enact an account of themselves and their community’.
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The assumption that meaning is produced in linguistic form fits well with
exploring stories, which are simply one type of linguistic form, or elements
of a discourse with certain characteristics. Stories are especially important for
corruption researchers because they contain values – ideas about good and
evil, right and wrong. For instance, Pujas and Rhodes (1999) address the re-
port of the Committee of Experts of March 1999 concerning accusations of
fraud and nepotism within the European Commission, in which a storyline
develops of the crusade of a ‘clean north’ versus a ‘corrupt south’. That three
of the four implicated Commissioners were from a ‘southern’ country
(France, Spain, and Portugal) and only one from a ‘northern’ country (Ger-
many) seemed to strengthen the view. Yet Pujas and Rhodes questioned its
fairness:
‘Is there really a ‘clash of cultures’ in Europe between quite different types of public ad-
ministration, responsible for a ‘fundamental division’ in the European institutions between
the ambassadors of ‘clean’ northern government and the cynical representatives of closed,
corrupt and clannish southern bureaucracy?’ (1999: 688-689).
Within stories, ‘is’ and ‘ought’ are closely connected. Even if they seem to
give simple factual descriptions, an enormous implicit normative power lies
within narratives. Hayden White (1980: 26): ‘What else could narrative clo-
sure exist of than the passage of one moral order to another? (…) Where, in
any account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure that morality or a
moralizing impulse is present too’. According to White, the events that are re-
corded in the narrative appear ‘real’ precisely insofar as they belong to an order
of moral existence, just as they derive their meaning from their placement in
this order. It is because the events described are or are not conducive to the es-
tablishment of social order that they find a place in the narrative attesting to
their reality (Ettema/Glasser 1988: 10). A narrative analysis can therefore shed
light on how different moral positions relate to each other. It shows how nar-
rative structures (partly) determine moral positions and identities, and how
they thereby influence the actions of individuals and organizations. And they
show how internal dynamics of a discourse can influence the moral position
taken; this can also be used strategically. An example from a study by
Bracking (2009: 44):
‘These attempts by members of the political elite to gain political ground relative to one
another by attempting to fix the others’ behavior as ‘corrupt’, entail ‘corruption’ acting as a
signifier of moral detraction in a political discourse that pretends liberal reform but serves
authoritarian power. Narratives like these often involve ‘illegal’ foreign exchange transac-
tions (...) There is also a popular narrative of corruption acting as a moral censure of a ra-
pacious elite’.
Scholars have pointed to the moral significance of metaphors. Weick (1979:
50), for example, has pointed to their operational consequences. Like stories,
metaphors are important to corruption researchers because of the (often im-
plicit) moral baggage they carry. Describing metaphors in discursive prac-
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tices can bring clarity to how metaphors, in part, morally shape discursive
practices, that is, how morality is embedded in discursive practices. This is
also noted in the theoretical postmodern corruption theories. Just think of the
consequences it has once we use the slogan of ‘war on corruption’. The
metaphor of ‘war’ opens up a discursive space in which all kind of military
and violent options are on the table to deal with the ‘problem.’ Describing
corruption as ‘a cancer that eats away at the body politic’ portrays it as a
threat to the continued existence of the state or its subordinate civil authori-
ties.
We could also look at non-textual imagery such as symbols and powerful
images that have portrayed corruption. Consider, for instance, a 2008 cartoon
by the South-African newspaper Sunday Times in which ANC leader Jacob
Zuma is portrayed as a potential rapist of Lady Justice. Shortly before that
Zuma had been charged with corruption, and in 2006 had been acquitted of
rape indictments.
7. The presence of the past
As stated above, meaning is always a contingent and historical achievement;
corruption discourses are socially and historically constructed. To this point
we have mostly looked at the social construction; many researchers, however,
look for the ‘presence of the past’: historical corruption research can follow
the traces of a discourse back in history, reveal the contingencies of a current
corruption discourse, and thus dissolve the current coherence of systems of
intelligibility. Research like this is called ‘genealogical’. For example, Wither
analyzed the change in meaning of the word ‘racketeering’ in his study of
corruption accusations against the teamsters union in the 1930s (Kreike/Jor-
dan 2004). He also observed the steadily growing discrepancy between the
public opinion of racketeering and the way the phenomenon was conceived
on the shop floor (Witwer 2004: 197-238).
In a 2008 special issue of the public administration journal Public Voices,
several historians showed how our current systems of understanding are a
historical achievement: definitions and morality concerning corruption are in
constant flux. By producing historical representations of corruption and its
morality – which are often unfamiliar to 21st century Westerners – and some-
times by isolating the moments in which more familiar representations have
emerged, historical corruption researchers can disclose the instabilities and
chance elements of our current understandings of corruption (cf. Shapiro
1992).
Hoenderboom and Kerkhoff (2008) investigated an Early Modern Dutch
corruption scandal concerning the transgressions of a local magistrate,
Lodewijk Huygens, in the city of Gorinchem. The scandal shows the impor-
tance of a contextual approach towards corruption as different sources of val-
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ues and standards of conduct made up the (in)capability and corruption of
this magistrate, such as legal arguments, public opinion as expressed in pam-
phlets and codes of the shop floor. The codes of the shop floor show that an
Early Modern magistrate such as Huygens should at least be able to maintain
harmony and balance in everyday administration, especially concerning the
bestowal of office, gift exchange, and appropriation of funds. The codes of
the shop floor contrasted sharply with legal standards, which entirely prohib-
ited the obtainment of offices by offering money or gifts. An unambiguous
standard concerning what constituted corruption was therefore lacking (Ho-
enderboom/Kerkhoff 2008).
Kroeze (2008) presented a comparable study for the nineteenth century.
He emphasized the role of scandals in shifts in administrative values, and
then focused on an 1855 scandal concerning the selling of votes, which was
in sharp contrast with the value dualism characteristic of the Early Modern
period. A dominant set of liberal values became visible whereby, for in-
stance, putting particular interests (provincial, individual) above the general
interest in matters of political representation was not allowed. Public officials
were also expected to act with ‘dignity’, ‘openness’, ‘respect’ and ‘honor’,
and all parties more or less agreed on the seriousness of violating these im-
portant values. All parties involved therefore shared the same discourse
(Kroeze 2008).
In the same issue of Public Voices Engels (2008) considered the nine-
teenth century to be a period in which existing conflicts between value sys-
tems were finally resolved, and focused on turning points. His comparison of
anti-corruption movements in three countries and focus on the related mo-
tives does not only show the public-private dichotomy becoming clearer, but
also a visible tendency towards centralization and corruption criticism closely
connected to an anti-pluralist world of ideas comprising anti-capitalism, anti-
liberalism, and anti-Semitism. Interestingly, Engels stated that there was no
positive link in nineteenth century history between modernizing or democra-
tizing forces and the anti-corruption movement (Engels 2008).
Other historians have simply shown how different perceptions of corrup-
tion were in the past, thus sensitizing us to their social constructivist nature.
Will (2004), who has studied administration in late imperial China, describes
how a Weberian-like ethos on sufficient remuneration for impartial adminis-
trators could clash with the impossibility of supplying sufficient salaries and
with a rival ethic of loyalty to an administrator’s extended family and place
of birth. His work practically mirrored Sissener’s (2001; see above) (Will
2004: 29-82). Woodfine, who did not ‘seek to resolve the notorious difficul-
ties of the concept of corruption, but will accept the term in the senses in
which it was used in contemporary discourse’ (2004: 167), studied corruption
rhetoric in England during the first part of the eighteenth century. In a world
that did not know a strict public-private dichotomy or a clear separation be-
tween politics and administration, and one that was characterized by patron-
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age and clientage, what did Walpole’s regime do to make it so vulnerable to
accusations of corruption? Walpole, it turns out, grossly amplified things by
turning corruption into an overt system and organizing machine politics much
more thoroughly than before (Woodfine 2004: 167-196). Coulloudon – an-
other historian whose approach resembles Sissener’s – describes how cor-
ruption in the Soviet Union was a practical necessity because plan targets
could often not be met without fraud. Failing to meet targets could have seri-
ous consequences for the workers involved. Superiors who committed the
necessary fraud were looked upon favorably. Unsurprisingly, therefore, cor-
rupt Soviet officials caught for fraud often felt no guilt at all (Coulloudon
2004: 247-249). Many more historical studies in which corruption is seen as
a social construct exist. See for example the recent Beiheft of the Historische
Zeitschrift (Engels/Fahrmeir/Nützenadel 2009).
8. Power and the consequences of anti-corruption
discourses
There is considerable power in structured ways of viewing reality. Power in
post-positivistic research is defined relationally rather than an institutional or
personal feature. So-called genealogical1 discourse analyses of corruption
cases and corruption controversies analyze how power and knowledge func-
tion, how the rules and resources that set the limits of what can be said are
working. Foucault (1977; 1984) has shown how power works through ‘sub-
jectification.’ Bracking (2009: 36) argues that
‘the formal definition of corruption used by international financial institutions (…) acts in
practice as a strategic resource and signifier within World Bank political discourse, indi-
cating bad governance, illegitimacy and geopolitical position (…) Rather it is the wider
strategic role that the concept plays as a disciplinary governance concept which is critical
to donors’ attempted management of African politics and societies.’
Every discourse claims to talk about reality. In doing so, it classifies what is
(not) true permitted, desirable, and so on. Truth and power are closely re-
lated. As Foucault (1984: 74) stated, ‘Truth is linked in a circular relation
with systems of power which induces and which extend it; a ‘regime of
truth’’. Power is not just repressive; it is always productive. A genealogical
discourse analysis of corruption cases can reveal some of the ways power
                                                          
1 By using a grammar in its descriptions that replaces the subject with consciousness by a
subject as the receiver of social meaning, static concepts are in genealogy made fluid in a
historical process. Within genealogy, Foucault (e.g. 1977) looked for the way forms of
problematizations are shaped by other practices. Shapiro (1992: 29): ‘Genealogy is gray,
meticulous, and patiently documentary. Committed to inquiry, it seeks endlessly to dissolve
the coherence of systems of intelligibility that give individual and collective identities to
persons/peoples and to the orders that house them by recreating the process of descent
within which subjectivities and objectivities are produced’.
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functions and can thus add to the understanding of the meaning of the cor-
ruption cases. It can follow back in history the traces of a corruption dis-
course and reveal the contingencies of a current discourse.
Building partly on the work of Foucault, some have shown how dis-
courses on corruption with their inherent worldviews give some an advantage
over others. For example, Roberts et al. (2007) have shown how the dis-
course on governance in the so-called Pacific Plan resulted in a technocratic
direction such that a particularly narrow conceptualization of governance
dominates. ‘In a direct reading of the Pacific Plan and the interventions it
empowers there is ample evidence that governance (good and bad) is used in
a disciplining way’ (Roberts/Wright/O'Neill 2007: 981). As a result, most
emphasis in the region was laid on institution building (offices of auditing,
statisticians, and so on).
‘The definitions and modes of monitoring governance provide a framework through (…)
which Pacific Island elites (…) are able to know and analyze their region (…). As the Pa-
cific comes under the gaze of an expert calculus that frames forms of governing as ‘good’
or ‘bad’ the island nations and people are once again defined in terms of lack, with answers
proffered by development experts’ (Roberts/Wright/O'Neill 2007: 978/979).
To reveal the forces or power of a discourse, genealogy has to go back to the
moment in which an interpretation or identity became dominant within a dis-
course, like the Pacific Plan, in which case many alternatives for the domi-
nant governance discourses are available. In fact, in some cases the alterna-
tives effectively challenge the governance interpretations of the Plan. ‘The
continual remake of governance occurs in several ways as social movements
act to make strategic use of the term within the context of the Pacific Plan
and beyond it’ (Roberts/Wright/O'Neill 2007: 980).
In so-called critical corruption studies, questions are asked about the con-
sequences of the international anti-corruption measures. Brown and Cloke
(2006: 281): ‘Recently, together with several other commentators (Hanlon
2004; Harrison 2003; Michael 2004; Polzer 2001; Szeftel 1998; Williams/
Beare 1999) we have been promoting the need for critical academic reflection
upon the growing calls for an international ‘anti-corruption’ crusade’. Why,
then, has there been such an explosion of interest in corruption since the
1990s, and why is there such an apparent political commitment towards tack-
ling the problem (Brown/Cloke 2004) when there is no evidence that corrupt
behavior has increased? Brown and Cloke (2004) argue that an important
factor has been shifting geopolitical priorities after the end of the Cold War.
The effects of anti-corruption measures turn out to be manifold, and towards
much more than simply reducing the levels of corruption.
‘Despite the evolution of structural adjustment into a kindlier, cuddlier poverty reduction
version, within the international financial institutions there is no serious commitment to
address the issues of regulation and control so vital to any understanding or control of cor-
ruption that debilitates countries of the North, East, West and South’ (Brown/Cloke 2007:
318).
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Once again, the importance of context is emphasized. Consequences of any-
thing will always depend on the particular situation, so it is stressed. Brown
and Cloke (2006: 282/283):
‘This lack of detailed, contextualized analysis of the implementation of supposed anti-
corruption initiatives is, we would argue, reflected everywhere, rather than having anything
to do with any uniqueness of Nicaraguan circumstances (…) we have also come across a
series of major reservations expressed particularly by those whose evaluation of such ac-
tivities stems from long-term research experience in the country concerned (…) Taken to-
gether, these points reflect our concerns that in too many cases what is referred to as cor-
ruption has been taken out of the context within which it occurs both globally (in terms of
the interactions between North and South, the transforming influence of globalization etc.)
and locally (reflecting a tendency to seek for global explanations for and solutions to a
monolithic signifier named corruption, rather than more detailed considerations of the
complex dynamics of the nature of multiple, interlinked corruptions within individual so-
cieties)’.
Most of the critical corruption studies are not against anti-corruption meas-
ures per se, but what is labeled ‘corrupt’, what is not, and the effects thereof
are critical. A special concern is what the negative consequences will be for
the poor (e.g. Brown/Cloke 2006).
The intentions of anti-corruption discourses are questioned as well. Some
claim, for example, that such discourses reflect a post-Washington consensus
seeking to reinvigorate regulatory institutions while maintaining blame for
the failure of development in South American governments (Le Billon 2005:
687). Another example: ‘Policy on corruption is deeply embedded within the
wider constructions of global neo-liberal and free market economic govern-
ance (Brown/Cloke 2004, 2005; Marquette 2003; Szeftel 1998), where a clear
divide between the political and economic and between the public and private
spheres is expected’ (Bracking 2009: 37) – remarks similar to Roberts et al.
in their study on the Pacific Plan. Kondos focuses on the meaning of favorit-
ism using a set of Nepalese cultural practices, showing that ‘the favour’ and
therefore ‘partiality’ as values are in accordance with Hindu cultural values.
Yet he also explains how Western intellectuals tend to construct ‘favoritism’
to mean corruption and its motives. As a result an ideological conflict in the
field of political ethics arises from Western pressure to adopt the principle of
‘impartiality’ in government (Kondos 1987). Gupta (1995: 375-402) focuses
on discourses of corruption in contemporary India, specifically, practices
within the lower echelons of Indian bureaucracy and representations of the
state in the mass media. He stresses vigilance toward the imperialism of the
Western conceptual apparatus, questioning the Eurocentric distinction be-
tween state and civil society and the conceptualization of the state as a uni-
tary entity. Some also see the use of (insincere) anti-corruption discourse as a
strategic tool to legitimize the invasion of Iraq (Le Billon 2005; Whyte
2007).
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In some critical corruption studies we find criticism of ideologies, espe-
cially neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism is not just blamed for promoting the in-
terests of the elite via anti-corruption discourses; some even blame it for
causing corruption. Whyte (2007: 179), for example, states: ‘Neo-liberalism
creates a fertile environment for ‘corrupt’ market transactions to flourish, be-
cause it seeks the creation of limited space as a means of promoting entrepre-
neurialism and the pursuit of self-interests’, once again reminding us of Rob-
erts et al. and the Pacific Plan. Paradoxically, the Enron scandal, which
involved falsification of balance sheets, manipulation of accounting practices,
and the creation of an image of financial health, showed the pervasive nature
of corruption within corporate America – a hotbed of neo-liberal thought.
MacLennan (2005: 156, 159) states, ‘corruption is more than a simple, iso-
lated crime committed for personal gain. It is a part of corporate and political,
culture – more pervasive and acceptable among elites than we realize. In
short, it is becoming institutionalized’.
Others are very critical of almost all anticorruption measures – integrity
workshops, national integrity system analysis, anti-corruption commissions –
in the sense that they are seen as parts of wider mendacious practices where
people are subjected as supernumeraries to human development: ‘The anti-
corruption discourse and donor practice itself can cause perverse effects
which aggravate cycles of deteriorating governance (discussed by various
authors in Bracking 2007)’ (Bracking 2009: 37). Just as we saw in the Pacific
Plan example (Roberts/Wright/O'Neill 2007), it is often stated in critical cor-
ruption literature that the current dominating anti-corruption discourse is too
focused on technical solutions and the public-private distinction, resulting in
too much attention to the public sector as the major cause of corruption. In
short, the ‘anti-corruption crusade needs to be shorn of its anti-state bias’
(Brown/Cloke 2004: 291).
9. Fighting Corruption
So what remedies do post-positivist corruption scholars propose? Clearly,
they are cautious about supporting anti-corruption measures. After all, to
them any interpretation of corruption and its causes is contestable. Applying
a post-positivist perspective to corruption could most importantly sensitize us
to the fact that people live in different social realities, and therefore have dif-
ferent perceptions of what constitutes corruption. Knowing so might give us
Western Weberians pause before flinging accusations of corruption. We
should also critically study the effects of (academic) corruption discourses
that necessarily result from any specific interpretation of or theory on the
causes of corruption.
For Bourdieu/Wacquant (1992) reflexivity is key to entailing awareness of
the effects of one's own social position, perceptions, observations, and the
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conditions of understanding that structure discourse. As an act of self-
reference reflexivity serves to make explicit the underlying unthought struc-
tures that frame our social world. Lennerfors (2008: 393-397) asks in his dis-
sertation how postmodern philosophers would have viewed corruption – one
of his sections is called ‘Baumanian corruption’- had they dealt with the phe-
nomenon. He then applies these insights to a Swedish case. In the last chapter
of his book he asks himself what ‘gifts’ he has presented to practitioners, and
‘reflection’ is his answer. He invites administrators to reflect on clear rules
and the pros and cons of grey zones. He also warns against concentrating on
rules instead of on the underlying values. Reflection should also be given to
the exact limits between the public and private spheres. As not everyone in an
organization shares the same corruption discourse, reflection on which group
of colleagues one would like to identify with could also be helpful. He issues
a similar invitation to reflect on one’s attitude to the private parties involved,
and invites the public in general to reflect on the reasons behind the accusa-
tions of corruption it reads in the newspapers.
Tänzler, who is scientific coordinator of ‘Crime and Culture: An Interna-
tional Research Project within the Sixth Framework Programme of the Euro-
pean Commission’, is rather more ambitious. The project he coordinates is
aimed at finding ‘means to optimise corruption prevention in the EU’. The
project’s point of departure is that the different perceptions of what consti-
tutes corruption in the EU are a major obstacle to fighting it, as the remedies
might well be based on corruption definitions not shared by the people they
are targeting. Making clear what different perceptions of corruption European
cultures hold might increase the fit between these perceptions, and the reme-
dies used. The project explicitly aims at finding new remedies. It might thus
lead to more success in combating corruption in Europe.2
Alternative explanations and understanding of corruption in particular
countries can help us reconsider the effectiveness of existing policy instru-
ments to combat corruption. Above all, the importance of context became
clear. Too often, corruption and its remedies are discussed outside its social
and historical context. This is dangerous because, whatever way one looks at
the causes of corruption, the contingencies are many. Any proposed solution
should take as many contingencies as possible into account.
10. Conclusion
In this chapter we looked at how post-positivistic theories study and view the
causes of corruption and the ontological stances on which the theories are
based (the importance of language and discourse). We saw that post-
positivistic scholars do not study what corruption ‘really’ is or means, but
                                                          
2 http://www.unikonstanz.de/crimeandculture/project.htm.
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how the definitions of corruption come about, both in academic and all other
discourses on corruption. And, very importantly, we looked at the effects of
using the concept.
It turns out that there is no unifying post-positivistic corruption approach;
indeed, most post-positivistic researchers denounce classifications. Lenner-
fors (2008: 309): ‘Had Bauman written about corruption, he might have
claimed that the real issue of corruption lies within the more general project
of classification and division – and hence the structuring of the world as such
(…) Bauman describes classification as an act of violence.’ Many of the
studies in this chapter turned out to have an affinity with social constructivist
ideas, just as theories that look at the (power) effects of discourses on cor-
ruption. Or, as Lennerfors (2008: 307) put it, ‘A postmodern understanding
of corruption is related to ambiguity and that no classification of the world is
accurate.’ In other words, we live in an ambiguous world with no clear cate-
gories of right and wrong, yet there are demands for clarity and demarcation.
This illustrates why, throughout the chapter, the context of corruption re-
search and discourses is fundamental.
The causes studied here were primarily those of the usage of the label
‘corruption’. This in clear contrast to chapters in this volume that see corrup-
tion as a clear phenomenon whose causes can, at least in principle, be estab-
lished. This does not mean that we believe it is not useful to try to establish
the causes of corruption; the other chapters provide new invaluable insights.
The value this chapter has added, however, is foremostly to show how useful
it is to critically study the effects of corruption discourses. And it ends with a
plea to corruption scholars to critically reflect on the effects that their own
academic discourses have on corruption.
Chapter 8:
The Criminology of Corruption            
Wim Huisman and Gudrun Vande Walle      
1. Introduction
Corruption is a form of crime. Most people, including scholars, would agree
on that. Criminology is a scientific discipline that has crime as its object of
study. Surprisingly, however, corruption has rarely been the focus of crimi-
nological research and mostly in the context of broader concepts of crime,
such as organized crime. This is rather strange because other concepts are
perfectly suitable for a criminological analysis of corruption. As criminolo-
gists, we are convinced of the added value of a criminological perspective on
corruption. Taking criminology as the reference point we will address two is-
sues in this chapter.
First, several criminological concepts, developed for the study of distinct
forms of crime, will be discussed. These concepts enable a better under-
standing of corruption as a crime phenomenon. Concepts related to corrup-
tion are: organized crime, occupational crime, corporate crime, state crime,
and the more recent derivatives such as state-corporate crime. We end this
analysis with the concept of ‘victimization’ and the added value of victimol-
ogy for a better understanding of the crime phenomenon.
One question that connects the different concepts is the question of defi-
nition. Mainstream criminology generally works within the context of the
criminal law definition. For corruption this usually means the criminalization
of bribing. Bribing has an active side of offering bribes by the ‘corruptor’ and
a passive side of accepting bribes by the ‘corruptee’. From this narrow defi-
nition, an important question emerges when we reflect upon the meaning be-
hind the criminalization of corruption, being the disapproval of the abuse of
power for personal gain: ‘must we use the law to draw the line?’(Nelken
1994). Should the criminological study of corruption be limited to those
forms of corrupt behaviour criminalized by law – mostly offering and ac-
cepting bribes? Or should we extend the scope of research to legal behaviour
that leads to the same sort of abuse of power?
In the second part of this contribution, several theories on the aetiology of
crime will be explored to discover their explanatory value for a better under-
standing of corrupt behaviour. The selection of theories is based on the as-
sumption that corruption is mostly committed by agents operating in the
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context of organizations. A multi-level approach is chosen, exploring possi-
ble causal factors on the macro-level of globalisation and nation states, the
meso-level of organizations and the micro-level of interactions of individuals.
We end this contribution by reflecting upon the methodology that has
been used to study corruption as a crime phenomenon. Empirical research in
criminology is limited and often based on second sources. Some remarkable
research initiatives ought to stimulate further empirical research.
2. Fertile ground for corruption research
The most important concepts that have been host to corruption studies are or-
ganized crime, occupational crime and organisational crime. Organisational
crime is further divided into corporate crime and state crime. Even if the lat-
ter domains retain their authenticity, researchers have crossed the border of
their own domain and are now searching for connections and networks be-
tween organized, corporate, state and occupational crime. This border-crossing
has been introduced by, among others, the criminologists Kramer and Micha-
lowski, with the concepts state-corporate and state-organized crime (2006).
Today more researchers refer to the blurring of boundaries between legal and
illegal organisation and the unreliable employee. This approach starts from
the perspective of the perpetrator. We end this chapter with a reflection on
the contribution of victimology to the understanding of corruption victimisa-
tion.
2.1 Corruption and organized crime
Without any doubt organized crime has been the most important domain in
criminology for research into corruption. This is due to international initia-
tives of criminal policy at the end of the 90s in the fight against organized
crime. Organized crime was perceived as a crime phenomenon that was in-
creasingly threatening the legal economy but it appeared to be impossible for
the police to capture the illegal networks behind organized crime. Money
laundering and corruption were considered as mechanisms used by criminal
organisations to facilitate or to continue their lucrative illegal activities with-
out being detected. Regarding corruption, differences could be made between
corruption on the political level, on the enforcement level or on the level of
administration. These moments of contact between the underworld and the
upperworld gave a clue to the police for further detection of the criminal
network. This idea of the strong link between organized crime and corruption
of the upperworld was later affirmed by the Dutch Parliamentary Inquiry
Committee concerning Investigation Methods, the Van Traa Commission.
The commission said: there is organized crime when – among other require-
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ments – the group is capable of covering up their crimes in a relatively effec-
tive way, particularly by demonstrating their willingness to use physical vio-
lence or to rule out persons by means of corruption (Fijnaut et al. 1998).
What could be called a ‘moral panic’ at the end of the 90s concerning or-
ganized drug trafficking and human trafficking has also had an impact on re-
search in criminology. In the 1960s and 1970s, criminologists created mafia-
like images of criminal organisations: organized crime was an underworld
totally separated from the legal world. Beare refers to the ‘alien conspiracy
notion’ that separated organized crime from normal society and therefore
distanced organized crime from corruption (Beare 1997a: 66). The urgent
demand for more profound research led to a more realistic picture on organ-
ized crime in criminology (see, e.g., Fijnaut 1998; Kleemans 2008; Rider
1997; Ruggiero 1996). Empirically based research such as the Van Traa
Commission succeeded in de-mystifying the mafia-like image of organized
crime in the Netherlands (Fijnaut et al. 1998). Independent academic research
is now deconstructing organized crime in all its complexities, with particular
attention for the moments of interface between the legal and the illegal world
(Fijnaut/Paoli 2004; Van Duyne/Jager/Von Lampe/Newell 2004). Discussing
organized crime is not the same as discussing one concept anymore. Among
other reasons, the variety of organized crime will depend on the ability to
garner support and assistance via corruption. The greater the ability to corrupt
the greater the ability to remain invisible (Beare 1997a: 68). Fijnaut et al.
(1998) see three further relationships of crime with the upperworld: parasiti-
cal, symbiotic and implantation. In a parasitical relationship the contacts with
the legal economy are rather limited and only in the interest of the under-
world. If an opportunity appears, the criminal organisation will try to corrupt.
A symbiotic relationship is more complex, based on the mutual interests of
the criminal organisation and the upperworld. Corruption becomes more im-
portant and gives mutual benefit. However, since the relation between both
worlds is close, corruption is more complex and difficult to prove. The last
kind of relationship type is implantation. The criminal organisation is partly
absorbed in the upperworld and the criminal activities are totally mixed up
with legal business. Corruption changes in a situation of permanent pressure.
The study of organized crime has stimulated attention for corrupt practices:
even if there is no consensus about the necessity of corruption for the continu-
ity of illegal activities, it is obvious that at the very least corruption can be a fa-
cilitator. On a world scale, Buscaglia and Van Dijk found a strong correlation
between the perceived level of organized crime in countries and the level of
perceived corruption in these countries as reported by Transparancy Interna-
tional (Buscaglia/Van Dijk 2003). On the other hand criminologists must be
aware that the connection with illegal organisations is only one specific dimen-
sion. Other dimensions of corruption, committed in the sphere of the legal
economy, are possibly less obvious but may, give to be more reason for the
study of corruption as an independent crime phenomenon.
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2.2 Corruption and white collar crime
A second criminological concept, providing the opportunity for independent
corruption research, is white collar crime. Sutherland, who introduced the
concept during the congress of the American Sociological Society in 1939,
defined white collar crime as ‘crime committed by a person of respectability
or high social status in the course of his occupation’ (Sutherland 1961: 9).
His definition was not very precise but his empirical research made clear that
he was referring to criminal behaviour committed by members of the upper
socio-economic class during their occupation, independent of the fact that an
individual or the company is the beneficiary (Sutherland 1961: 9-10).
Already from that very beginning of what is now called organisational
criminology the definition of white collar crime was a main topic of debate.
The discussion questioned whether it was the role of criminal law to define
white collar crime. Sutherland was convinced of the fact that general criminal
law did not cover all forms of white collar crime because most of the harmful
activities conducted by white collar criminals are dealt with outside the
criminal court by civil litigation or disciplinary rules.
‘Given that ‘upper class’ criminals often operate undetected, that if detected they may not
be prosecuted, and that if prosecuted they may not be convicted the amount of criminally
convicted persons are far from the total population of white collar criminals.’ (Slap-
per/Tombs 1999: 3).
This far reaching statement clashed with the opinion of some lawyers, e.g.
Tappan, who saw in the extension of the definition of crime outside the crimi-
nal law an attack on the principle of innocent until proven guilty. The debate
about the delineation of white collar crime is still going on today. The republi-
can criminologist John Braithwaite, for example, returned to Sutherland’s defi-
nition in saying that the criminal code is at the centre of delineation but most
organisational crime is redefined as a private law conflict (Braithwaite 1984:
6). Some other criminologists rejected the criminal law definition completely
because it is an institution enforced by the state and dominated by the powerful.
These criminologists put forward a human rights definition with social harm as
central point of delineation (Schwendinger/Schwendinger 2001: 84-85). This
definition-debate which had faded through the years pops up again when talk-
ing about corruption. The Global Integrity Report states that the majority of
countries have anti-corruption law: even those countries perceived as vulner-
able for corruption. But when we study the implementation of the corruption
law the results are less optimistic (Global Integrity Index 2008). Even in the
Netherlands and Belgium the amount of corrupt practices which end up in
criminal sentences are limited (Huberts/Nelen 2005: 50; Database Central
Registration of Punishment, Belgium)1 As an alternative to incarceration, the
                                                          
1 Information on the conviction rate of corruption in Belgium was provided by the Federal
Department of Justice.
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case ends with a disciplinary sanction or a dismissal for lack of evidence (Slap-
per/Tombs 1999: 87). The record is even worse for private corruption or cor-
ruption committed between two private individuals. This crime phenomenon
that is considered to have the highest incidence of all corruption phenomena is
often settled in the private sphere or penalised by market mechanisms. For the
years 2004 and 2005 not one case reached a Belgian court (De Bie 2009; see
also: Database Central Registration of Punishment, Belgium).
Despite the immense impact of Sutherlands work on criminology, the
content of white collar crime refused to become clear. Sutherland failed to
distinguish crime committed by an employee in favour of his organisation
with crime committed by an employee in his own interest and against the in-
terests of the organisation. After Sutherland, the concept of white collar
crime fell into disuse and different sub domains were developed: the domain
of ‘offenses committed by individuals for themselves in the course of their
occupations and the offenses of employees against their employers’ (Cli-
nard/Quinney 1973: 188) or alternatively, crime committed by a legal organi-
sation or a member of that organisation in the course of his occupation in fa-
vour of the organisation. The legal organisation that commits crime can be a
private company (corporate crime) or a public organisation (state crime).
2.2.1 Corruption and occupational crime
The concept of occupational crime is relevant when analysing passive cor-
ruption. It means that an employee, in a public or private organisation, has
abused a position of power or trust for private gain and against the interests
of the employer. Clinard and Quinney introduced occupational crime in
‘Criminal behaviour systems: a typology’ (1973). Friedrichs thought that the
definition of Clinard and Quinney made a scientific debate impossible be-
cause the concept was still too broad. He further diversified the concept into
three categories: ‘occupational crime’ referring to illegal and unethical ac-
tivities committed for individual financial gain – or to avoid financial loss –
in the context of a legitimate occupation; ‘occupational deviance’ as the de-
viation from occupational norms (e.g. drinking on the job; sexual harassment)
and ‘workplace crime’ for conventional forms of crime committed in the
workplace (e.g. rape; assault) (Friedrichs 2002). Other researchers who gave
continuity to the work of Clinard and Quinney are, amongst others, Blount
(2003), G. Green (1990) and Mars (2006).
When talking about corruption as a kind of occupational crime some re-
marks are necessary. Firstly, concerning passive corruption, it is certainly the
case that the offender has a personal responsibility but the organisational and
social context cannot be denied. Frequently, it will be a hybrid mixture of on
the one hand the personal characteristics of the corruptee and the impact of
organisational aspects such as organisational structure, organisational culture,
and style of leadership (Mars 2006; Tillman 2009); and on the other hand
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elements external to the organisation such as globalisation, the legal frame-
work and law enforcement (Box 1983: 34-79; Mars 2006; Tillman 2009).
Punch illustrated the complexity of occupational crime in his research on po-
lice corruption. He rejects the bad apple metaphor and focuses more on bad
orchards, an institutional context where the organisation, the kind of work,
and the culture play a key role. In Punch’s work police corruption is viewed
as both individual and institutional failure. Even if corruption, from a certain
perspective, possibly fits the definition of occupational crime, caution is
called for in establishing a causal link (Punch 2000: 314-315; Punch 2009:
18). Gray expressed the same concern for health and safety problems in
companies: while workers are often victims of health and safety problems
they are often too easily portrayed as offenders (Gray 2006). Even if the ini-
tiative emanates from the civil servant, the organisational context often cre-
ates the opportunities to commit corruption. The organizational context as a
causal factor in explaining corruption will be elaborated upon in chapter 3.
A second remark concerning corruption as a form of occupational crime
is that occupational crime may not necessarily be against the interests of the
employer. From the point of view of the corruptee in the case of public cor-
ruption, the organisation can often profit from individual actions, especially if
the company has already participated in a long process of blurring moral
standards. In case of private corruption the interests of the organisation and
the interests of the corruptee correspond. One example is the case of the Bel-
gian soccer club SK Lierse and the Chinese gambler Ye. The bribe that was
paid to some players of SK Lierse guaranteed the continuation of the club,
was a benefit for some players and a guarantee of profit for the gambler.2 In
general, soccer seems prone to corruption (Hill 2009). In practice it is not
easy to make a clear distinction between occupational and corporate crime
and a continuum of activities which favours the organisation more than the
employee or vice versa although the latter occurrence seems to be more re-
presentative.
Occupational crime as a subject of research has been barely studied in
criminology. It could be argued that a previously pro Marxist approach in or-
ganisational crime deflected attention away from the deviant behaviour of
employees (Cools 2009: 192). Another reason could be that organisations try
to hide deviant behaviour of employees in order to avoid negative publicity
or, in the case of a public organisation, to keep their legitimacy.
2.2.2 Corruption and organisational crime
The other part of white collar crime is organisational crime or crime com-
mitted by an organisation or a member of an organisation in the interest of
                                                          
2 Lierse SK ‘naïef’ in omkoopschandaal (Lierse SK ‘naive’ in corruption scandal), Trouw 19
April 2006.
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the organisation. A decade ago every text concerning white collar crime
contained the statement that there is no criminological research on white
collar crime (cf. Pearce/Tombs 1998: ix; Slapper/Tombs 1999: 9). Today, the
domain of organisational crime represents a significant part of criminological
research as a whole and phenomena such as environmental crime, food safety
scandals or financial crime no longer pass unnoticed by organisational crimi-
nologists. This is not the same for corruption. Few organisational criminolo-
gists have studied the act of corruption as an aim in itself.3 This can be ex-
plained in the following ways:
First of all, corruption has always been strongly related to organized
crime and studied as a facilitator of organized crime. It is only recently that
criminologists have given attention to the seriousness of corruption as a
crime phenomenon of the upperworld.
Secondly, and related to the first argument there was no pressure from
‘outside’ to set up corruption research. For a long time politics was indiffe-
rent to the deviant activities of legal organisations and it was certainly not
supported by the private sector who considered the research of organisational
crime as a threat to the free market. It is only during the last two decades that
the attention for public integrity and business ethics has started to grow – also
on the political level. This differs from organized crime which has always
been considered as a threat for the legal economy and has always been taken
seriously by the private sector as well as government.
Thirdly, corruption is an ambiguous concept. We have already mentioned
that the debate about the demarcation of organisational crime is a constant
theme. This is certainly the case for corruption. When leaving the safe legal
framework of bribery and enlarging the definition of corruption to the ‘abuse
of power for private gain’ a new world of insecurity and vagueness is re-
vealed. Perception studies establish a wide range of perceptions on corruption
depending upon the social position of the perceiver and the kind of corruption
committed. Heidenheimer, for example, categorizes corruption according to
social acceptance in white corruption, grey corruption and black corruption
(Heidenheimer 1989). The lack of clear definition of corruption may restrain
criminologists from studying corruption especially since criminologists have
always had difficulties leaving the criminal law borders behind.
Finally, the lack of ‘visible’ victims could be a reason for the lack of in-
terest into corruption as a form of organisational crime. Organisational crimi-
nologists have been traditionally sensitive to scandals and disasters with huge
victimisation rates and serious financial, physical, and emotional impact (Van
de Bunt/Huisman 2007). Even if corruption produces its own human tragedy:
                                                          
3 In 1990 Clinard published ‘Corporate corruption. The abuse of power’. However the title
was misleading since the book is an analysis of unethical and illegal behaviour committed
by the Fortune 500.
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unemployment, lack of health care, school education or famine; it is a slum-
bering problem that is too easily accepted as part of a culture or tradition.
It is possibly the case that there are more reasons to be found for the ne-
glect of corruption in organisational criminology. Nevertheless, the two next
study domains in criminology: corporate crime and state crime, will prove to
be valuable for the study of corruption.
2.2.2.1 Corporate crime
When the criminal law definition of corruption is analysed, it has two main
players: the active corruptor and the passive corruptee. Little attention is
given to the role of corruptor in the media and/or research. We have to agree
with Levi when he says that crime committed by social outsiders is accepted
far less gently than crime committed by the respectable company (Levi 2009:
51). Also in criminology, corruption committed by private companies or the
active corruption side is a neglected crime phenomenon.
The debate on the definition of organisational crime takes on an extra dif-
ficult dimension the moment private companies become the central objects of
research. Sutherland had already illustrated that an organisation is able to
commit white collar crime without being perceived as criminal or without
being detected or prosecuted. One of the explanations for their exclusion
from the definition of crime is the social network of white collar people. The
social network was, according to Sutherland, referable to the cultural homo-
geneity of people working for the government and in business: both being in
the upper strata of the American Society, family and friendship, relations, and
the mechanism of the revolving door. ‘Many persons in government were
previously connected with business firms as executives, attorneys, directors,
or in other capacities’ (1961: 248) Thus the initial cultural homogeneity,
close personal relationships, and power relationships protect businessmen
and women against critical definitions by government. This perception of the
relationship between companies and the political level is something which
fed the idea that companies always escape formal condemnation and that
gave an impulse to the definition debate. This debate is still currently of high
relevance in cases of corruption. While some activities of ‘abuse of power for
private gain’ are considered as corrupt, other activities with the same risk of
harm are considered socially acceptable; for instance networking and lobby-
ing, make the regulator vulnerable for what is called regulatory capture.4 An-
other mechanism that endangers the independent position of the regulator is
‘a revolving door’. A revolving door refers to the mechanism of personnel
shifting between affiliations in politics or regulatory agencies and executive
positions in companies subjected to regulation. In fact people who left their
                                                          
4 In case of regulatory capture the regulating agencies act in favour of those who are regulated
and not for the public interest. The reason for capture is the dominant position of the regu-
lated in the regulation process. This dominant position is the result of a direct or indirect
mechanism of influencing or even manipulation. (See also: Vande Walle 2010).
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job come back in with other interests. The previous network and contacts will
help to protect the interests of the regulated.
In comparing lobbying and corruption Campos and Giovanni have sug-
gested that legal mechanisms such as lobbying are preferred in rich countries
while companies in poor countries have to rely on corruption (Cam-
pos/Giovanni 2006). The promotion of medicines and the subtle interaction
between pharmaceutical companies and physicians is a good illustration of
the distinction between what is legal and what amounts to corruption. While
general practitioners are seduced by pharmaceutical companies offering to
equip their medical cabinets or facilitate participation in a conference with a
luxurious destination they are also encouraged to prescribe new medical
products of that specific company to their patients (Braithwaite 1984; Vande
Walle 2005: 232-240). Despite the recognition of overmedication as a new
western disease, such mechanisms continue to be tolerated.
In the near future more profound criminological research into the corrup-
tive practices of private companies and the acceptability of the relationship
between the private and political level seems to be essential. The initial im-
petus for the latter has already been given with the introduction of the con-
cept known as state-corporate crime; a concept that emphasizes the impor-
tance of both the private company and the state, emerging from the
compilation of the study of corporate crime with the study of state crime.
2.2.2.2 State crime
State crime is a relatively new study domain in criminology. Illegal or devi-
ant acts perpetrated by or with the complicity of state agencies were until re-
cently mostly studied international political sciences and anthropology (P.
Green/Ward 2004: 431). The recent criminological attention has some speci-
fications and challenges for the future. However, with the introduction of the
International Criminal Court, state crime has gained academic attention, also
in criminology.
In line with the competences of the ICC the attention has gone particu-
larly to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (P. Green/Ward
2004; Huisman 2009; Rothe/Ross 2009; Smeulers/Haveman 2008). With the
exception of P. Green and Ward corruption is seldom considered as a state
crime. We think it is a challenge for criminologists to further explore the re-
lation between war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity on the one
hand and corruption on the other, as will also be discussed in section 3 (Ban-
tekas 2006).
Relating corruption to human rights abuses brings the risk of the ‘overex-
posure’ of corruption in countries in transition and third world countries and
makes people think about corruption in terms of ‘the other’ and ‘the self’.
Criminology of the other is a type of criminology which speaks of poor
countries and countries in transition ‘as if they are the gangsters, the rogue
states, the failed states and we can present ourselves as police’ (P. Green/
Wim Huisman and Gudrun Vande Walle124
Ward 2004). On the other hand criminology of the self considers state crime
as a ‘natural outcome of the economic, military and geopolitical rationalities
of advanced capitalist states’ (P. Green/Ward 2004). This could be a fallacy
when studying corruption and when overstressing the culture of a country or
population. Criminology of the other is possibly an idea which is fostered by
instruments such as Transparency International or the Global Integrity index
which seems to isolate the responsibility for corruption to the government of
the corrupt country while in a global economy more actors are involved. Al-
though Transparency International has attempted to restore the balance by fo-
cusing its 2009 report on corruption into the private sector. In recent years,
companies have gained access to the regulation process and other legal
mechanisms of regulatory capturing have made corruption, in the strict ju-
ridical sense, less important. This evolution into co-regulation risks turning
the attention of the criminologists away from the responsibility of western
countries to poor countries.
To avoid the spurious dichotomy of the self and the other and of the rela-
tion between private companies and the state, a new approach has now be-
come essential.
2.2.2.3 State-corporate crime
A last biotope for the study of corruption is state-corporate crime. State-
corporate crime provides a framework for studying forms of organisational de-
viance created or facilitated by the intersection of political and economic insti-
tutions (Kramer/Michalowski 2006: 18). In the first decades of the study of
corporate crime, criminologists were strongly focussed on the private legal or-
ganisation as the perpetrator and the study of the role of public authorities was
somewhat limited (Kramer/Michalowski/Kauzlarich 2002: 270). In theories
explaining corporate crime, state responsibility was reduced to a lack of state
regulation or a lack of enforcement (Box 1983: 64) or, going back to Suther-
land, was conceived as belonging to the same social class (1961: 248). How-
ever the statement ‘no corporate crime without the state’ holds water. Kramer,
Kauzlarich and Michalowski reintroduced the state as participant in the com-
mission of corporate crime, either as facilitator or as initiator. The introduction
of the notion state came from a feeling of dissatisfaction with the underesti-
mated responsibility of the state in committing corporate and organized crime.
Their critique was based on the proposition of Quinney that ‘the definition and
control of some behaviour as criminal and the selection of others as acceptable
are the consequences of socially embedded processes of naming, not qualities
in resident in the behaviour so named’ (Kramer et al. 2002: 265-266). With the
introduction of state-corporate crime; Kramer and his colleagues reintroduced
the state, not in the baseline as an element of explanation, but as a responsible
actor. Certain behaviour committed at the intersection of corporate and state
goals are not as seen as criminal; either because they are not named as such by
law, or are not treated as such by those who administer and enforce the law, re-
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gardless of the social harm this type of behaviour causes (Kramer et al. 2002).
State-organized crime is organized crime that is created or facilitated at the po-
litical level (Chambliss 1989). P. Green (2005) brought the three domains to-
gether in his study of the construction industry in Turkey and the disasters after
the earth quakes. This same mechanism of the blurring of boundaries between
organized, corporate, and state crime is remarkable in the illegal trade in natural
resources and the relation of this illegal trade with arms trafficking (Boekhout
van Solinge 2008; Reno 2009). A striking example is the scandal of ‘Angola-
gate’ in which French officials have recently been convicted of taking bribes
and doing business with shady arms dealers to safeguard French oil interests in
Angola and in which former executives of the French oil company Elf have
been convicted for offering bribes to both parties in the civil war in this country
(Frynas/Wood 2001).
Kramer and Michalowski further differentiated the responsibility of the
state between state-initiated and state-facilitated (Kramer et al 2002: 271)
notions that fit with what are called acts of commission and acts of omission.
State-initiated activities are socially injurious activities initiated by a gov-
ernmental actor. State-facilitated activities occur when government regula-
tory institutions fail to restrain illegal acts, ‘because of a collusive relation-
ship or because they adhere to shared goals whose attainment would be
hampered by aggressive regulation’ (Kramer et al 2002: 271-272). The cor-
rupt activities of a civil servant in a tolerant environment without leadership
or implementation of regulation could be considered as state-facilitated.5
State-corporate crime is a rather inflexible concept but it sets some re-
flections in motion. Firstly, it has contributed to a more complete view of the
network of responsible actors involved in corporate crime. Not only is the
private company important but also the state, as an institution of rule making
and of enforcement. Secondly, the activities of the state itself are questioned
more thoroughly. Finally, the concept of state-corporate crime highlights the
debate about the criminal law definition of corruption: is the legal definition
sufficient to encompass socially injurious relations between companies? This
is a debate which pops up from time to time in criminology: reminiscent of
the radical criminology of the Schwendingers who pleaded for a human
rights definition of crime because the legalistic definitions cannot be justified
                                                          
5 Even if these different notions of responsibility hold water, their application in practice can
be a rather complex exercise and nuances can be subtle. Take for example the weapons ex-
ported from the Belgian weapon factory Fabrique Nationale de Herstal or in short FN.
Since 1997 the Walloon Region is the 100% owner of the Herstal Group which the FN fac-
tory belongs to. They provide employment for 3000 people in Belgium, Japan, Portugal and
the US. In 2002 FN was front page news because the parliament of the Walloon region gave
permission for the export of more than 5000 machine guns to Nepal whilst weapons export
to regions in conflict is internationally forbidden. What was the Walloon region doing in this
case: facilitating to protect a national traditional economy and employment or, initiating be-
cause they were 100% owners of the company in question? In other words – how do we
categorize a case where the state is the company and the regulator at the same time?
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as long as they make the activity of criminologists subservient to the state
(Schwendinger/Schwendinger 1975: 138). In addition, P. Green and Ward
specified the aspect of socially injurious by referring to human rights viola-
tions (P. Green/Ward 2004: 28). Barak moreover, says that in a sense, injuri-
ous activities of the state are more threatening than harmful activities of the
private sector because the state makes the rules in the name of common inter-
est or national welfare (Barak 1991: 5). Even if these contributions are radi-
cal criminological points of view which stand far from practical applicability,
they keep criminologists alive to the relativity of the penal code and potential
injurious effects of legal activities (Passas/Goodwin 2004).
2.3 Corruption in victimology
Corruption can have a wide variety of victims: the state, competing firms, the
community or even entire societies. Moreover, those under direct or indirect
duress to commit corruption offer a broad base for further criminological
analysis. Surprisingly, however, victims are seldom the topic of concern in
corruption studies. This is a general fallacy of organisational criminology.
Corporate crime has often been represented as victimless crime for many rea-
sons (Croall 2001: 8-9; Wells 1994: 26). Ross said it was due to the character
of the perpetrator, the criminaloid, who consciously avoids victimising in his
direct neighbourhood (Ross 1907). Others blame it on the private character of
organisational crime: committed in offices or by using safe telecommunica-
tion. Also, the time-space distance between the offender and the victim plays
a role (Vande Walle 2005: 39-44) Going back to the case of the export of
counterfeit medicines to Nigeria, between the moment of bribing the customs
officer and the consumption of the pseudo-medication a considerable period
of weeks or months passed. Finding the causal link between the injurious ef-
fects and the transaction between company and customs officer was almost
impossible. The distance between the offender and the victim reinforces the
invisibility of victimisation and the unconsciousness of the injured of being a
victim. Furthermore, especially in the case of corruption, the indirect effects
on employment, health care and education, avoids public disapproval. Even if
people were conscious of their victimisation, their social position makes it
almost impossible to react with impact. The Global Corruption Barometer of
Transparency International (2008) shows that low income households have to
pay most bribes. This finding is in flat contradiction to the democratic cha-
racter often attributed to corporate crime. Everybody can be a victim but the
weakest, the poor, the uninformed, are the first victims.
The characteristics of corruption make the victim into what Sutherland
called a weak antagonist, or a victim who resigns because of his low social
status or lack of knowledge (Sutherland 1949: 230). It is one of the tasks of
victimology to make victims more visible primarily, in their own interest but
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also to get a better understanding of the mechanisms which operate to make
people apparently resigned to their fate.
3. The aetiology of corruption
The previous section has shown that criminologists would place corruption in
the scope of types of crime which take place in an organisational context. It is
therefore plausible to explore whether theories that have been developed to
understand the causes of these forms of crime, are also applicable to the aeti-
ology of corruption. In addition, the distinction between organisational and
occupational crime is parallel to the active and passive sides of corruption. In
a corporate crime context, it can be a corporate agent who is offering bribes
in order to achieve a corporate aim, for instance acquiring a contract or ob-
taining a governmental permit. On the passive side, it will be a member of a
private or public organization taking the bribe for his or her own benefit, in
exchange for a service or omission that will probably not be for the benefit of
the organization.
This distinction can also be relevant for the explanation of corruption.
Theories on the causes of organized and white-collar crime are often elabo-
rations of general theories of crime. These theories focus on three categories
of explanatory variables: motivation, opportunity and the operationality of
social control. According to Coleman (1987:409) motives are ‘a set of sym-
bolic constructions defining certain kinds of goals and activities as appropri-
ate and desirable and others as lacking those qualities’. Opportunities entail
‘a potential course of action, made possible by a particular set of social con-
ditions, which has been symbolically incorporated into an actor’s repertoire
of behavioural possibilities’. According to Shover and Bryant (1993: 144)
opportunities for corporate crime are ‘objectively given situations or condi-
tions encountered by corporate personnel that offer attractive potential for en-
riching corporate coffers or furthering other corporate objectives by criminal
means’. The operationality of control is the opposite of opportunity: informal
and formal control provided by guardians serve as a restraint on the commis-
sion of crime (Benson/Simpson 2009). While a motivation is a subjective
construction of psychological desires, and opportunity and control are rooted
in objective social conditions, these variables are inseparably interwoven in
particular settings. Motivations evolve in response to a particular set of
structural opportunities and have little meaning in another context. Equally,
an opportunity requires a symbolic construction making that particular be-
havioural option psychologically available to individual actors. Finally, a
lack of control contributes to the opportunities to commit crime. In other
words, acting in an environment in which business opportunities present
themselves after showing willingness to take care of the personal needs of
authority figures might influence the motivation to do so.
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This example shows that these explanatory variables can be found on sev-
eral aggregate levels: the level of the individual offender and his or her social
interactions, the organizational level of structural and cultural characteristics
of organizations and the institutional level of political economy and business
regulation (Kramer/Michalowski 2006; Shover/Bryant 1993). Vaughan (2002)
has emphasized the importance of understanding the interconnections of the
micro-, meso- and macro-levels and the relationships between the environ-
ment, the organizational setting and the behaviour of individuals within for
the explanation of misconduct committed from within an organizational
context.
3.1 The institutional level
On the macro-level, many criminologists attribute a criminogenic effect to
the ‘culture of competition’, a complex of values and beliefs that is particu-
larly strong in social systems based on industrial capitalism (Coleman
1995:363). In this worldview, the foundations of which can be traced back to
the 17th century (Coleman 1987: 416), great importance is given to achieving
wealth and success, while people are seen as autonomous individuals with
powers of reason and free choice and therefore responsible for their own
condition. In this way, the culture of competition defines the competitive
struggle for personal gain as positive, rather than negative or selfish. Compe-
tition produces maximum economic value for society as a whole. This de-
mand for success and the pursuit of wealth is seen by some criminologists as
criminogenic in itself (Punch 1996). Others point to the fact that it is rather
the flipside that brings a risk: when success is threatened and illegitimate
means are perceived as the only remaining method of attaining wealth (Pas-
sas 1990). According to Coleman, this ‘fear of falling’ is the inevitable cor-
relate of the demand for success, which together provides a set of powerful
symbolic structures central to the motivation of economic behaviour (Cole-
man 1995: 417). Furthermore, the principle of calculated self-interest of mar-
ket exchange collides with principles of open sharing and reciprocal ex-
change found in societies that are not deeply influenced by industrial
capitalism. It is this collision of capitalist self-interest and traditional recipro-
cal exchange which is often related to the observed ‘corruption eruption’ at-
tributed to the internationalization of economic markets (Williams/Beare
1999). The question at hand is whether globalisation of business has in-
creased the prevalence of corruption or has globalisation increased the visi-
bility and sensibility of corruption.
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3.1.1 Globalisation and anomie
Most authors in the field of criminology regard globalisation as a crimino-
genic development. According to Passas (1998), globalisation multiplies,
intensifies and activates ‘criminogenic asymmetries’ that lie at the root of
corporate crime. Passas defines these asymmetries as ‘structural disjunctions,
mismatches and inequalities in the spheres of politics, culture, the economy
and the law’. These are criminogenic in that they offer illegal opportunities,
create motives to use these opportunities and make it possible for offenders to
get away with it. Passas sees corruption as a conservative force that main-
tains or increases asymmetries (Passas 1998: 26). It hampers social, eco-
nomic and political progress and it facilitates the illegal markets which are
the result of asymmetries. Corruption, on the other hand, is also a conse-
quence of asymmetries (Passas 1998: 27). ‘Companies operating in countries
with slow and inefficient administration will be tempted to pay ‘speed
money’ in order to get the job done.’ Economic asymmetries might foster at-
titudes justifying corruption as functional to local economies and as way of
redistributing wealth. Corrupt practices might become seen as patriotic acts,
for instance in skimming off funds of international organisations intended for
economic development.
Criminogenic asymmetries can also be found in the field of the regulation
of corruption. The nature and the firmness of the regulation of corruption
may differ from one country to another, ranging from total absence of bind-
ing standards, to an emphasis on self regulation and criminalization. Al-
though most countries that abide by the Rule of Law have criminalized cor-
ruption and 37 – mostly developed – countries have ratified the 1999 OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention, bribes paid in international business are still tax-
deductable in several countries or alternatively, there is a lack of legal en-
forcement, creating ambiguity around the illegitimacy of corruption (Trans-
parancy International 2008). Asymmetries in the regulation of corruption
might not only provide de jure opportunities but they can also contribute to
the moral ambiguity of offering and accepting bribes. Ambiguity surrounding
regulatory requirements and therefore applicable norms and boundaries of
acceptable behaviour is often seen as a typical feature of white-collar crime
(Nelken 1994; Zimring/Johnson 2005).
‘As in the study of white-collar crime, to study corruption is an attempt to follow a moving
target: the way that certain transactions move in and out of acceptable behavior as the
boundaries of what is legitimate are softened, reaffirmed or redrawn; this is the classic stuff
of labeling theory’ (Levi/Nelken, 1996).
Situations in which there is a high degree in uncertainty or confusion as to
what is and what is not acceptable, due to radical changes in society, were la-
beled by the great sociologist Durkheim as ‘anomie’ (Durkheim 1897/1997).
According to Durkheim and the criminologists who have elaborated upon his
theory, in an anomic environment, comparatively high levels of crime might
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be expected. Countries which reputably have high levels of corruption, as
might be deducted from the Transparency Corruption Index, might be in the
process of experiencing such rapid and radical changes. ‘Likewise any sud-
den political or economic shift – such as into free-markets, democratic sys-
tems – may result in a contemporary state of heightened corruption and insta-
bility. The corruption may not be to blame for this chaos, but in fact may be
reflective of it’ (Beare 1997b: 163). An alternative reading of the influence of
globalization on corruption is that it has increased the sensitivity for corrup-
tion. Based on the review of the publications and policy statements of the
leading anti-corruption crusaders – namely the OECD, the IMF and the
World Bank – Williams and Beare (1999) claim that the key change that has
occurred over the past few years is not the growth of overall levels of corrup-
tion or the severity of its effects on domestic economic growth, but rather, the
reframing of corruption as a source of economic risk and uncertainty that
must necessarily be problematized according to the objectives and interests of
the global economy.
It will be discussed below how the anomie can be found on the meso- and
micro-levels within organizations, contributing to causes of corruption. How-
ever, first the relations between nation states and multinational corporations
will be discussed as relevant to the concept understanding of corruption.
3.1.2 Corporations and states
Nation states are responsible for exercising control of corporations by regu-
lating business and enforcing the regulations by actively inspecting compli-
ance and when necessary, sanctioning non-compliance. Corporate crime is
state-facilitated when this social control is lacking; when government regu-
latory agencies fail to restrain deviant business activities. This failure might
be due to negligence, but it might also be an intentional strategy to attract
foreign corporations. As mentioned above, corporate crime might also be ini-
tiated by the state. State-initiated corporate crime occurs when corporations,
employed by the government, engage in organizational crime at the direction,
or with tacit approval of the government.
Corruption can be a causal factor or a result of this nexus of state-
corporate relations leading to deviant behaviour. The concept of state-
corporate crime reflects the fulfilment of mutually agreed objectives of a
public agency and a private entity achieved through cooperative illegal activ-
ity (Friedrichs 2007: 147). The study of state-corporate crime rests on the
premise that on the one hand, in order to operate, the modern corporation re-
quires a particular legal, economic and political infrastructure which is pro-
vided by governments; while on the other hand, governments in capitalist
states depend on corporations to supply goods and services, provide an eco-
nomic base and support government policies (Harper/Israel 1999). ‘A trawl
of literature (largely non-criminological) reveals a great many cases where
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corporations and states have colluded in criminal enterprise for mutual bene-
fit’ (P. Green/Ward 2004: 29)
Corruption might be used as a lubricant, to create situations of depend-
ency of governmental agencies or officials, making them more willing to
serve corporate interests. This might especially be the case when a large
multinational corporation is dealing with a weak government of a developing
country. The desire for development through foreign investment often results
in developing countries ending up dependent on investment by foreign corpo-
rations. This dependence might lead a government to sacrifice the environ-
ment and the human rights of its population to economic development. This
dependence will increase in situations of armed conflict: then the revenues of
foreign investment are needed to keep the war effort going. Dependency on
foreign investment is also strong in countries with a large financial debt, as is
the case in almost all developing countries. According to Barnhizer, ‘the debt
service obligation almost compels governments to look the other way when
foreign and domestic investors offer some hope of increasing economic de-
velopment and hard currency earnings from foreign trade’ (Barnhizer 2001:
146-147).
Furthermore, strong dependence arises in large projects in which the gov-
ernment of a developing country is doing business directly with a large cor-
poration: such as the building of a gas-pipe by the military Junta in Burma
and the US-based corporation Unocal (Marshman 2003) and the Ok Tedi
mining project and Australia’s largest mining corporation Broken Hill Pty in
Papua New Guinea (Harper/Israel 1999). In these cases, governments might
even be willing to change the law so that the operations of this specific cor-
poration is not restricted by regulation that would be violated, while the ac-
tions of its civilians directed against the corporation might be criminalized, as
happened in the Ok Tedi case (Harper/Israel 1999).
Again, bribing might further increase dependencies. Shell has admitted
that their way of doing business stimulated the corruption in Nigeria.6 Also,
while being used by corporations as a means to facilitate smooth business,
profiting from these kickbacks might become the prime motivation for the
business at the receiving end. In the Angolagate scandal it was uncovered
that, via complicated schemes, French officials provided the MPLA govern-
ment with arms that were to be used in its civil war with the rebels of
UNITA. Apparently, these arms were not of very high standard. Sometimes
the arms were just delivered solely for the commission and were directly put
into a tank graveyard because the tanks could not function any more (Shax-
son 2007).
The privileged positions of corporations with exclusive contracts or joint
ventures with state-organs might also lead to strong personal relationships
between corporate executives and politicians or public officials. These per-
                                                          
6 Shell (2003): People and The Environment report.
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sonal relationships may further facilitate corruption. Allegedly, Liberian
president Charles Taylor and Gus Kouwenhoven, director of Liberia’s big-
gest logging companies OTC and RTC had such a relationship. ‘Taylor and
Mr. Gus were close friends’, told the former management-assistant of OTC to
a reporter of the Dutch newspaper Trouw, ‘they often stayed together here on
the complex and played volleyball or went fishing’. The reporter also de-
scribes how these logging companies paid large kickbacks to Taylor and his
accomplices to obtain logging concessions.7 Often, these personal relation-
ships go hand in hand with corruption. The desire to generate foreign ex-
change at an institutional level coincides with the desire of individual politi-
cal and corporate elites to gain personal profit.
In general, a high level of corruption may facilitate harmful business con-
duct, such as human rights violations and environmental pollution (Interna-
tional Council on Human Rights Policy 2009). Due to this causality, Ban-
tekas proposes to qualify corruption as a crime against humanity in these
situations (Bantekas 2006). The countries in which human rights abuses are
frequently committed also score highly on the Corruption Perception Index of
Transparency International (2008).
Corporations will be able to pay off any unfavourable governmental reac-
tion to their harmful business activities. They may also be able to let govern-
mental forces do the dirty work deemed necessary to protect corporate inter-
ests. For example, in Nigeria, a representative of the oil company Chevron
was allegedly seen handing money to governmental soldiers, after having
shot and killed protesters who had occupied one of Chevron’s oil platforms
(P. Green/Ward 2004: 38-39).
Not surprisingly, corporate involvement in human rights violations occurs
in countries with dictatorial political systems. In such a system there is no
democratic control governing the deals that the regime is making with corpo-
rations and the ways in which the government facilitates corporate interest
and the destination of the revenues of such cooperation. Controversially, but
interestingly, Le Billon also points to possible positive effects of corruption in
situations of armed conflict: ‘buying-off’ belligerents can facilitate a transi-
tion to peace (Le Billon 2003; 2008).
The preceding section might create the impression that developing coun-
tries are particularly prone to corruption. However, the public governance
structures of developed industrial societies might also create vulnerabilities
for corruption. An example closer to home (at least the home of one of the
authors) is the so-called Poldermodel that is seen as typical for public gov-
ernance in The Netherlands, and especially in Dutch governmental policies
regarding business. It has an historical meaning and refers to the crucial co-
operation of the inhabitants of the Netherlands (‘the low countries’) to im-
                                                          
7 Arjen van der Ziel, ‘Tropisch hout met bloed eraan’ (Tropical wood stained with blood).
Trouw. 3 september 2003.
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polder’ their land and maintain dikes, in order to keep the water out, other-
wise all would drown. This must have shaped Dutch civil society into resolu-
tion by negotiation and settlement rather than conflict. In the 1990s this
Dutch form of public governance was labelled the Poldermodel (Delsen
2000). It represented the organized cooperation between the Dutch govern-
ment, employers and trade unions, aimed at reaching agreements rather than
conflict (Léonard 2005). The model gained official status by the 1992 report
of the Dutch Social Economic Council (The Economy of Convergence and
Consultation) (Sociaal Economische Raad 1992).
For years this model of public governance was praised, even by the former
president of the United States, Bill Clinton. According to Dutch criminologists,
this famous Poldermodel also has its less desirable side-effects (Van de
Bunt/Huisman 2007). The result is that Dutch governmental bodies are de-
pendent in many ways on the commitment of corporations to realise their goals.
A criminogenic side-effect is an obscure web of shared interests and secret un-
derstandings that can be characterized as ‘collusion’. The small number of
cases of corruption by public authorities in the Netherlands (Huberts/Nelen
2005) may well be related to widespread collusion: it is not even necessary to
bribe enforcers and other public authorities in the Netherlands because they are
already perfectly willing to keep in mind the interests and views of corpora-
tions. The concept was also used as an explanation for the malpractice in the
construction industry that led to a parliamentary inquiry (Van den Heuvel
2003). When a whistle-blower reported on the large scale price-fixing of which
public authorities were the main victims, it was hastily assumed this was due to
bribing practices. However, although some examples of business trips to exotic
locations and attending brothels did occur, these could not explain the wide-
spread nature of overpricing governmental contracts. This was better explained
by the close relations between local officials and construction companies lead-
ing to collusion (Van den Heuvel 2003).
This Dutch example reaffirms the suggestions presented above that more
refined forms of corruption enable developed countries to escape the more
blunt form of bribery found in developing countries (Campos/Giovanni 2006;
Johnston 2005).
3.2 The organizational level
It was discussed above that the strong emphasis placed on the goal of ‘suc-
cess’ typical for the culture of competition found in capitalist societies has
spread through globalisation to the world economy; moreover, situations of
anomie that can occur in societies and that anomic situations are also fuelled
by globalisation. This culture of competition and situations of anomie are of-
ten related to high levels of white-collar crime, such as corruption. A macro
approach, however, cannot fully explain why some corporations or corporate
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agents are willing to bribe foreign officials to get certain contracts, or do-
mestic officials to get certain permits, or to escape sanctioning, while others
do not. The macro perspective does not explain differences in compliance
between organizations and their agents subjected to the same macro-
variables. Therefore, it is necessary to look at organizational characteristics
that may also influence the behaviour of organizational members. ‘Corporate
crime is organizational crime, and explaining it requires an organizational
level of analysis’ (Kramer 1982).
3.2.1 Strain
On the meso-level of organisations, the culture of competition can be related
to organizational crime as a result of the strain that is felt between being able
to achieve goals and having the means to do so. The strain-theory was origi-
nally formulated by Merton as a general theory of crime (Merton 1957). In
his analysis of the American society in the nineteen thirties, Merton argued
that the goal of economic success was valid for all members of society – the
‘American Dream’ – while the cultural prescribed means for achieving these
goals are not evenly distributed among all members and social groups in so-
ciety. This could bring groups with less access to legitimate means for ac-
quiring wealth to search for alternative, possibly illegitimate means, dubbed
by Merton as ‘innovation’. Cloward and Ohlin added to this that also the
availability of illegitimate means may not be evenly distributed among soci-
ety (Cloward/Ohlin 1960). Adolescents growing up in neighbourhoods with
extensive informal economies might have easier access to illegitimate busi-
ness opportunities than youngsters growing up in neighbourhoods without
these criminogenic opportunity structures. While having been developed for
the explanation of crime in the lower classes of society, the strain theory
proved very popular in the explanation of white-collar crime, especially
combined with the notion of anomie (Cohen 1995; Passas 1990). Several
studies have focused on the relevance of strain-situations that can exist within
organizations for understanding white-collar crime. Specifically on the use of
corruption by firms in Russia, Venard (2009) found a positive relationship
between the intensity of competition and the level of corruption.
Especially when opportunities for making profit are threatened and the
continuation of a corporation is at stake, corporate agents might transfer to
illegitimate means to make profit, such as offering bribes to get the necessary
contracts. In their classical and extensive study on corporate crime in Ameri-
can businesses, Clinard and Yeager found that ‘firms in depressed industries
as well as relatively poorly performing firms in all industries tend to violate
the law to a greater extent than those not in this situation’ (1980:129). How-
ever, the application of the strain theory is not restricted to marginal corpora-
tions. First, since all types of organizations are goal-seeking entities, innova-
tive means to achieve goals – besides profit – can be used when conventional
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means are blocked. Corruption as an innovative means to reach organiza-
tional goals – which can be closely connected to personal goals – can there-
fore also be found in non-profit organizations, such as political parties and
NGO’s. Second, it is rather the level of ambition with which goals are set and
the perception that goal attainment is threatened that creates a feeling of
strain than that it is an objectively desperate situation. Even in quite profit-
able and economically healthy firms, strain can be a motive for rule-breaking
when ambitions are set so high that they can only be met by using ‘innova-
tive’ ways. By consolidating the notions of reference groups and relative dep-
rivation, the strain theory could predict rule breaking in any organization, at
every level. In his study on retired managers of large corporations, Clinard
(1983) found that especially middle-managers experienced strain. Top man-
agement sets the goals and the responsibility for achieving these goals is then
passed in the organizational hierarchy to middle managers. Ambitions at the
top may create so much internal pressure that the perceived only possible re-
action of those in the middle is to break ethical and legal rules.
Although lower ranking personnel may be forced to do the dirty work,
such as the actual bribing, they may not be without personal benefit for find-
ing innovative courses of action. Indeed, the attainment of personal goals of
success might be connected to and dependent upon the prosperity of the or-
ganisation. Personal gain may take the form of career advancement, having
stock and receiving personal bonuses. The alignment of personal interests
and organizational goals is not limited to corporations but can be seen in po-
litical organizations as well.
The breach of legal norms can at the same time constitute behaviour
which conforms to the standards and expectations prevalent in the organiza-
tion. ‘Such standards may emerge out of efforts to deal with problematic
situations and structurally generated strains’ (Passas 1990:165). This means
that informal, standard, operating procedures come into being that are clearly
not in accordance with the law, but that are viewed and rationalized as ac-
ceptable and non-criminal, for instance because there are no real victims.
This was exactly the landmark-rationalisation given by a respondent in Geis’
case-study of price-fixing in het heavy electrical equipment industry in the
nineteen fifties: ‘Illegal? May be, but not criminal’ (Geis 2006). The same
rationalization could apply to corrupt standard procedures, as one of the
authors was told in an interview with an executive of the former Dutch avia-
tion industry Fokker: ‘What do you think? If we do not first offer a Fokker
Friendship to the president, we won’t be able to do business in Africa’
(Huisman 1995). Other rationalization in situations in which corruption is
endemic is that one is merely conforming to expectations and that everybody
is doing it. Indeed, in systemic corrupt societies, ‘clientelism’ and patronage
are the norm and not taking part might be seen as deviant behaviour.
These rationalizations lead to a myth of normality surrounding nothing less
than deviant behaviour which has become deeply entrenched in the organiza-
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tional culture and which is passed on to new organizational members. Although
Shover and Hochstetler (2002) warn us of a ‘monolithic bias’ of using organ-
izational culture as an explanation for organizational crime and stress that cul-
ture is no ‘straightjacket for action’, they do point at the evidence that the
stance towards ethical conduct and compliance with the law taken by organiza-
tional leadership may be a critical determent of organizational culture.
The choice for innovative strategies for goal attainment is even easier
when the lines between legitimate and illegitimate behaviour are blurred due
to regulatory obscurity, as might be the case in the regulation of corruption.
The above analysis shows that the relation between strain and anomie is dou-
ble-sided and mutually reinforcing: in anomic situations it is easier to defer to
illegitimate means to achieve otherwise strained goals and strain can contrib-
ute to the blurring of norms of acceptable behaviour, creating deviant sub-
cultures. When it is not clear which rules are applicable, or when such be-
haviour is condoned in the specific subculture, offering or taking bribes will
come to be seen as an acceptable way of achieving organizational or personal
goals. By so doing, this informal norm will become more deeply rooted.
3.2.2 Loosely coupled structures
Besides organizational goals and the pressure put on their attainment, another
organizational feature that has been related to rule-breaking within the or-
ganization is the organizational structure. While the long hierarchical lines of
a classic bureaucratic organization might lead to a diffusion of information
and internal control, facilitating the occurrence of misconduct, deviant be-
haviour has recently been related to the contemporary trend of ‘loose-
coupling’ in organizations. Loose coupling is the answer to increasing un-
certainty in the environment of organizations, partly due to the internationali-
zation of markets, and creates the capacity to respond to changes in the envi-
ronment – threats or opportunities – with greater flexibility. Loose coupling
is a form of decentralization in which sub-units are partly detached from the
parent organization and receive a greater amount of autonomy. Although a
loosely coupled structure allows an organization to better adapt to change, it
also has some dysfunctions which may become an impetus to disreputable
and illegal behaviour (Tombs 1995). A highly divisional, loosely coupled
system may lack internal control. Because of the autonomy of sub-units, ille-
gal behaviour may not come to the attention of the parent’s management.
While this behaviour may be an unwanted side-effect, de-coupling may also
be a deliberate strategy to isolate subunits that run a higher risk of being ac-
cused of disreputable or illegal behaviour, for example because it is operating
in a corruption ridden market or country (Gobert/Punch 2003). Uhlenbruck et
al. (2006) show that corporations that enter foreign markets in corrupt envi-
ronments adapt to the risk of corruption by using equity modes of entry such
as short term contracting and joint ventures.
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A step further in detaching from liability and reputation risks, is out-
sourcing questionable activities. This can often be observed as a corpora-
tion’s reaction to a scandal concerning one of its subsidiaries. For example,
when the large multinational fruit corporation Chiquita had to agree to a plea-
bargain after being accused of providing pay-off money to the AUC in Co-
lombia – a paramilitary group that is on the US terrorist organizations list – it
officially left Colombia. Instead, a new company and independent company
was formed for the export of bananas, Banamex, which has as sole client
Chiquita and used all the infrastructure formally owned by Chiquita (Windsor
2008).
3.3 The interactional level
Although the discussed theories follow the common assumption in organiza-
tional sciences that organizations could be studied as actors, this anthropo-
morphic approach seems to forget that in the end it is people who are offering
or accepting bribes. Most authors in the field of white-collar crime stress that
white-collar offenders are ‘normal’ people, meaning that their personality
traits, demographic and socio-characteristics are more similar to law-abiding
middle-class citizens than offenders of regular, street crime. ‘it is generally
agreed that personal psychology plays no significant role in the genesis of
white-collar crime and that the white-collar criminals are indeed psychologi-
cally normal’ (Coleman 1995). The scarce literature on the profile of white-
collar offenders confirms this view (Weisburd/Waring 2001).
3.3.1 Socialization of deviance
White-collar criminologists emphasize the conditioning effect of the organi-
zation on the individual’s behaviour. Individuals who do not have a deviant
self-image, become offenders through the pressures of the ‘normalization’ of
deviance as discussed above. Organizational sociologists refer to the numb-
ing effects of modern bureaucracies upon the moral sensibilities of their em-
ployees. Drucker labelled this as the ‘Organization man’, who is under pres-
sure to conform to the image that individuality and personal ethical standards
must be scarified for the sake of career. Processes of socialization can create
a kind of ‘moral numbness’, in which unethical or illegal activities appear to
be a normal part of daily routine.
According to Cohen (1995), organizational members who are subjected to
the contradictions between behavioural norms in society and the norms being
transferred in the organizational subculture, might suffer from psychological
anomie. However, one might say that the processes of the socialization of de-
viance offer a way out from this state of alienation. Passas (1990: 166) even
states that: ‘In anomic situations, offenders are in a better position to neutral-
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ise and rationalize their acts, and at the same time preserve their self-esteem’.
Organizational subcultures provide their member with appropriate justifica-
tions. According to Coleman, police subcultures, for instance, often distin-
guish between ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ pay-off money and hold that there is noth-
ing unethical about accepting the former (Coleman 1987).
So, at the interactional level we can see that white-collar deviancy, such
as corruption, is normal learned behaviour. We should thank Sutherland not
only for introducing the concept of white-collar crime, but also for develop-
ing a theory for understanding social learning of deviancy. According to his
differential association theory, criminal behaviour is learned like any other
behaviour and the criminal must learn both the techniques of crime and moti-
vations favourable to criminal behaviour. Through differential association
and techniques, rationalisations and attitudes are passed on.
‘The hypothesis of differential association is that criminal behaviour is learned in associa-
tion with those that define such behaviour favourably and in isolation from those who de-
fine it unfavourably, and that a person in an appropriate situation engages in such behav-
iour if, and only if, the weight of the favourable definitions exceeds the weight of
unfavourable definitions’ (Sutherland 1949: 234).
3.3.2 Neutralization techniques
While there are several forms of corruption, and it could be assumed that
their techniques are not hard to grasp, it might be more interesting to look at
the neutralization of corruption. As white-collar offenders are generally
strongly committed to the central normative structure, every offender has to
cross a moral threshold to be able to violate laws or ethical norms. To main-
tain an identity of being a respectable citizen, a white-collar offender has to
adjust the ‘normative lens’ through which society would view his behaviour.
In their classic study, Sykes and Matza showed that delinquents adjust this
normative lens by using techniques of neutralization that deny the seriousness
of the offence and the blameworthiness of the offender (Sykes/Matza 1957).
As Coleman pointed out so clearly, neutralisation techniques are not only
post hoc rationalizations of white collar crime, but can also precede rule
breaking and thereby morally facilitate non-compliance. ‘A rationalization is
not an after-the-fact excuse that someone invents to justify his or her behav-
iour but an integral part of the actor’s motivation for the act’ (Coleman 1987:
411) This would lead to the assumption that having neutralisation techniques
at one’s disposal is a crucial condition for getting involved in corruption and
being capable of offering or accepting a bribe. Besides the obvious opportu-
nities and limited control mechanisms, these neutralisation techniques could
be an important object of study when doing research on corruption.
In a study on the accounts which convicted white collar offenders used to
justify or excuse their behaviour, Benson identified three general patterns in
accounting strategies: accounts oriented toward the offence, accounts toward
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the offender and accounts toward the denouncer (Benson 1985: 1998). Ac-
counts that focus on the offence either emphasize the normality and general
acceptability of the behaviour (‘business as usual’) or portray the offence as
an aberration, not representative of typical behaviour patterns. When the per-
petrator himself is the subject of the account, he will try to show that no
matter how the offence is eventually characterized, it is not indicative of his
true character. Perpetrators must show that they are ordinary, reasonable in-
dividuals to be seen as separate from their offence and emphasize the crime’s
unique character. Accounts that aim at the denouncer condemn the condemn-
ers. For example, the offender might claim that prosecutors are motivated by
personal interest rather than a desire to defend social or legal values, and that
they were singled out for political reasons that had nothing to do with the
harmfulness of their behaviour.
Both Benson and Coleman constructed a typology of the techniques of
neutralization used by white-collar criminals. Anand, Ashforth, and Joshi
(2005) applied these to corruption in organizations.
One of the most common techniques is the denial of harm. According to
Coleman, the convicted white collar offender frequently claims that their ac-
tions did not harm anyone, and that they therefore did not do anything wrong.
This technique is rather obvious in neutralizing corruption. Although the re-
lationship of the stakeholders in a corruption scheme is often portrayed as a
triangular affair – the one that is bribing, the one that is being bribed and the
victim – the victim is often more difficult to detect. Of course, as discussed in
section 2.3, victimization can always be constructed: competitors who did not
get the contract, refugees who receive less aid because of the amount of kick-
backs taken by local officials, and the integrity of the political system in gen-
eral. However, for both sides benefiting from corruption it will often be easy
to maintain that no harm has been done.
A second neutralisation technique used by white collar offenders is to
claim that the laws they are violating are unnecessary or even unjust. Offend-
ers using this rationalization find support in the influential neo-liberal Chi-
cago school of economics which argues that market systems can only operate
at a maximum efficiency when there no artificial barriers such as government
regulation (Friedman 1962; Posner 1976). ‘The state has no role except to get
out of the way’ (Snider 2000: 182). In the light of corruption this argument is
interesting, because it is due to the pressure of international business that in-
ternational organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD and
the European Union are forcing nation states to prohibit and prevent corrup-
tion, trying to create a ‘level-playing-field’ for multinational corporations.
Corporations wish to be able to operate as inexpensively and rationally as
possible throughout the world. Systems of graft and bribes are unpredictable,
unreliable and costly (Williams/Beare 1999). Nevertheless, those who are
struck by these regulations might say that they only promote international
business at the expense of the local economy.
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A third neutralisation is that the violation of regulation is necessary to
achieve vital economic goals or just to survive. Both on the active and the
passive side of corruption this neutralization can be identified. Those who of-
fer bribes will stress that this – however undesirable – is necessary to be able
to conduct business. Those who receive the bribes may say that the regular
salary is not sufficient to survive and that the extra income is necessary to
take care for the family.
A fourth technique of neutralization involves transfer of responsibility
from the offender to a larger group. This will be especially useable when cor-
ruption is endemic. Both those who are offering and who are accepting bribes
might claim that ‘everybody’s doing it’. The accompanying rationalization is
that it is unfair to condemn one violator unless all other violators are con-
demned as well.
The fifth neutralization method is that a person is not responsible for his
behaviour – which therefore cannot be qualified as criminal – when merely
conforming to expectations of others. This refers to the escape of middle-
management to situations of strain: through processes of socialization, using
bribes might be seen as an acceptable way of meeting the targets set by
higher management. Moreover, when clientelism and patronage are endemic,
paying or taking bribes is expected.
Finally, many occupational crimes are justified on the grounds that the of-
fender deserves the money. This rationalization clearly only applies to the re-
ceiving end of corruption, but it might be a dominant neutralization for the
more daily forms of kickbacks that are attached to a certain position in public
office. A good example is the saying used by members of the All Peoples
Congress administration of Sierra Leone, as recorded by Thompson and Pot-
ter (1997: 150), ‘Da sae wey den tie cow, nar dey e go eat grass’ meaning lit-
erally that ‘A cow will graze on land allotted to it for that purpose’.
4. Methodological considerations
A final issue to discuss is the methodology to explore corruption as a crime
phenomenon. It is debatable whether we should discuss a criminological
methodology of the study of corruption. First, in the domain of criminology
empirical research on corruption is very limited. Second, being a social sci-
ence of which the boundary with other social sciences is blurred, research
methodology would also be equally similar. Nevertheless, in criminological
research, methodological strategies have been developed to overcome the
handicaps connected to studying behaviour which people would neither see
nor hear due to its illegal nature (Bijleveld/Nijboer 2003).
Basically, two types of data are used in criminological research to study
crime (and its offenders, its causes and its consequences). The first type is
data produced by law enforcement agencies, such as police reports, court
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rulings etc. The second type consists of data directly gathered from offenders
or victims of crime, mostly by victim surveys and self-reporting surveys.
Corruption is a consensual crime, of which reporting to the police benefits
neither the corruptor nor the corruptee and the victims may be oblivious to
their victimization. Most corruption cases remain hidden because both parties
respect the rule of silence, because nobody in the environment reacts to the
corruption or because their corruptive practices are not perceived to be cor-
ruption. Furthermore, corruption cases that occur in an organisational context
are often settled in alternative ways, such as a disciplinary procedure.
Therefore, corruption is a crime phenomenon with a large ‘dark figure’.
This concept refers to the amount of crime that is not reported and therefore
not visible in official registrations and files. Official data show only the tip of
the iceberg. As a Founding Father of research into white-collar crime, Suth-
erland was aware of the problem that the files of the criminal court only rep-
resent a small part of corruption cases and that most cases were settled out of
court or in a civil or a disciplinary procedure. To study the true amount of le-
gal violation committed by the largest American companies, he collected
both the criminal and civil court files together with databases of disciplinary
agencies. Since only a small amount of cases are dealt with in the criminal
courts the researcher must broaden their research domain to non-judicial en-
forcement organisations. A recent example is the research on corruption in
the Dutch public administration, executed under order of the Ministry of Jus-
tice of The Netherlands (Huberts/Nelen 2005). The aim was to gather infor-
mation on the extent, nature and settlement of corruption cases in that coun-
try. To study the extent of corruption, the researchers started from the idea
that the corruption files at the level of criminal justice are known. They com-
pleted the information by sending a questionnaire to the public administra-
tions asking to report on the files of internal settlement of corruption cases.
The methodology to study the nature of corruption was particularly case-
study research. The settlement question was explored by a triangulation of
conducting interviews and the analysis of files of the public prosecutor and
the public administration.
Every crime, even murder, has its dark figure. But because of its diffuse
character and its apparent victimless nature, the portion below water surface
of the iceberg of corruption will be relatively large even if all law enforce-
ment agencies are included. Victim surveys and self-reporting have been de-
veloped to overcome the dark-figure-problem in studying crime. However,
the limited awareness of corruption victims of being victimized, and the am-
biguous criminalization of many forms of corruption, limit the added value of
these instruments in studying the prevalence and the nature of corruption.
In line with Transparency International some criminologists chose for
perception study (Dormaels 2010; Zang/Cao/Vaughn 2009). Instead of meas-
uring the prevalence of corruption, social scientists developed a methodology
to measure the people’s perception of corruption (see, eg., Gardiner 1967;
Wim Huisman and Gudrun Vande Walle142
Gibbons 1990; Heidenheimer 1989). These perception studies give an idea of
the way people judge acts of politicians and civil servants. These types of
study primarily shed light on people’s trust in public authorities and proces-
ses of the criminalization of corruption. However, their contribution to crimi-
nological research questions on prevalence and causes of actual acts of cor-
ruption is negligible.
The dark figure of corruption cases makes a quantitative analysis based
on official registration or victim surveys useless. Therefore, most corruption
research in criminology is based on a qualitative methodology: interviewing,
participant observation and case-study. For example, in his research on cor-
porate crime in the pharmaceutical industry, Braithwaite interviewed ma-
nagement and employees of pharmaceutical companies to find out whether
and how companies commit corruption (Braithwaite 1984). A lot of publica-
tions could be read as case-studies even if the methodology is not that rigid.
We refer to the work of Punch on police corruption. His research on police
corruption is based on interviews with police officers and arrested police of-
ficers, on informal talks, on the interaction with police officers during pres-
entations, on visits to police stations etc. (Punch 2009)
The method of case study certainly has its merits. Shover and Hochstetler
(2002) mention that ‘the findings of case-studies can be used to generate hy-
pothesis or to cast doubt on theory-based hypothesis’. Case-studies also en-
able the researcher to study the ‘real thing’, and getting a better understanding
of the meaning of corruption in the social setting in which it is committed.
However, they also point out the shortcomings of explaining organizational
crime on the basis of case-studies. Usually the more serious cases concerning
high-profile individuals or organizations in which they occurred are singled
out, in the process becoming landmark-narratives of scholarship on corrup-
tion. As Shover and Hochstetler remark, findings gained from the most egre-
gious incidents and offenders may have limited application to the more typi-
cal corruption, if such a thing exists. For instance, besides the obvious
example of mafia-ridden countries like Italy, the Dutch perception of corrup-
tion was for a long time shaped by the exceptional case of the bribing scandal
of Prince Bernhard who at the time of the scandal was the husband of the
reigning monarch, Queen Juliana of The Netherlands. The prince was em-
broiled in scandal with the American arms manufacturer Lockheed, in the
process of the procurement of new fighter jets for the Dutch Air Force in the
1970s. The same could be said about the more recent Agusta-scandal in
which two Belgian ministers and the Belgian secretary-general of NATO
were found guilty of being bribed in the acquisition of attack-helicopters
(Cools 2009).
A discrepancy seems to exist between the study of corrupt behaviour of
civil servants or politicians on the one hand and the scientific indifference vis
à vis the corruptive practices of private companies and of civilians. Most re-
search is directed to the passive corruption side while the active corruptor at-
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tracts less attention. Shichor and Geis who carried out a survey on transna-
tional bribery confirm that business men escape the disapproval: people think
that accepting a bribe is worse than offering a bribe (Shichor/Geis 2007). One
of the explanations for this underestimation is that criminologists for a long
time have shown restraint in entering private companies. Indeed, ‘getting a
foot in the door’ is widely recognized as the greatest methodological chal-
lenge of researching corporate crime (Verhage 2009). Once inside, a second
challenge is getting past the socially desirable answers of the public relations
departments and getting managers to talk about the sensitive issues of cor-
ruption. Exceptions in the field of corruption are Venard (2009), who inter-
viewed a mere 552 managers of Russian firms on the issue of environmental
pressures and the decision to adopt corruption, Van de Bunt (1993) who got
corporate security officers in The Netherlands talking about corruption in the
private sector and the already mentioned Braithwaite who linked corruption
to the pharmaceutical industry. One of the recommendations for criminologi-
cal research is to intensify the study of the responsibility of private compa-
nies in corruption cases. The annual Global Corruption Report 2009 of
Transparency International may stimulate research on corruption in the pri-
vate sector.
5. Conclusion
This chapter started with the observation that corruption has seldom been the
topic of criminological research. Nevertheless, corruption is a crime. How-
ever, as shown by the several domains of study in which corruption is of in-
terest, corruption can be both causal factor and side-effect of categories of
crime, such as organized crime, corporate crime and state crime.
Even if these criminological domains are fertile ground for corruption re-
search it has been a rather limited list so far. Generally, corruption is not
studied per se but comes into the picture as a facilitator for organized crime
or a crime phenomenon typical for third world countries. One of the explana-
tions for this scarce attention is the lack of public indignation. Levi gives the
example of the corruption practices of the International Olympic Committee
(Levi 2009: 58). The media who gave some publicity to the case had to pre-
vent being blamed for publicity-seeking incompetence. Illustrating this point,
Box said with reference to his research of police corruption: ‘Corruption
penetrates the public consciousness rarely, like a missed heart-beat in an oth-
erwise perfectly functioning body’ (Box 1983: 93).
Due to the natural evolution of the discipline itself, but also because of
the social context, we predict an increase in criminological corruption re-
search in the near future. First of all, the move to transnational crime research
that discloses the sometimes deviant connection between the western market
and local and national governments of third world countries or countries in
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transition, shows the urgency of corruption research. Secondly, the anti-
corruption measures that have been taken at the international and state level
and the positive pressure that goes out from non-governmental organisations
such as Transparency International have a stimulating effect. Thirdly, actors
in the private sector also start to take initiatives that disturb fair competition.
In the Ethical Corporation magazine corruption is perceived as ‘the’ corpo-
rate crime of the century (Roner 2008). The criminal investigations on the
corrupt practices of Siemens, Statoil and BAE Systems do not pass unno-
ticed. The resistance with which organisational criminologists are confronted
when doing research concerning injurious corporate crime is apparently dis-
appearing.
Finally, we would like to warn against adopting a narrow perspective on
deviant relations between public authorities and the private sector. It is not
only corruption that makes the position of private companies more comfor-
table. The relation between the political level and the private sector has been
changing from a state-regulated market into a policy of co-regulation and de-
regulation. We wonder to what extent corruption is still a necessity for the
protection of companies’ interests and if the danger is not moving to legal
relations between the public authorities and the private sector; in particular,
lobbying, networking and the risk of the revolving doors. The European
commission has recently tried to regulate the market of lobbyists who work at
the European level in Brussels but had to reduce its plans from an obligatory
system of transparency into a voluntary system of openness to the public.8
This chapter has raised the question whether the definition of corruption
should go beyond legal boundaries and include other socially injurious forms
of entanglement of interests. A problem of so doing is the inevitable net-
widening and inflation of the term, further blurring the boundaries between
corrupt and non-corrupt acts. However, not doing so limits the scope of the
criminology of corruption to the usual suspects: the more visible and bare
forms of bribing. Or, as McBarnett has put so eloquently: ‘is corruption a
‘crime for the crooks’ or are some activities ‘whiter than white collar
crime?’’ (Mc Barnett 1991: 3) In the case of the latter, Passas (1998) quali-
fies corruption as ‘crime without law violation’.
The application of criminological theories results in a plausible hypothe-
sis on causations of corruption. This hypothesis illustrates the interplay of
motivation, opportunity and control at the individual, organizational and en-
vironmental levels. This dynamic and mutually reinforcing relationship can
have a spiraling down effect, amplifying deviance and increasing the likeli-
hood of corruption (Den Nieuwenboer/Kaptein 2008).
However, there are two possible flaws in our analysis. First, the many
forms of corruption might challenge the assumption used in this chapter that
it is often committed in a white-collar crime context, and second, this as-
                                                          
8 See for the list of lobbyists: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin/welcome.do
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sumption and also the hypothesis based on it need to be empirically tested,
therefore. However, there is hardly any criminological research that explicitly
focuses on corruption. Nonetheless, in corporate crime research, some metho-
dology has been developed for studying ambiguous and seemingly victimless
crimes committed in organizational context.
Seeing corruption as forms of organized, occupational or organizational
crime would also suggest that the strategies developed and derived from cau-
sations for combating these forms of crime, would also apply to fighting cor-
ruption. It is noticeable that international and non-governmental organiza-
tions involved in the fight against corruption, often stress the importance of
criminalization and the application of criminal law enforcement. However, it
is questionable if this plea serves as a moral message or as an assumption of
the instrumentality of criminal law. Looking at the responses to organized
and organizational crime, it is generally assumed that the deterrent effect of
criminal law – or any legal sanctions for that matter – is rather limited. While
in theory, total control would deter organizational crime; in practice the de-
terrence strategy suffers from too many flaws to be effective. On the basis of
a meta-analysis of studies of the effectiveness of deterrence of corporate
crime, Simpson concludes:
‘The evidence is far from conclusive regarding whether corporate violators should be
criminally prosecuted or whether other justice systems (civil or administrative) produce
higher levels of corporate compliance or if sanctions should be directed toward the com-
pany, responsible managers, or both (…) ‘Get tough on corporate crime’ recommendations
have relatively little empirical merit at this point of time, especially without consideration
and research on how legal sanctions operate in conjunction with other social control
mechanisms’ (Simpson 2006: 69, 77).
And also the recent studies and policy document on combating organized
crime show a realistic view on the limitations of the effectiveness of the ap-
plication criminal law: ‘You can put them in jail, but you cannot put them out
of business’ (Huisman/Nelen 2007). Because of these limitations, contempo-
rary criminal policy is more focused on taking away the opportunities for
committing criminal offences. Crucial in such situational crime prevention, is
blocking the access of offenders to potential target or victims. However, with
many white-collar crimes, specialized access to corruptees is connected to
occupational roles and blocking this might not be feasible in the organiza-
tional or business setting (Benson/Madensen 2007).
Chapter 9:
A Multi Approach in Corruption Research:
Towards a More Comprehensive Multi-Level
Framework to Study Corruption and Its Causes
Leo W.J.C. Huberts       
1. Introduction
Corruption and causation are among the most contested concepts in (social)
science and their combination offers an intriguing as well as a seemingly un-
solvable puzzle. In this chapter, I will try to clarify some of its pieces.
The first puzzle piece concerns the characterization of corruption. It is
crucial to be clear about the actual interpretation of the corruption concept. Is
it bribing and being bribed; is it private profit from (public) power; is it un-
ethical (public) behavior? (§ 2) Second, whenever causes are debated, the
question of how causation is interpreted arises. Stemming from the literature
on power and influence, the view on causes as INUS conditions is presented.
A cause is a characteristic or condition that is an ‘Insufficient’ but ‘Neces-
sary’ part of an ‘Unnecessary’ but ‘Sufficient’ condition for the effect (§ 3).
Many conditions can lead to corruption and in research, it is essential to try to
find the element that cannot be missed among the many that together contrib-
ute to it.
A third complication and challenge is the interrelationship of many con-
ditions at different ‘analytical’ levels. We all are familiar with the micro-
meso-macro distinction. Although many researchers focus on one or two of
these levels – often because their disciplinary orientation so limits them – few
will deny that the real challenge in is (inter)relating these levels. A number of
approaches and studies will be presented with different and challenging foci
on the factors that determine corruption. First some descriptive multi-level
frameworks will be summarized (§ 4); second a number of challenging ‘lim-
ited level’ studies will be presented (§ 5). After the brief sketches of these
studies on the conditions and causes of corruption, we conclude with a first
idea about a multi-level approach or a better framework for analysis (§ 6).
Not surprisingly, it becomes clear that there is no simple way out of multi-
dilemmas. The main conclusion is nonetheless optimistic. A comprehensive
framework that relates types of corruption with a variety of factors at differ-
ent levels might help. And although we are only in the first phase, that is,
collecting and summing up what might matter, I am optimistic about using
that knowledge for overlapping theory building.
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2. Multi-Corruption
It is often stated that the corruption phenomenon is complex, complicated,
and difficult to grasp, resulting in the notion that defining corruption is more
or less a mission impossible. In my view, however, there is not so much a se-
rious conceptual problem of obscurity or complexity but primarily a matter of
disagreement between scholars and practitioners. To put it simply: interpre-
tations of what corruption vary between broad and narrow, and we can avoid
Babylonian confusion of speech by being explicit in definition and specifica-
tion.
Often ‘corruption’ is related to acting in opposition to what is considered
morally good or right (Barker/Carter 1996; Bull/Newell 2003; Caiden 1991;
Caiden/Dwivedi/Jabbra 2001; Cooper 2001; Crank/Caldero 2000; Dobel
1999; Heidenheimer/Johnston 2002; Huberts/Jurkiewicz/Maesschalck 2008;
Johnston 2005; Menzel/Carson 1999; Preston/Sampford/Connors 2002). In
other words, it is equal to violating what is considered to be in line with rele-
vant moral values and norms, equal to the violation of integrity (and rather
close to ‘improper interests involved’, when the last part is interpreted
broadly).
The interpretation is quite different from the probably most-favored defi-
nition of corruption in terms of private interest and profit from (public) office
(Lawton/Doig 2006; Menzel 2005; Pope 2000). This interpretation is wide-
spread but has to compete with an ‘even more’ specific interpretation that
concentrates on where the private profit is coming from. Is misusing office
for private profit always corruption or is it conditional whether there is a third
party involved? If so, we are concentrating on bribing and other types of im-
proper influence (active and passive); if not, all types of theft, fraud, and
misuse of resources are included.
In VU research, a broad typology of integrity violations is used. It was
originally formulated through an analysis of the literature on (police) integ-
rity and corruption and later adapted and validated (Lasthuizen 2008) based
on empirical research on internal police force investigations. The typology
explicitly incorporates violations of law as well as of (informal) moral norms
and values, violations in function within the organization, private time
(mis)behavior, behavior serving private personal interests, and misbehavior
in favor of the organization (‘noble cause corruption’) (Lamboo 2005).
Among the types of integrity violation are corruption (bribing and favor-
itism)1, fraud, theft, conflict of interest through gifts, conflict of interest
                                                          
1 Thus, only bribing and favoritism explicitly use the corruption label. Corruption as bribing
involves the abuse of powers for private gain, coming from an interested third actor (because
of advantages promised or given). In corruption as favoritism, the advantages promised or
given to the corrupt functionary can take the form of indirect personal gains, such as when
family or close friends (nepotism), friends or peers (cronyism), or a party or one’s own or-
ganisation (patronage) are favoured.
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through jobs, improper use of authority, misuse and manipulation of infor-
mation, indecent treatment of colleagues or citizens and customers (including
discrimination and sexual harassment), waste and abuse of organizational re-
sources, and private time misconduct. To distinguish between them is im-
portant, especially when discussing the causes of ‘corruption’. It seems plau-
sible that corruption as ‘bribing’ will not be caused by the same factors as
other corruption-related violations (favoritism, fraud, conflict of interest, and
so on), let alone other types of violation (for example, waste and abuse of re-
sources and private time misconduct).
Focus
This chapter will concentrate on corruption with an interpretation used by
other authors in this book, that is, corruption as the abuse of a (public)
authority for private benefit. This is more or less in line with Michael
Johnston’s definition of corruption as ‘the abuse, according to the legal or so-
cial standards constituting a society’s system of public order, of a public role
or resource for private benefit’ (1996: 322). More specifically, this means
that the following elements of the typology are incorporated:
1. Bribing: Misuse of (public) power for private gain: asking, offering, ac-
cepting bribes.
2. Favoritism: Misuse of authority to favor family, friends or party (nepo-
tism, cronyism, patronage).
3. Fraud and theft: Improper private gain from the organization, colleagues,
or citizens without an interested external actor.
4. Conflict of (private and public) interest through gifts, services, assets, or
promises taken.
5. Conflict of (private and public) interest through sideline activities (jobs,
position, activities).
Conclusion
It seems important to realize that future research will have to differentiate
more clearly between types of violations, but for now it is most important
that we are clear about the phenomenon we are addressing. I will from this
point focus on corruption as the abuse of a (public) authority for private
benefit. In terms of the integrity violations typology, it means that it includes
bribing, favoritism, conflicts of interest, and fraud and theft. But please, keep
in mind that when we concentrate on corruption as improper private profit
from public power, we should not then over exaggerate the relevance of re-
sults for the causes of other types of integrity violations.
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3. Multi-Level Causation
Causation is in a sense a more complex and disputed concept than corruption.
Its content is essential for much of the work of social scientists, whatever
their field. We all agree that ‘correlation is not causation’ and that co-
variation as such is only a starting point for attempts to come to conclusions
about cause and effect relationships. But what are the characteristics of a re-
lationship that enables us to conclude it is a causal one? First it is important
to be specific about the effect that is analyzed in order to establish causes.
Second it is conditional that cause and effect both have occurred; that cause
and effect are distinct ‘events’; that, in the circumstances, if the cause had not
occurred the effect would not have occurred; and that cause is prior to the ef-
fect.
Very strict interpretations of causality then imply that we only speak of
the cause of an effect when the cause is necessary and sufficient for the ef-
fect, but this does not bring us much further in trying to understand the di-
verse and complex corruption phenomena we see in society. More often, a
combination of conditions and circumstances seem to contribute to the effect
or result, a corrupt person, regime, or organization.
A way out seems to be Mackie’s idea to about ‘INUS conditions’ meaning
‘Insufficient’ but ‘Necessary’ part of an ‘Unnecessary’ but ‘Sufficient’ condi-
tion for the effect (Mackie 1965, 1974). Mackie stressed that effects have, typi-
cally, a plurality of causes. That is, a certain effect can be brought about by a
number of distinct clusters of factors. Each cluster is sufficient to bring about
the effect, but none of them is necessary. Each single factor is an insufficient
but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition for the effect.
In other words, trying to find out more about the causes of corruption
means trying to discover conglomerates of conditions that actually have led
to cases of corruption. When there is corruption, there is by definition a set of
sufficient conditions present. The next step is to disentangle the conglomer-
ate, trying to find out what conditions seem to be most prominent or neces-
sary or in INUS terms non-redundant.
Multi-Level
Another aspect of any approach is taking into account at which level corrup-
tion manifests itself and is analyzed. The common distinction between levels
is that of micro (the individual), meso (group, organization), and macro (so-
ciety).
Many scholars see the macro-meso-micro problem as hard to solve and
many discussions on the importance of causal factors for corruption stem from
researchers’ involvement with different levels. Sometimes this is done by
eclectic mapping of whatever is mentioned as a cause in (part of the) literature.
Other examples concern researchers who consciously try to combine multi-
level factors in empirical studies.
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4. Eclectic Mapping of Causes
My first rather limited attempt to do international comparative research on
the causes of ‘public corruption and fraud’ started with a literature review
(Alatas 1990; Benaissa 1993; Caiden 1988; Van Duyne 1995; Heiden-
heimer/Johnston/Levine 1989; Hoetjes 1982; Huberts 1992; Klitgaard 1988;
Wertheim/Brasz 1960). It resulted in a typology of social, economic, politi-
cal, organizational, and individual factors mentioned in the literature as pos-
sible causes of corruption and fraud.
The starting point for that typology of factors was the ‘ecological ap-
proach’ of Ben Hoetjes, a Dutch pioneer in this field, who worked on devel-
opment administration (primarily India) and on corruption in the Netherlands
(1977, 1982, 1998, 2000). Hoetjes distinguished between four disciplinary
approaches or clusters of relevant factors and causes (1977: 53-65).2 The first
‘Weberian approach’ sees corruption as a lack of rationalization of the public
service and corruption is a phase on the route from patrimonialism to rational
legal authority. Second is the structural functionalist approach. Which func-
tion fulfills corruption in a certain society? Is it for example the lubricant
between the central and the local levels or between state and business levels?
Or does corruption provide protection and influence for social groups with
material wealth but little or no political influence? (Riggs 1964). The third
approach, institutional economics, sees corrupt officials as rational utility
maximizers who simply take the most profitable course of action. It favors
perceiving ‘individuals as rational beings attempting to further their own self-
interest in a world of scarce resources’ (Rose-Ackerman 1978: 4) and is also
interested in the conditions that determine a profitable course, including the
discretionary power of an actor and the expected costs of accepting a bribe
(Rose-Ackerman 1999, 2006).
Hoetjes favored another approach to corruption that he called ecological,
which concerns distinguishing the environment that furthers corruption
(Hoetjes 1977: 60-65; Hoetjes 1982: 72-76). In his framework, many social,
economic, and political factors are identified, but he does not limit himself to
the environment or an ‘ecological orientation’. He added many personal and
organizational characteristics. The following set of causes can be derived
from his work:
– Individual and personal factors: personal experiences, feelings of insecu-
rity, personal identity, moral ambivalence
– Informal group factors within the organization: group or clique propensity
to corrupt, informal group leadership, relationships with colleagues
– Formal organization: unclear tasks and responsibilities, lack of central
authority, semi-publicness (between public and private), uncontrolled
                                                          
2 See also chapter 1 of this book.
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growth of the organization, demoralizing working conditions, contradic-
tions between organizational circumstances and social expectations
– Society as a whole: social inequality, rapid social change, norms and val-
ues, apathy and ignorance, distrust
– Economy: poverty and inequality, inflation, sudden influx of external re-
sources, state intervention in economic life, state monopolies, feelings of
injustice concerning economic conditions
– Politics: increasing (party) political influence and de-bureaucratization,
lack of democracy, lack of openness and public debate (also via the me-
dia).
It seems fruitful to reinterpret Hoetjes’ four approaches in terms of questions
on the causes of corruption. Weberians see the relationship between politics
and administration as the key factor (including the quality and independence
of the civil service) and ‘economists’ point to motives of the involved actors
(individuals in particular) and their self-interest. Functionalists point to posi-
tive effects for the functioning of the system to explain the persistent pres-
ence of corruption, but they are not specific on the causes (more in general:
the interests of the political and economic actors). Ecologists add that context
is crucial and characteristics of society, politics, law, economy, technology,
and culture have to be taken into account.
Figure 1: Hoetjes’ Corruption Approaches: Weberian, functionalist,
economics and ecological
Hoetjes’ impressive inventory of factors may serve as a starting point, but a
number of clarifications, changes and additions seem necessary to make the
framework (more) useful for and appealing to corruption researchers. First,
we have to take into account that the inventory was in part based on personal
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impressions, which makes it rather random. State-of-the-art theory and re-
search will have to be built in. Leadership characteristics, for example, are
nowadays often seen as important to explaining and understanding corrup-
tion, but they are only impressionistically mentioned (Ciulla 2002;
Lasthuizen 2008; Treviño et al. 1999). Second, its seems wise to reinterpret
the four approaches by including all the mentioned factors on the micro (mo-
tives and circumstances), meso (organization) and macro (society) levels as
possible causes of corruption. Third, it should be clearer that the corruption
phenomenon to be explained manifests itself at different levels and thus
causes and effects can be so situated and analyzed. Are we interested in indi-
vidual, organizational or (social, political, economic) systemic corruption?
Expert Panel Views
When so many factors at different levels seem to contribute to corruption, an
obvious question is what really matters (most). More than a decade ago, I
carried out some research on the importance of a variety of multi-level causes
of corruption (Huberts 1996, 1998). Twenty social, economic, political, or-
ganizational, and individual factors from the literature were selected as pos-
sible causes of public corruption and fraud (defined as the misuse of public
power for private gain). An international expert panel was surveyed by mail
about the extent of their nation’s public corruption and fraud, the causal con-
ditions, and the methods and strategies they considered to be effective com-
batants. (Huberts 1998). A total of 257 respondents from 49 countries an-
swered the questions, 190 from higher and 67 from lower income countries.3
The panel was asked to indicate the importance of 20 factors, including social
(inequality, norms and values, crime), economic, political, organizational
(culture, structure, leadership) and individual (norms and values, income)
factors. Table 1 summarizes the results.
                                                          
3 75 respondents from Western Europe, 4 from Eastern Europe, 65 from Asia, 14 from Oce-
ania, 55 from North America, 37 from Latin America and 7 from Africa. ‘Higher income
countries’ and ‘lower income countries’ were distinguished on the basis of the GNP per
capita (GNP per capita > $6,000 = higher income country).
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Table 1: Importance of Multi-Factors for Corruption in
(Lower and Higher Income) Countries
Factors
(very) important cause of public corruption
or fraud in own country
higher
income
countries
(n=190)
lower
income
countries
(n=67)
total
panel
(n=257)
social factors
? increasing strength of organized crime
? social inequality
? rapid social change
? strong family ties and obligations
? social norms and values concerning private and public
(rights and duties)
? values and norms concerning government and state offi-
cials and organizations
economic factors
? economic problems: inflation/recession
? fast economic growth
political factors
? growth and size of government organization
? strong interrelationships: politics and administration
? strong interrelationships: business, politics, state
? penetration of market ideology in the state
? increasing significance of lobbying
organizational factors: culture
? public sector culture (values/norms)
? lack of commitment of leadership (/giving bad example)
organizational factors: structure
? misorganization and mismanagement
? lack of control, supervision, auditing
? computerization of administrative procedures
individual factors
? norms and values of individual politicians and public ser-
vants
? low salaries in the public sector
79.3%
66.7%
64.7%
52.4%
78.0%
84.6%
62.2%
51.4%
60.0%
67.0%
86.8%
47.1%
76.5%
83.3%
82.2%
80.7%
87.2%
31.4%
88.4%
56.9%
90.0%
90.2%
81.4%
61.4%
73.7%
79.7%
85.2%
67.3%
72.9%
86.4%
92.9%
43.9%
72.9%
76.8%
90.2%
91.9%
93.3%
30.4%
98.4%
87.1%
82.0%
72.8%
69.0%
54.6%
76.9%
83.3%
68.0%
55.3%
63.2%
71.8%
88.3%
46.3%
75.6%
81.8%
84.2%
83.5%
88.8%
31.1%
90.9%
64.6%
According to the experts a conglomerate of causal factors was important to
explaining cases of public corruption and fraud in their country. Not surpris-
ingly, some factors related to developmental problems were considered more
important by respondents from lower income countries. These factors were
‘social inequality’, ‘low salaries in the public sector’, and ‘economic prob-
lems: inflation/recession’. The simple message here was that policies against
poverty and underdevelopment would contribute to establishing more integ-
rity in the public sector.
At the same time, there was much more agreement on the importance of
causes in differing contexts than expected. The three most important were
identical for higher and lower income countries, and most of the other most
important causes of corruption in higher income countries were important in
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lower income countries as well. In all parts of the world, rich or poor, cor-
ruption and fraud were associated with (1) the values and norms of individual
politicians and civil servants, (2) the lack of commitment to public integrity
of leadership, (3) organizational problems and failures (lack of control and
supervision and mismanagement), (4) the relationship between the public
sector and business, and (5) the increasing strength of organized crime.
What to think of these results? What is the use of presenting the aged
views of an expert panel in a new book on the causes of corruption? I of
course agree that the account presented is by definition questionable: the data
are empirically limited and the work is poor on theory. The research none-
theless shows that experts can combine and relate causal factors at different
levels in an analysis of corruption in their own countries. This makes me op-
timistic about the possibility of a comprehensive multi-level framework and
of moving forward, empirically and theoretically.
An important question then is whether the many ensuing studies on the
causes of corruption justify that optimism. The next section presents a selection
of that important work with studies on the macro, meso, and micro levels.
5. Multi-Studies on the Causes of Corruption
Introduction
In this section we summarize a number of studies on the causes of corruption,
concentrating first on macro level research, followed by meso and micro
studies. The sketch is meant to be illustrative, not at all pretending to select
the best studies nor present the state of the art.4
Macro Studies of Causes of Corruption
Two of the most quoted and famous contributions on the causes of corruption
are that of Treisman (2000) and Lambsdorff (2005).5 Both researchers focus
on the macro level, analyzing many countries and taking into account a lim-
ited number of primarily macro characteristics. Later, both authors reviewed
the enormous body of literature in their field that was published in the last
decade. Most of these studies use corruption perception data to assess cor-
ruption levels across countries. Many surveys ask businesspeople, citizens,
analysts and others to estimate the amount of corruption in countries (defined
in terms of the ‘abuse of power for personal gains’) and these data are com-
bined into indexes. Most often data from Transparency International or the
World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2007) are used.
                                                          
4 I also immediately acknowledge that I lean on studies familiar to me, in particular the work
of a number of esteemed VU colleagues.
5 Treisman (2000) with 891 hits on Google scholar and Lambsdorff (1999) at a distance sec-
ond with 163 hits (20-Jan-2009).
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Based on his review of the wave of empirical studies in 2005, Lambsdorff
concluded that corruption clearly correlates with a low Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP), income inequality, inflation, crime, policy distortions and lack of
competition. The direction of causality for these indicators, however, is con-
troversial. ‘Corruption may cause these variables but is at the same time
likely to be their consequence as well’ (2005: 27).
The general idea is that countries can be trapped in a vicious circle where
corruption lowers income, increases inequality, inflation, crime and policy
distortions, and helps monopolies at the expense of competition. These de-
velopments in turn escalate corruption. Lambsdorff adds that not all empiri-
cal results were consistent with his expectations on the causes of corruption:
‘For example, the disciplining and motivating effect of higher official wages was found to
be rather limited. Also the impact of colonialism on corruption was ambiguous. Press free-
dom and the (de facto) independence of the judiciary and prosecutors appeared to be im-
portant elements in reducing corruption. Increased corruption also resulted from compli-
cated regulation of market entry and tariffs. Corruption was found to increase with the
abundance of natural resources and with the distance to the major trading centers. How-
ever, these two latter results provide no direction for reform. The same is largely true of
cultural dimensions. In particular, a mentality of accepting hierarchies was found to in-
crease corruption.
Democracy obtained the expected positive impact on absence of corruption. However, this
impact was more complex. Only countries with high levels of democracy, or electoral sys-
tems with high rates of participation, are able to reduce corruption. Medium levels of de-
mocracy can even increase corruption. The effect of democracy is also not immediate but
takes decades rather than years. Thus, democracy reduces corruption in the long run, but
not the lukewarm type of democracy’ (2005: 27).
Another central scholar in this field, Daniel Treisman, reflected on the state
of the art in 2007 in ‘What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corrup-
tion from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?’ Treisman re-
viewed the efforts by political scientists and economists to explain cross-
national variations in corruption using subjective ratings, and examined the
robustness of reported findings (2007: 241):
‘We now know that states are perceived by business people and their citizens to be less
corrupt if they are highly developed, long-established liberal democracies, with a free and
widely read press, a high share of women in government, and a long record of openness to
international trade. Countries are perceived to be more corrupt if they depend on fuel ex-
ports, have intrusive business regulations, and suffer from unpredictable inflation.’
But like Lambsdorff, Treisman is skeptical about the causality of the relation-
ships. We cannot reliably say that most of these factors cause corruption per-
ceptions to be high or low, he states, although evidence of this is strongest for
economic development. Very important is that Treisman compares percep-
tion data on corruption with information on actual experiences of corruption.
The United Nations Crime Victims’ survey, the World Business Environment
Survey and Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer, for ex-
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ample, offer measures of how frequently citizens or business people encounter
demands for bribes in different countries. Treisman concludes (2007: 211):
‘Quite strong evidence suggests that highly developed, long-established liberal democracies,
with a free and widely read press, a high share of women in government, and a history of
openness to trade, are perceived as less corrupt. Countries that depend on fuel exports or have
intrusive business regulations and unpredictable inflation are judged more corrupt. Although
the causal direction is usually unclear, instrumenting with income as of 1700 suggests higher
development does cause lower perceived corruption. However, controlling for income, most
factors that predict perceived corruption do not correlate with recently available measures of
actual corruption experiences (based on surveys of business people and citizens that ask
whether they have been expected to pay bribes recently). Reported corruption experiences
correlate with lower development, and possibly with dependence on fuel exports, lower trade
openness, and more intrusive regulations. The subjective data may reflect opinion rather than
experience, and future research could usefully focus on experience-based indicators.’
Meso and Micro Studies of Corruption
Many studies on corruption and integrity at the meso and micro levels also
pay attention to the causes of corruption. To illustrate the line of reasoning
and empirical results, I will summarize a number of studies of the VU re-
search group Integrity of Governance that address the relationship between
cases of corruption and characteristics of the involved individuals and or-
ganization(s).
Lasthuizen (2008) investigated the relationship between leadership and
integrity violations in organizations via empirical work within a Dutch police
force. The research defined, conceptualized, and empirically operationalized
distinct notions of (ethical) leadership and integrity violation types, as well as
the mediating factors of ethical culture and moral judgment. Corruption ap-
peared to be a complex as well as very partial phenomenon among the integ-
rity violations the police is confronted with (Table 2). Corruption and fraud
in terms of bribing, favoritism (by supervisors and employees), fraud and
theft, and conflicts of interests were distinguished.
One finding was that the respondents perceived most types of integrity
violations seldom occurred in the direct work environment and judged them
unacceptable practices. However, the responses also suggested that favorit-
ism by supervisors, fraud, indecent treatment of colleagues and customers,
and waste and abuse may be more widespread, an observation that, for fraud,
coincides with a milder moral judgment (i.e., fewer respondents find this
violation unacceptable).
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Table 2: Moral Judgments on and Observed Frequency of Integrity Viola-
tions in the Police
Types of integrity violations Observed frequency
percentage
“never”
Acceptability
percentage
“never acceptable”
Corruption: bribing 96% 98%
Corruption: favoritism by supervisors 51% 64%
Corruption: favoritism by employees 80% 78%
Fraud 25% 25%
Theft 82% 96%
Conflict of interest through gifts 72% 60%
Conflict of interest through jobs 83% 57%
Improper use of authority 78% 83%
Misuse and manipulation of information 84% 89%
Discrimination against colleagues 85% 96%
Sexual harassment of colleagues 92% 99%
Indecent treatment of colleagues 54% 72%
Indecent treatment of customers 58% 80%
Waste and abuse 60% 85%
Private time misconduct 73% 71%
What caused these integrity violations? Lasthuizen focused on leadership types
as possible causes or explanations of what went wrong. She concluded that,
contrary to the assumptions prevalent in the literature, leadership is neither a
Eureka concept nor a panacea. Rather, the influence of the relationship between
leadership and the incidence and prevalence of integrity violations primarily
works indirectly through the ethical culture and employee moral judgments.
Only a few direct effects were established. Specifically, positive direct effects
(i.e., the limiting of integrity violations) were found for inspirational leadership
on favoritism by supervisors; and for role-modeling leadership on bribing, fa-
voritism by supervisors, and private time misconduct. However, negative direct
effects (i.e., the allowing of integrity violations) were observed for passive
leadership on waste and abuse, for integrity-focused leadership on discrimina-
tion against colleagues, and for unethical leadership on favoritism by supervi-
sors and manipulation and misuse of information.
Employee moral judgment appeared to be an important factor for limiting
the incidence and prevalence of integrity violations. If employees find a spe-
cific type of integrity violation unacceptable, fewer integrity violations of
that type will occur. Employee moral judgments can be influenced by the
ethical leadership styles of role-modeling and integrity-focused leadership.
Lasthuizen presented AMOS models to illustrate the various indirect paths
along which these total effects were reached (dependent on type of integrity
violation). Figure 2 presents the results on bribing.6 The arrows represent the
effect of the independent and intermediate variables on the dependent vari-
                                                          
6 Covariances were permitted between all leadership styles, as the correlational analysis has
shown that the leadership styles intercorrelate significantly.
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able, while the numbers represent the effect size; only significant standard-
ized betas are included.
To summarize: inspirational leadership causes bribing to be more (!)
prominent; result-oriented leadership is much less influential; role modeling
and integrity-focused leadership help to limit bribing.
Figure 2: Leadership Styles and Bribing
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Nature of Corruption
Another example of a study on the causes of corruption at the meso and mi-
cro levels is De Graaf’s work on the nature of corruption in the Netherlands.
The project was part of a broader study on corruption (Huberts/Nelen 2005).
Definitionally, ‘public officials are corrupt when they act (or fail to act) as a
result of receiving personal rewards from interested outside parties’. De
Graaf studied ten Dutch corruption cases in depth (De Graaf/Huberts 2008).
The confidential criminal case files, which included taped telephone conver-
sations, official reports, suspect interrogations, and witness interviews, were
studied thoroughly along with all available public sources such as newspaper
articles and court records. Fifteen interviews were held with the respective
case detectives and their superiors to glean as much as possible about the ac-
cused officials and their organizational context. Where possible, the proposi-
tions were compared with existing literature on the nature of corruption.
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The research findings on the nature of corruption derived from the ten
cases concerned (1) the individual corrupt official, (2) his or her organiza-
tional context, and (3) the relationship between the briber and corrupt official
(De Graaf/Huberts 2008). Among the conclusions and propositions were:
1. Next to material gain, the most important motives for officials to become
corrupt are friendship (or love), status, and making an impression on col-
leagues and friends.
2. Officials ‘slide’ toward corruption; most processes of becoming corrupt
can be considered a slippery slope.
3. Corruption rarely evolves from personal problems – financial, for exam-
ple – of the official. In no case studied here was there a conscious cost-
benefit calculation as to whether to accept bribes or not. In almost every
case, the process of becoming corrupt can be characterized as a gradual
one, a slippery slope.
4. Often, corrupt officials have dominant and strong personalities, know
how to ‘get things done’, take or get the freedom to do things independ-
ently, and overstep formal boundaries of authority. The more the public
official is a ‘business type’, the higher the risk of corruption.
5. In most corruption cases, supervision of the corrupt official is not strong.
In each of the criminal files of the ten cases, complaints were found about
the direct superior’s or the organization’s executives’ failing to supervise
the corrupt official.
6. In most corruption cases, management had not promoted a clear integrity
policy. Integrity was not an issue.
7. Because of loyalty and solidarity, colleagues are hesitant to report suspi-
cions of another’s corrupt activities. Signals of something ‘irregular’ sur-
faced before the corruption case was discovered; the signals, however,
were not properly handled.
8. The relationship between briber and the official is most often enduring.
The firmness of the relationships between the corrupt officials and their
bribers is notable.
9. Corrupt officials, including those who operate external ‘corrupt net-
works’, do not limit their corruption to one incident.
Bad Apples, Bad Barrels
Whether misbehavior and corruption is more a function of bad apples (per-
sonal characteristics) or bad barrels (organizational and societal variables) is
constantly debated in the literature. The evidence of the sketched multiple
case-study supports the argument of many social researchers (cf. Kish-
Gephart et al. 2010; Vardi/Weitz 2004) that (1) neither the individual nor the
organizational perspectives fully explain corruption, and (2) integrative ex-
planations are the most useful to explain corrupt behavior (De Graaf 2007).
So we need the combination of meso and micro, but what about macro?
The studies presented in the previous paragraph illuminated the importance
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of macro characteristics (as wealth, culture, democracy and the judicial sys-
tem) for the amount of corruption in a country. Should the metaphor of bad
apples and bad barrels be systematically completed by paying attention to
bad trees and bad orchards?
6. Conclusion and Discussion
Let me open for discussion and future research a number of concluding obser-
vations on a possible multi-approach in the study (of the causes) of corruption.
1. Reflection about the causes of corruption should start with a definition of
corruption.
We can work with many interpretations of the phenomenon, but clarity is
crucial. In this chapter, corruption was defined in terms of private profit from
public power. Corruption then includes types of behavior such as bribing, fa-
voritism, fraud, and conflict of interest.
2. Explaining corruption demands being explicit about the explanandum.
When the definition of corruption used is clear (private profit for public
power), it is also important to be specific about the explanandum. What ‘ef-
fect’ are we trying to explain? Are we interested in the causes of one specific
corruption case? Do we want to know what caused individual X, organization
Y, or party Z to become corrupt? Or is our interest more general, looking for
what causes individuals, organizations, parties, policy sectors, countries to
become corrupt? And if so, what type of corruption is the explanandum? Is
the focus on ‘grand corruption’ by elites in politics and administration
(Moody Stuart 1997) or ‘petty corruption’ by street-level bureaucrats?
The answers will vary with the chosen research question, including the
selected ‘effect’. When a police officer falls in love with a criminal, and ‘ex-
changes’ confidential information for love, the cause of the case clearly has
to do with that characteristic. No love, no corruption. It is also clear, how-
ever, that love is much less important to a more general explanation of the
corruption of individuals (let alone organizations and countries).
It is worthwhile to explain all types of corruption (cases). The more spe-
cific to the more general can be the topic of our research, but they require dif-
ferent frameworks of (micro, meso, and macro) factors that might be causally
relevant.
3. Reflecting on the cause of corruption (of a person, case, organization,
sector, country) presupposes taking into account a multitude of factors on
different levels.
A starting point for theoretical progress should be that all actual specific
cases of corruption are related to micro, meso, and macro level characteris-
tics and circumstances or causes.
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Even in the most specific cases of individual corruption, the influence of
multi-level causes can easily be recognized. Research has shown the impor-
tance of the lack of supervision and the absence of integrity policies, clearly
meso in character, but they will depend heavily on macro characteristics. In
the Netherlands, for example, government organizations are obliged by law
to formulate and evaluate integrity policies. On the opposite side of the spec-
trum, macro studies on the level of corruption in countries include variables
such as the salaries of public servants and the percentage of women in gov-
ernment.
Additionally we have to realize that all analyses of corruption will thus
have to take into account the interrelatedness of causal factors at different
levels. When we reflect on the causes of a specific case, the organizational
context matters (structure, culture, leadership, policy) as well the broader so-
cietal context, including the public’s moral values and norms. These factors
or causes are, of course, also related.
4. Conglomerates of factors matter at all levels, but not all factors matter.
Reflecting on the cause of corruption presupposes an idea of the necessary or
most influential factors among a collection of conditions that appear to be
leading to corruption.
It is easy to state that ‘factors at all levels matter’, but how can we prevent
getting lost in a complex mix of multi-level causes of corruption amidst an
infinite number of potentially relevant aspects and characteristics at the mi-
cro, meso, and macro levels (and their interrelationships). Selection is inevi-
table. What among the many relevant factors is really necessary in an ever-
complex context with many contributing factors?
Theories can provide information and expectations about the causes as
well as the causal mechanism (how cause brings about effect). Many chapters
in this book show how a theoretical framework can lead to a number of pos-
sibly relevant causes (leaving out many others). The specificity is under-
standable; it brings focus and understanding. The offered explanations, how-
ever, are often limited.
Another line of reasoning takes the results from empirical work as a
starting point to come to the conglomerate of factors to take into account. Re-
sults are collected, analyzed and combined, and detached from their theoreti-
cal embeddings. This might lead to conclusions and hypotheses to be tested
in further research. This eclectic approach may start at the different analytical
levels, micro-meso-macro, as I try in the brief summary of factors that fol-
lows. A next step should concentrate on establishing a framework that ex-
plicitly relates factors proven to be significant at the personal, group, organ-
izational, and national levels.
5. What matters: individual and micro.
At the individual and personal levels several characteristics are important.
The studies presented and existing multi-level frameworks have shown that
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character matters: strong personalities receive more bribes. Emotion can be
crucial too: falling in love makes us vulnerable. Neither can the economic
circumstances of the (public) functionary be ignored. If corruption is the only
strategy of ‘economic survival’, the result seems obvious unless the depend-
ency is contradicted by his or her personal and group values. These values are
directly related to the functionary’s general ideas about being treated right or
wrong (in the organization and in society). The resulting view on the accept-
ability of unethical behavior (including corruption) is an important interme-
diary factor explaining the resulting behavior.
6. What matters: work, group, organization, meso.
The type of work matters, which is often related to characteristics of the or-
ganization. At the group and organizational level the behavior and opinions
of direct colleagues and supervisors are influential as well as the content of
the job in terms of the power to decide about others. Discretion is conditional
to deciding because of inappropriate interests. This is directly related to the
type of function, the type of (durable) contacts with the outside world and the
embeddedness in a stable trustful network.
Within the organization important causes of corruption are lack of control
and supervision, failing (ethical) leadership, and a culture with values and
norms justifying or even demanding corruption. Failing policy on corruption
and integrity matters as well.
7. What matters: system, country, macro.
At the country level crucial factors seem to be the level and stability of eco-
nomic (under)development, the dependency on (fuel) exports, the relation-
ship between state and business, the social norms and values (perceived fair-
ness of the system), characteristics of the system of democratic accountability
(including press freedom and citizen participation) and, importantly, the
strength of the judicial system. Of course, these interrelate with factors men-
tioned that cause corruption at the individual and group levels.
8. Multi-types of causes.
Table 3 summarizes important individual, organizational and system factors,
which without exception belong to the agenda of the broad community of re-
searchers dealing with the causes of corruption. The framework nonetheless
sends a message to the many researchers involved in studying a limited seg-
ment of it.
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Table 3: Multi-Types of Corruption Causes
Individual
Character/personality, private economic circumstances, personal values (moral judgment), emotions,
discontent
Individual and work-related
Type of work, colleagues, relationships and (trustful) network, discretion, operational leader(ship)
Organizational
– Structure: lacking control/supervision, separation of responsibilities, discretion
– Culture: goals/mission, values and norms (informal and formal) on corruption, ethics
– Policies: integrity policy, reward system
– Failing leadership: operational, strategic
Environmental
Economic (high-low income; openness and trade)
Political-administrative (state-business, politics-bureaucracy)
Judicial (the system, rule of law)
Societal (norms and values, feelings of injustice, crime)
9. Multi-approach.
The real challenge results from the necessity to build theories that combine
the many multi-level factors in an interconnected framework for understand-
ing corruption. Let me end with the presentation of a very preliminary ex-
planatory framework of the types of causes of corruption.
Corruption in countries is first related to political, economic, and social
macro circumstances with, at the core, the idea that the amount of corruption
in a country will depend on the perceived fairness of the existing polity,
economy, and society. When parts of the population do not get their ‘fair’
share of the benefits in terms of power and wealth, private profit from public
power becomes a justifiable way of life. This is true for countries poor and
rich. The idea of fairness might be expected to coincide with the morals of
citizens, including their views on the acceptability of corrupt behavior.
Not all organizations and individuals will become corrupt, however; what
they do is influenced by the macro social, economic, and political context.
Organizational and individual factors also matter.
Political and bureaucratic corruption can be limited or stimulated by meso
factors. The closer the organizational relationships between politicians and
bureaucrats and between those functionaries and business, the higher the
public corruption and the more corrupt the country. One aspect of the rela-
tionship is organizations and sectors having something ‘to offer’ (business
sectors such as fuel and construction seem important). Another is what the
organizational policy and leadership in words and deeds signal to the individ-
ual and the group about the acceptability of corruption. If corruption is ac-
cepted practice throughout the organization, the individual or group cannot
be expected to behave differently. However, having leaders and policies ex-
press the importance of ethics and integrity is no guarantee for similar micro
behavior. Some will still become corrupt because of private circumstances
Leo W.J.C. Huberts164
(love, finances), character and values (personal motives and views on cor-
ruption), and opportunity (risk of discovery, sanctions expected as well as
work discretion and nature of the services). Being dissatisfied with the or-
ganization seems very important in this respect.
Many individual and organizational factors are also characteristics of the
macro or country level. A country’s culture can be more or less individualistic,
repressive, or tolerant; a country’s systems of political, bureaucratic, private, and
business organizations can be more or less interconnected and tight, rely more or
less on compliance and sanctions or on integrity and values, give employees
more or less discretion, and so on. Research on the corruptness of countries of-
ten ignores such types of ‘macro’ characteristics, which is a pity. In that sense,
the criticism of many micro-meso researchers that macro researchers ignore the
‘real’ context of actual corruption (cases) is correct. We need to become more
sensitive to consequences of multi-level interplay on the research that is done.
However, this is also true for the criticasters. When micro-meso researchers
picture the causes of a specific corruption case, they often ignore the broader
macro context. Politics, culture, economics do matter and are often reflected in
a specific ‘context’ of behavior. What we lack are comparative case studies in
different countries on the amount and character of corruption. Micro studies are
too ‘local’; macro studies too monotonous in the variables studied.
The interrelationship between causes at different levels will have to be ex-
plored further. To conclude this chapter, I summarize a first general idea for the
direction of that exploration. Each level of analysis seems to have some very
specific factors, causes, conditions, or variables but a number of related areas
could be given more attention. Table 4 summarizes the argument.
Table 4: Multi-Approach for Further Research
Type
of factor
Level
Culture
Values
Economics Political / or-
ganization
Policy: com-
pliance and
integrity
Injustice
Discontent
Other
factors
Macro /
national
social
values
culture
economic
situation
state-busi-
ness
politics-ad-
ministration
politics-so-
ciety (net-
works)
judicial sys-
tem;
law;
integrity
policy
feelings of
injustice
social discon-
tent
crime
Meso /
organiza-
tional
organiza-
tional val-
ues, cul-
ture
reward sys-
tem
control sys-
tem
job discre-
tion
leadership
norms and
sanctions
leadership
integrity pol-
icy
discontent in
organization
reward sys-
tem
policy sector
Micro /
individual
personal
values,
moral
judgment
personal
financial
situation
relationships
(internal, ex-
ternal)
type of work
moral judg-
ment
risk of pun-
ishment
individual dis-
content and
frustration
(society,
work, job)
character
emotions
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Individual character, personality, and emotions seem rather specific but may
be related to the broader culture. The personal values and moral judgment are
almost by definition related to and influenced by organizational and social
values and the same is apparent for the personal economic or financial situa-
tion, the organizational reward system, and the state of the economy. Factors
stemming from the political and organizational structure also find their
counterparts in characteristics as the relationships at work and the amount of
discretion of the individual (and the group). Very important and under re-
searched is the relationship between feelings of injustice and frustration at
the different levels.
Two last additional remarks are important. First, the mechanisms and
conditions causing corruption should of course not be limited to the columns
in the table. Values and culture, economics, politics and social structure are
interrelated and causes of corruption will entail different dimensions.
Second, the selection of types of factors obviously depends on the spe-
cific question that we are trying to answer. The explanation of an individual
case of corruption asks for another set of factors than the explanation of the
amount of corruption of a country. What the Multi Approach adds is the need
for more sensitivity concerning the multi-level and multi-factor character of
causal relationships. A more comprehensive framework might contribute to
our understanding of the complex corruption phenomenon as well as help to
connect the different approaches sketched in this book.
Chapter 10:
Concepts, Causes, and the Neglected Third
Party: the Victim of Corruption                    
Gjalt de Graaf, Patrick von Maravic, and
Pieter Wagenaar    
1. Introduction
Corruption: we all have an idea about what it is, and we all have more or less
experience with it. It is an object of research that inspires numerous – and di-
verse, as this book manifestly proves – academic endeavors. While many may
have known that the concept of corruption is essentially contested and its defi-
nitions various, The Good Cause shows that the differences in academia travel
farther and deeper than the differences in definition. Within different discourses
specific ideas exist on what the research questions are, what they should be,
and how knowledge on corruption can be gained. In other words, the differ-
ences are not only on the level of what the object of research is or should be;
the epistemologies within The Good Cause differ profoundly. One example
would be ‘empirical studies’. In institutional economics it translates primarily
to employing a range of clever devices to generate quantitative estimates, but in
criminological studies it means studying actual corruption cases – two entirely
different interpretations within the same area of research. The reason for the
epistemological differences has also become clear: the underlying ontologies
are different. In some areas of corruption research – the Rose-Ackerman chap-
ter for example – the ontology is not part of the (mostly positivist) research; in
other areas, like the Hiller, and the De Graaf, Wagenaar, and Hoenderboom
chapters, it is. In a sense, therefore, corruption research reflects social science
research in general. It demonstrates how research in the social sciences and
humanities differs from the beta sciences where paradigm shifts take place, but
not many paradigms exist at the same time. Collier (Collier 2002) is right when
he states that an interdisciplinary theory on the causes of corruption never
emerged. He is also right when he claims that it is because corrupt behavior is
extremely complex social behavior – but even that is only the beginning of the
explanation. Corruption research attracts people whose ideas on what the social
world is are so fundamentally different that a new interdisciplinary approach is
not likely to emerge. It is worth noting here that the various approaches’ units
of analysis also differ widely, a detail discussed later in the chapter.
Beyond the definitions, methodologies, epistemologies, and ontologies,
the concept of ‘causes’ also varies profoundly. In the introduction we dis-
cussed the philosophy of causality, in which we can distinguish epistemo-
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logical and ontological traditions (Schinkel 2004). Here we can say on a
practical level that what some call ‘causes’ of corruption others describe as
‘contributing factors’, ‘motives’, or ‘enhancing circumstances’. And in many
cases it is perhaps better to speak of studies trying to ‘understand’ corruption
rather than to ‘explain’ it (compare Weber 1921). Rose-Ackerman points out
that in most economical studies the consequences of corruption are difficult
to distinguish from the causes; the causal arrow appears to be bi-directional.
In sum (and unsurprisingly), because the differences in approaches are great,
so are the differences in the book’s chapters.
Whereas different paradigms in the beta sciences lead to conflicts until
one is ‘proven right’, in The Good Cause, we find a kind of stalemate. On
one side are universalists, who work with a definition of corruption they as-
sume to be the same everywhere in the world; on the other are particularists,
who have no specific definition of corruption, expect that corruption defini-
tions can differ widely between cultures or social groups, and find benefit in
studying the differences. In the next section we discuss the differences be-
tween the approaches, and follow with sections on their similarities. We con-
clude by pointing at blind spots in existing corruption research and discussing
the (im)possibility of finding an ultimate remedy.
2. Understanding and Researching Corruption
Weberian approaches use ideal-type guided research, comparative, and histori-
cal research. Causes of corruption are located in the wider context of a specific
form of domination and personal rulership (cf. Rubinstein/von Maravić, this
volume). An explicit understanding and legally-sanctioned definition of
corruption comes into existence with the separation of private household and
public office, which occurs with the rise of a bureaucratic system; the legal-
rational system is dominated by an explicit rule system that sanctions the use of
public power for private means. The unit of analysis is the system of govern-
ance. Corruption occurs when one system slowly makes way for another.
F.W. Riggs’s theory is Weberian in the sense that corruption is typical of
a developing society, especially in his use of ideal types, but he veers off
from Weber by taking a structural-functionalist approach. According to
Riggs, societies consist of structures with functions. ‘Fused’ societies have
very few structures, each of which fulfills many functions. ‘Diffracted’ so-
cieties are the opposite, i.e., they have many structures fulfilling few func-
tions each. Corruption occurs in the intermediate stage of development – in
the ‘prismatic’ society – from the friction between the fused and diffracted
logic. Riggs then explains the peculiar logic of such prismatic societies and
shows how fused practices are often hidden behind diffracted facades.
In terms of institutional economics, corruption occurs where private
wealth and public power overlap; institutional frameworks determine the na-
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ture and the extent of its opportunities. The units of analysis can be countries,
organizations or individuals, even though economic theory is poorly
equipped to explain variation across individuals who face the same structural
incentives. Preferred research techniques are survey methods and experi-
ments.
The multi-approach by definition uses a multitude of levels, analyses, and
all possible research methods. Beginning with one (classic) definition of cor-
ruption – the abuse of (public) authority for private benefit – it is the most
comprehensive attempt of all the approaches in this book to arrive at an in-
terdisciplinary framework. At the country level, for example, corruption is
related to political, economic, and social macro circumstances. This frame-
work observes causes of corruption at all possible levels.
Systems theory has a very distinct approach. Corruption is seen as the
linkage of different horizons of meaning in social communication. The re-
search question stemming from it is how the linkages of meaning come
about. Corruption arises when organizations (networks, groups, individuals)
assigned to particular functional contexts fail to uphold the appropriate func-
tional logic in their decisions. How is the corruption observed? By whom? –
These are the possible research questions with which to start. We can think of
studying the structural conditions that must be observed for a phenomenon to
become the subject of a moral discourse and for corruption to be potentially
labeled reprehensible.
Institutional design looks primarily at meso and macro levels. Differences
between regimes represent different sets of institutions that may (or may not)
be able to constrain behavior. The concept of corruption captures behavior
that is beyond the pale of what is commonly accepted in industrialized de-
mocracies; behavior that undermines fairness and probity in governing makes
it apparent to the public that appropriate standards of integrity are not being
followed by public officials. Some doubts remain about the relevance of
macro-level political structures for explaining corruption: the basic outcome
of Peters’ analysis in this book is that any simple understanding of institu-
tions as structures or rule systems is incapable of shedding much light on the
likelihood of good governance. According to Peters so much difference exists
between the regime types that making predictions is next to impossible. The
causal linkage between institutional structures and the behavior of individuals
within them is so attenuated that attempting to explain corruption on an indi-
vidual level is difficult.
De Graaf, Wagenaar, and Hoenderboom state that, from a constructivist
perspective, any interpretation of corruption and its causes is contestable.
Some overlap with the Hiller chapter is clear. Their unit of analysis is dis-
course, not (corrupt) agents on the individual level, and they study the effects
of texts on other texts. Included in this approach are historical and genealogi-
cal studies that illustrate how discourses on corruption are always socially
and historically constructed.
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Criminological approaches look at corruption as deviating from legal
standards. Several criminological theories exist, but most employ three ele-
ments at three levels: motivation, opportunity, and control at the individual,
organizational, and environmental levels. Units of analysis are both individu-
als and organizations, sometimes even the state. The empirical studies in this
approach turn out to be unexpectedly limited, dealing mostly with the role of
organized crime in corruption. Data used for research are partly produced by
law enforcement agencies and gathered directly from offenders or victims.
Most corruption research in criminology is thus qualitative in the form of in-
terviews, participant observation, and case-studies.
3. Corruption and Morality
One of the similarities in the different academic discourses that struck us is
the agreement that corruption, both conceptually and empirically, has a clear
moral connotation. Rose-Ackerman for example points out that where some
institutional economists claim to be purely positive, their analyses also con-
tain normative aspects. Hiller writes that the social observation of corruption
is a matter of moral communication. All researchers, regardless of their ap-
proach, seem to agree that the phenomenon they study is part of a moral dis-
course. De Graaf, Wagenaar, and Hoenderboom point out that by describing
discourse on corruption, moral aspects come to the fore. Hiller even goes so
far as to state that the moral observation of corruption is one of the most ex-
citing areas of corruption research.
Moral norms change over time and place, but corruption – whatever it is –
is always considered reprehensible. People disagree about the norms that de-
termine whether someone is corrupt, not about the concept’s reprehensive-
ness. Anyone labeled ‘corrupt’ is judged in a morally negative way. Corrup-
tion is therefore morally loaded – like ‘integrity’, but with an opposite moral
loading. In the De Graaf, Wagenaar, and Hoenderboom chapter attention is
drawn to the consequences of being so labeled. Several Dutch civil servants
convicted for corruption in a court of law admitted they did something
wrong, but denied being ‘corrupt’. As Hiller quotes Fleck and Kuzmicks
(1985: 7): ‘what is considered morally reprehensible and whether certain be-
havior is considered in this way varies from time to time (and from place to
place), but the fact that attributing the label is equivalent to an evaluation is
as good as unaffected by social change.’
Officials can also be certain ‘degrees’ of corrupt. A public official illicitly
receiving €5000 is ‘more’ corrupt than one receiving €500. And, research
shows, people regard a police officer who asks for €20 from a driver to
overlook a speeding ticket as being more corrupt than one who accepts €20
when it is offered to him. A comparison of research on public attitudes to-
wards corruption concludes:
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 ‘Over and over, the research found that respondents judged elected officials more severely
than they judged appointed officials; judges more severely than police officers; bribery and
extortion more harshly than conflict of interest, campaign contribution, and patronage; and
harmful behavior more harshly than petty behavior” (Malec 1993: 16).
The authors of The Good Cause differ on how to deal with morality sur-
rounding corruption. Some start out with a corruption definition, which
means presupposing a clear boundary between right and wrong; others be-
lieve such boundaries vary with cultures. De Zwart points out that in Riggs’s
view, the principles and techniques of modern public administration reflect
the normative structure of Western societies. Corruption is even defined as
normlessness. But of course then the relevant norms become important (cf.
Huberts, this volume). Transplanted to another culture, Western corruption is
still morally wrong in Western eyes, but not in a different normative struc-
ture. De Zwart points to the basic problem of moral relativism: to deny it is
cultural imperialism, but to accept is to ‘tolerate barbarity and atrocity in
those cultures. Damned if we do and damned if we don’t – either way the
prospects are bleak’ (Aya 2004: 31). This is similar to Rose-Ackerman’s
pointing out that the meaning of ‘misuse’ may indeed vary across cultures.
4. Public Corruption and the Outside World
We have noted that in most approaches the relationship between public and
private is important. Most speak of corruption as abuse of public power and
in doing so make a public-private distinction. Collusive public-private rela-
tionships also contribute to corruption. Huisman and Vande Walle ask
whether the legal definition of corruption encompasses the socially injurious
relations between companies. We can ask the same about non-legal defini-
tions.
What we see in many chapters – the one on criminology, for example – is
that close relations between private and public partners contribute to certain
forms of corruption. Huisman and Vande Walle: ‘In comparing lobbying and
corruption Campos and Giovanni have suggested that legal mechanisms such
as lobbying are preferred in rich countries while companies in poor countries
have to rely on corruption’ (Campos/Giovanni 2006). Huisman and Vande
Walle point to Shichor and Geis whose survey on transnational bribery con-
firmed that businessmen often escape disapproval: people think accepting a
bribe is worse than offering a bribe (Shichor/Geis 2007). One explanation for
this underestimation is that criminologists for a long time have shown re-
straint in interfering with private enterprises. The same seems to hold for
most other approaches. For example, Peters points to clientelism, in which a
powerful patron provides his clients favors in exchange for political support
(see also Rubinstein/von Maravić, this volume). Both Rose-Ackerman and
Peters wonder where ‘pork barreling’ ends and corruption begins.
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At present the relations between public and private organizations in most
countries are rapidly changing because of developments like New Public
Management, privatization, outsourcing, hybridization, and public-private
partnerships. Do the increasingly blurred boundaries between public and pri-
vate sectors mean that we can expect more corruption in the future (see Doig
1995, 1997, 1998; Erlingsson et al. 2008; Kolthoff et al. 2007; von Ma-
ravić/Reichard 2003; von Maravić 2007)? And what are the consequences for
corruption studies? After all, most approaches use the public-private distinc-
tion to make the corruption concept clear, instead of victims, and most look
differently at corruption in public versus private organizations. Thus when
the sectors get blurred, the concept changes meaning and, in turn, influences
future research endeavors.
5. Fighting Corruption: Now What?
Different approaches come with different solutions. Weber was interested in
how legitimate political and economic order is created and maintained. His
work illustrates how a society effectively restrains certain forms of behavior
and encourages others. The metaphor of the ‘iron cage’ implies that corrup-
tion occurs when the system of legal-rational dominance is not yet complete;
loopholes remain for the bureaucrat’s private motives. In other words, the
distinction between the private-public role is not clearly delineated, offering a
gateway for deviating behavior that could stem from inexplicit rules, subop-
timal methods of sanctioning and supervision, an inferior system of recruit-
ment, or an organizational ethos that has not been fully penetrated by the of-
ficial structure. A Weberian approach to fighting corruption would therefore
focus on the separation of the public-private domain, the formalization of
rules, and a clear public office ethos. This collectivist vision (Hood 2000: 73-
97; du Gay 2000: 1-13, 136-148) clashes, however, with the global Zeitgeist
of privatizing public functions, deregulating, outsourcing, public-private
partnerships, and other forms of hybrid governance.
Nor does the prismatic view in non-Western countries offer clear anti-
corruption or prevention interventions. We either await normative change, or
accept that administrations are corrupt. There is much skepticism – as with
postmodern and system analytical accounts – about good governance pro-
grams and Western interventions promoted through institutions like the
World Bank. We cannot transplant Western-designed administrative models
and practices into a different normative order and expect them to function.
And although De Zwart points to the work of Johnston, claiming, ‘[f]rom his
work it follows that articulating group interests, stimulating politics, state
formation, and bottom-up organizations can help the ‘good government
cause’’, Rose-Ackerman points out that even documented damage from
grand-corruption can escape the power or political will to be systematically
Gjalt de Graaf, Patrick von Maravic, and Pieter Wagenaar172
changed – another bleak picture. Institutional design does not come with
clear, institutional or otherwise, recommendations on how to prevent corrup-
tion.
Then there are scholars who claim that deep historical factors are the de-
terminants of corruption and that countries cannot escape their history. The
important issue from a policy perspective is whether the factors contributing
to corruption are exogenous or whether people react to others’ behavior. As
with every academic approach, institutional economics wants to address what
it sees as the underlying conditions (factors, causes, incentives) that create
corrupt incidents, meaning promoting incentive-based policy responses like
rearranging the rewards and costs of honest and corrupt behavior. Yet,
‘[c]lever technical solutions, based on economic incentives, may not be enough. If corrup-
tion is one of the pillars supporting a political system, it cannot be substantially reduced
unless an alternative source of revenue replaces it. Powerful groups that lose one source of
patronage will search for another vulnerable sector. Strong moral leadership is necessary
but not sufficient. Tough political and policy choices need to be faced squarely’ (cf. Rose-
Ackerman, this volume).
Hiller concludes that differentiation theory cannot lead to recommendations
on how to combat corruption. Huisman and Vande Walle emphasize the im-
portance of leadership in ethical conduct and corruption prevention. No
chapter disputes this; in fact, every approach that looks at organizational-
level culture makes this point.
Post-positivist students of corruption are also careful with recommending
remedies for corruption. They point to the problem of interpretations of cor-
ruption and the negative side effects of a corruption fight. What they do have
to offer, however, is reflection.
Collier wrote (2002: 2): ‘Additionally, my analysis demonstrates that the
corruption phenomenon is so complex that it can only be addressed through
grassroots changes in a state’s political, economic, and cultural institutions –
changes that are not only technical but also social in nature’. Indeed, no Good
Cause author disagrees with that or suggests catching and punishing ‘rotten
apples’. A conclusion of this book is, however, that agreeing on ‘cause’ is
impossible, let alone a or the cause of corruption – a problem if we want to
conclude with ideas on how to fight it. The many remedies named in this
book are helpful in the sense they can better the design of organizations and
influence cultures in such a way that it lessens corruption. Even so, De Graaf,
Wagenaar, and Hoenderboom warn us about unintended consequences.
Another problem is that the literature suggests many such devices, but
which works under what circumstances at how much of a cost is unclear.
When is a certain type of leadership important? How do we make sure public
ethos continues to support traditional public values? Since these theories do
not offer a premise on the cause(s) of corruption and are based on general re-
search and broad correlations, they do not say much about contingency,
which is so important for social research – especially corruption research be-
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cause of its complexity. This is an important point made by Anechiarico and
Jacobs (1996) in their comprehensive classic study in New York City. The
authors documented and analyzed the manifold liabilities of a vast range of
corruption control projects. They showed how corruption control mecha-
nisms, which might make sense when based on general research, might not
work in a specific context. ‘You name the anticorruption reform, the authors
point out its severe organizational liabilities’ (Silverman 1998: 182). And
how do we fill the gap noted by Van Hulten (2002: 182), who said that al-
most no empirical studies offer conclusions about which anti-corruption
methods work under what circumstances? The literature currently offers
much confusion. ‘The right mix of corruption controls will undoubtedly dif-
fer from governmental unit and from agency to agency within the same gov-
ernmental unit. Moreover, the optimal mix changes over time’ (Anechi-
arico/Jacobs 1996: 198). It is safe to say we know next to nothing about
which corruption controls are most efficient under different circumstances.
Take, for example, the installment of ‘integrity systems’ proposed by Trans-
parency International. Is it successful in preventing corruption? Perhaps.
Gilman (2000) and Huberts (2000) seem to think so. Others, however
(Anechiarico/Jacobs 1996; Brown 1999; Cooper 1998), disagree and would
probably maintain that the programs would be ineffective at best.
The diversity of answers given by the authors in this book is a function of
the empirical complexity of the phenomenon itself, different research foci,
and various epistemological and ontological traditions. It is easy to lament
the cacophony of corruption analyses and the non-unitary state of the social
and behavioral sciences, but this does not help reduce corruption. We should
abandon the idea of a ‘scientific law’ in the sense of Hempel and Oppenheim
(1948: 152), one that has the quality of a ‘true statement’ and forever deter-
mines a ‘treatment’ for corruption.
We do not, however, propose to give up the effort to seek causal knowl-
edge. Reflective causal knowledge is essential for decision makers to adapt to
external challenges, especially to knowledge that indicates manipulable causes.
Causality in the behavioral and social sciences also has a temporal dimension,
which makes causal explanation highly dependent on context. If we are ana-
lytically and practically confronted with such a complex social phenomenon as
corruption, and choose to reflect on it, perhaps the most important contribution
of this book is to remind us that there are different ways of conceptualizing
corruption and we have offered different pathways to reflect critically on our
own approaches. We should always be aware that the type of analytical lens we
choose determines what we will propose to do about corruption. We should
avoid dangerous conceptual lock-ins and getting trapped in the Achilles’ heel
of each strategy. What some might call ‘a bewildering cacophony’ we see as
desirable pluralism enriching the analytical toolbox for phenomena that cannot
be ignored, are complex, and deserve complex answers. No more or less, at
least for the moment, can we take for given.
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What this book clearly shows is that every approach sees different prob-
lems with corruption and has different solutions. Relevant contingencies pro-
hibit us from testing what works under what conditions. Finding one clear
solution remains an illusion. After reading all the chapters, it becomes clear
that the theoretical model chosen to a large degree determines the direction of
the proposed solutions (cf. Peters, this volume). Different causal chains, or
even ideas about causality, lead to different discourses on corruption preven-
tion and corruption control. The logical consequence of multiple causes can
only be multiple answers. But in what combination and what doses? As yet
we do not know, and in the end it depends, despite all attempts to reach uni-
versal answers, on the single case and tailor-made solutions. What can be
said from other fields in which institutional design plays a significant role –
for instance, common-pool resource problems (Ostrom/Walker/Gardner
1994) or grid-group concept (Douglas 1970; cf. also Hood 2000) – is that
sustainable institutional solutions depend on the combination of different in-
stitutional strategies – be they hierarchical, competitive, or trust-based – to
overcome each one’s inherent vulnerability.
Despite all this, we end with a strategy that might help in fighting corrup-
tion. The idea stems from the realization that most research approaches pay
little attention to the victims of corruption except in a very general way, e.g.,
some corruption is related to underdevelopment and poverty, and the poor
generally suffer the most. Little research exists on direct victims of specific
corrupt relationships. Attention to the third party in a corrupt relationship, the
‘end user’ of corruption, is largely missing.
Several approaches mention that those involved in corruption deny doing
or intending harm. Perpetrators try to avoid the concept of ‘corruption’ and
thus disengage their actions from moral discourse. Part of a strategy to fight
corruption is for corruption researchers, whatever their approach, to empha-
size and highlight the moral aspects of corruption and corruption cases. Who,
in the end, is the victim? What, precisely, is the harm? Identifying the victims
and damage gives corruption a face and a voice. And we know from moral
theory that victims who can be seen and heard receive attention.
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